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ABSTRACT 
This thesis captures the assignment of functions and resources to the national, provincial 
and local spheres of government in South Africa, and provides an assessment of the 
functionality of this assignment. The perspective of fiscal federalism is used as the ana-
lytical tool for this assessment. The discussion, in the second chapter, of considerations 
in the design of fiscal federalism generates the conceptual reference frameworks neces-
sary for the assessment of the South African system. It also outlines the impact of con-
stitutional provisions on fiscal arrangements in a country, an aspect that is further ex-
plored in the third chapter. This chapter highlights some of the key choices, relating to 
fiscal design, that negotiators were faced with during the deliberations on the new South 
Mrican Constitution. A detailed analysis of fiscal federalism in South Africa follows in 
the fourth chapter. The fifth chapter concludes that there is substantial congruence be-
tween the expenditure assignment recommended by economic theory and that outlined 
in the South African Constitution of 1996. Revenue assignment, on the other hand, re-
mains centralised although the theoretical framework indicates a number of sources suit-
able for decentralisation. While the South African Constitution allows for provincial 
taxation powers, these have yet to be implemented. The analysis indicates that further 
developments of the system of intergovernmental transfers and grants should be con-
cerned with ensuring revenue adequacy for all spheres, providing incentives for sound 
financial management, and maximising predictability. The conclusion also argues in fa-
vour of activating the constitutional borrowing powers of provinces to enable a greater 
focus on developmental expenditures. Corruption and a lack of administrative capacity in 
some subnational authorities, national mandates imposed on provinces without detailed 
costing and impact analysis, and rising provincial personnel costs all impede the smooth 
running of decentralised government in South Africa. Nevertheless, economic theory 
indicates that the constitutional assignment of responsibilities and resources to the dif-
ferent spheres in South Africa should not be adjusted for the sake of greater efficiency. 
Instead, the challenge remains to implement the system fully and to manage transitional 
difficulties proactively. Decentralisation includes a learning process, and newly created 
structures and institutions need to be developed and strengthened before they can deliver 
the full benefits of decentralisation. 
iv 
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OPSOMMING 
Hierdie tesis analiseer die toedeling van funksies en hulpbronne aan die nasionale, 
provinsiale en plaaslike sfere van regering in Suid-Afrika. Die bespreking van die oor-
wegings in die ontwerp van fiskale federalisme in hoofstuk twee genereer die nodige kon-
septuele verwysingsraamwerke vir die waardering van die Suid-Afrikaanse sisteem. Hier-
die hoofstuk oorweeg ook die impak van grondwetlike bepalings op fiskale reelings, 'n 
aspek wat verder verken word in die derde hoofstuk. Hierdie hoofstuk bring van die 
sleutel besluite na vore waardeur die onderhandelaars gekonfrontreer is tydens die 
beraadslaging oor die nuwe Suid-Afrikaanse grondwet. 'n Gedetaileerde analise van 
fiskale federalisme in Suid-Afrika volg in die vierde hoofstuk. Die vyfde hoofstuk kom 
tot die gevolgtrekking dat daar wesentlike kongruensie is tussen die toedeling van 
funksies soos omskryf in ekonomiese teorie en die Suid-Afrikaanse grondwet van 1996. 
Die toedeling van inkomste, daarenteen, is gesentraliseerd selfs al wys die teoretiese 
raamwerk op heelparty inkomstebronne wat gepas is vir desentralisasie. Terwyl die Suid-
Afrikaanse grondwet voorsiening maak vir provinsiale belastingsmagte, moet daar nog 
hiervoor voorsiening gemaak word deur wetgewing. Die analise dui aan dat verdere 
ontwikkeling van die sis teem van tussen regeringsoordragte en -toewysings voorsiening 
moet maak vir inkomstetoereikendheid vir alle sfere, aansporings moet voorsien vir be-
troubare finansiele bestuur, en voorspelbaarheid moet maksimaliseer. Die slotsom argu-
menteer ook ten gunste van die aktivering van grondwetlike leenmagte van provinsies ten 
einde 'n groter fokus op ontwikkelings-uitgawes moontlik te maak. Korrupsie en die af-
« 
wesigheid van administratiewe kapasiteit in sekere subnasionale owerhede, nasionale ver-
pligtings wat aan provinsies opgedring word sonder gedetaileerde kosteberekening en 
uitwerkingsanalise, en die groei in provinsiale personneeluitgawes belemmer almal die 
gladde funksionering van gedesentraliseerde regering in Suid-Afrika. Desnieteenstaande 
dui ekonomiese teorie aan dat die konstitusionele toedeling van verantwoordelikhede en 
hulpbronne aan die verskillende sfere in Suid-Afrika nie verander behoort te word ten 
gunste van groter effektiwiteit nie. Die uitdaging is eerder om die sisteem ten volle te im-
plimenteer en om oorgangprobleme proaktief te bestuur. Desentralisasie sluit 'n leerpro-
ses in en nuut-geskepde strukture en instellings moet ontwikkel en vesterk word sodat 
hulle die volle voordele van desentralisasie kan lewer. 
v 
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
A world-wide trend towards fiscaJ decentralisation1 has emerged over the past decades. 
This development has not only occurred in federal countries, but also in unitary states 
with a previous record of centralisation (fer-Minassian 1997a, Tanzi 1996: 296-297).2 
In South Africa, there is a history of dispute over decentralisation. The 1910 Union of 
South Africa was negotiated in the aftermath of the Anglo-Boer war. Representatives 
from the former independent Boer republics demanded substantial autonomy for pro-
vincial structures, while delegates from the two British colonies argued for a strong cen-
tral government. 3 For much of this century, the four provinces4 on the territory of white 
South Africa acted mainly as administrative extensions of the national government. The 
constitutionally weak status of these entities was underlined when the Provincial Govern-
ment Act (1986) replaced elected provincial legislatures with executive authorities ap-
pointed by the state president and headed by an administrator (Dollery 1998: 129). 
The National Party (NP) government, which came to power in 1948, introduced the 
philosophy of apartheid. State partition became the declared aim as its policies unfolded. 
The nationalists pursued the regional concentration of the black majority, based on a se-
ries of conso.lidation plans. Land set aside for blacks was developed into a system of ten 
"homelands" along ethnic lines in the 1970s. Of these structures the Transkei, Bophut-
1 Decentralisation describes a shift of functional responsibilities and / or resources to lower levels of gov-
ernment. Wolman (1990: 37) notes four operational definitions: (1) the range and importance of functions 
performed by subnational governments, (2) the autonomy given to subnational units through the legal re-
lationship between national and subnatipnal government, (3) the extent to which subnational governments 
are able to capture public sector resources, and (4) the degree of dependence of subnational governments 
on national government finance. Summary indicators, made up of all four elements, are most comprehen-
sive as the definitions Wolman offers also reflect different aspects of decentralisation. 
2 While in a unitary state ultimate political control rests with the central government, a federal state is based 
on the (usually constitutional) assignment of powers to different levels of government. The distinction will 
be discussed further in the second chapter. 
3 For the purpose of this analysis, the terms "provinces", "states" and "Under" all describe governments at 
a regional level, between national and local government, since such regional authorities are named differ-
endy across countries. Throughout the text, the term "subnational governments" is used as a summary 
term describing all governments within a country other than the central, federal or national government, 
whichever of the latter names is applicable in a given case. 
4 Namely the Cape Province, the Free State, Natal and Transvaal. 
1 
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hatswana, Venda and the Ciskei (the so-called "TBVC states") were given "independ-
ence" that was not recognised beyond South Africa. Under an elaborate resettlement 
scheme, an estimated 1.7 million people were displaced between 1960 and 1983 alone to 
"whiten" the territory of the republic, comprising all areas that did not form part of the 
homeland territories. The numbers of those "removed" from the white republic under 
resettlement programmes were swollen by those who were displaced from the urban ar-
eas under various influx control measures and forced to move to the homelands (Chris-
topher 1994: 65-102). 
The constitutional negotiations in the early 1990s signalled the end of this system of 
apartheid, and sought to achieve a peaceful transition to democracy and majority rule (De 
Villiers 1994a). One fundamental question that had to be addressed was what form of 
state the future South Africa should have, unitary or federal. 
Party positions on the question of federalism in the initial negotiating forum, the Con-
vention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), varied greatly. The governing NP, 
which had previously centralised the apartheid state by scrapping elected provincial leg-
islatures, reversed to a decentralised strategy hoping to retain some political power at 
subnationallevel. The regionally-based Inkatha Freedom Party (IFF), too, was a strong 
supporter of federalism (e.g. IFF et aI1993).5 The liberation alliance of the African Na-
tional Congress (ANC), to the contrary, feared that autonomous provinces would de-
crease its ability to govern, entrench existing disparities and could form the basis for divi-
sive tribal politics. The party supported provinces as a vehicle for greater participation in 
democratic and developmental processes, rather than opposing centres of political power 
(Besdziek 1998). 
The interim Constitution6 of 1993 reflected the compromises reached during the initial 
rounds of negotiations.? Its schedule 4 contained 34 constitutional principles which pro-
5 Although the IFP boycotted much of the negotiating process, the party ended up participating in the 
founding elections at the eleventh hour. The party's recently proposed constitutional amendments seek to, 
inter alia, increase provincial autonomy (IFP 1998). The IFP proposes eliminating perceived constraints 
hindering policy formulation by provinces, giving provinces the power to settle boundary disputes, 
strengthening the role of provincial constitutions, and extending exclusive provincial powers to such areas 
as policing, land affairs, ports and harbours. 
6 In the following analysis Act 108 of 1996 is referred to as "the Constitution", or as the "new" or "/inal 
Constitution", as distinct to the so-called "interim Constitution" (Act 200 of 1993) which governed the 
country for a transitional period of three years. 
7 For a description of South Africa's "negotiated revolution", see Sparks (1994). 
2 
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vided a set of constraints and guidelines for the writers of the final Constitution. The in-
terim Constitution empowered a Constitutional Assembly, consisting of both houses of a 
democratically elected Parliament, to draw up a final Constitution for the country (sec-
tion 68). With regard to the structures, functions and powers of provinces, this assembly 
would be informed by a Commission on Provincial Government (sections 163 and 164). 
A return to a system with four provinces, now incorporating the former homeland terri-
tories, had little support. The NP and the ANC both focused on the nine "development 
regions" outlined by the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) in 1982 as the basis 
for demarcation proposals (Welsh 1994, Urban Foundation 1993, McCarthy 1993). The 
territorial boundaries of today's nine provinces - the Eastern Cape, Free State, Gauteng, 
KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, Northern Cape, Northern Province, North West and the 
Western Cape - in essence resemble this demarcation.s All homeland structures were 
abolished and incorporated into these nine provinces. Several border disputes remain9, 
but the demarcation has not been challenged in any fundamental way. 
The first democratic elections for the national Parliament and nine provincial legislatures 
were held on 27-29 April 1994 (Lodge 1995, Mattes 1995, Sout;halI1994). Local govern-
ment elections were held as from November 1995 (Lodge 1999: 40-55, Rapdall 1998). In 
1994 the ANC won 252 out of 400 seats in the National Assembly, a majority of 63 per 
cent. The party also gained the most votes in seven of the nine provinces, obtaining its 
best result in the Northern Province with a 92 per cent share of the provincial vote. The 
NP won in the Western Cape with 53 per cent of the vote, while the IFP gained a narrow 
50 per cent majority in KwaZulu-Natal, a province that was and continues to be plagued 
by high levels of conflict (Ch~rry 1994).10 
8 In summary, the former Transvaal was broken up into four separate entities (Gauteng, Mpumalanga, 
Northern Province and North West). The territory of the former Cape Province was divided into three 
new structures (Eastern Cape, Northern Cape and Western Cape). The boundaries of the Free State and 
Natal were retained to some degree. 
9 For example, the residents of Bushbuckridge in the Northern Province have been demanding incorpora-
tion into Mpumalanga (Griggs 1997). 
10 The electoral dominance of the ANC was consolidated in the second democratic elections held on 2 
June 1999. The party gained 66 per cent of the national vote, translating into 266 out of 400 seats in the 
National Assembly, one seat short of a two-thirds majority. The ANC also won outright majorities in seven 
of the nine provinces, but fell short in KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape, where no party gained a 
majority of votes (Business Dty, 8 June 1999). Due to the hung legislatures in the Western Cape and Kwa-
Zulu-Natal, coalition governments became necessary at provincial level (Chothia 1998). The ANC at-
tempted to counter the "provincialisation" of its party structures (Sindane 1997) by centralising the ap-
pointment of premiers in the ANC-governed provinces for the 1999 elections (Business Dty, 23 April 1999). 
3 
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A version of the new Constitution was adopted by the Constitutional Assembly on 8 
May 1996. However, the Constitutional Court found that parts of the text did not com-
ply with the constitutional principles contained in the interim Constitution. With regard 
to provinces, the court noted that their powers over policing, education, traditional lead-
ership and local government had been substantially diminished.ll After its first certifica-
tion judgemene2, delivered on 6 September 1996, the text was referred back to the Con-
stitutional Assembly. The-assembly amended the text to comply with the court's re-
quirements, and the final Constitution was adopted on 11 October 1996. It was subse-
quently approved by the Constitutional Court in its second certification judgement.13 
The process of drafting the Constitution involved many South Africans through arguably 
the largest public participation programme ever carried out in South Africa. Two years of 
intensive consultations attempted to int~grate, as far as possible, the views of ordinary 
citizens, civil society and political parties. It is not often that deep-rooted conflict in a 
society is successfully channelled through a constitution-making process (Banting and 
Simeon 1985). South Africa is an example of where this was the case. 
The Constitution shapes the overall structure of government in the country, and captures 
the compromise over decentralised governance. Most notably, the founding provisions 
stipulate that the Republic of South Africa is "one sovereign democratic state" (section 
1), rather than a grouping of independent territorial entities, for which the Constitution is 
the supreme law (section 2). However, the Constitution also prescribes that government 
be constituted as national, provincial and local "spheres of government", which are de-
scribed as "distinctive, interdependent and interrelated" (section 40). The term spheres of 
government, rather than tiers or levels, has been interpreted as implying a non-
hierarchical relationship and "some equality in status of national, provincial and local 
government" (Department of Constitutional Development 1999: 10). The Constitution 
accordingly provides for the unity of the country, while at the same time providing for 
provincial and local structures. 
Different positions are often taken on the question of whether post-apartheid South Af-
rica is a federal state or not. Some argue that it is a unitary state with some federal ar-
11 In the latter case the decrease of provincial powers was balanced out by increased local autonomy, which 
the court regarded as a positive advance. 
12 Certificatioll of the C011StitUtiOll of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1996 (4) SA 744 (eq. 
4 
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rangements, or "a figleaf for federalism" (O'Malley 1994). Others call it a federal state 
(e.g. Kriek 1996 and 1994). The final Constitution does not use the terms "federal" or 
"unitary", nor did the interim Constitution. The concept of federalism is highly contro-
versial in South Africa, because it is frequently associated with apartheid's homeland 
system and its deeply racist ideological justification. As a result, some people may reject 
the word "federalism", but be comfortable with terms such as "decentralised govern-
ance", "regionalism" or "provincial system". Southall (1994: 649) remarks that "there 
seems to be an unwritten agreement amongst politicians of all stripes and the media to 
avoid explicit use of that term [i.e. federalism]". Although this debate is interesting from 
a purely academic angle, it seems to have little practical relevance. As Tapscott (1998: 27) 
notes, labels such as "federal" and "unitary" are of less importance than the manner in 
which intergovernmental relation.s are structured and function in practice. 
According to the final Constitution, provincial governments are now responsible for the 
administration of such vital areas as welfare, public health, primary and secondary educa-
. tion. In 1997, for the first time, the nine provinces that had been created in 1994 were 
responsible for drawing up their own budgets, within an overall resource envelopel \ 
rather than managing centrally determined allocations for each spending area. 
The structure of local government, too, has been subject to substantial revisions.ls The 
final Constitution requires a "wall-to-wall" system of local government, covering the en-
tire territory of the country (section 151(1)).16 However, many local authorities, especially 
those that were newly created, have experienced great difficulty in fulfilling their func-
tions (Solomon 1998). In a joint report on the state of municipal finance, the Depart-
ments of Constitutional Development and Finance (1997: 48) acknowledge that restruc-
13 CertzJicotioll of the Amended Text of the COllStitUtiOll of the Republic of South Africa, 1996,1997 (1) BCLR 1 (CC). 
14 The term "resource envelope" describes the total amount of money that is available to cover the expen-
diture of a department, government, or level of government. 
15 The Local Government Transition Act (1993) represented the first attempt to introduce a unified system for 
local government throughout the country. The end of apartheid left the country with a system that was 
fragmented along racial lines (Ismail and Mphaisha 1997: 3-9, Tapscott 1996: 13). Shack settlements had 
become a cornmon feature in urban areas by the end of apartheid, due to a mixture of population growth, 
migration from rural areas, inadequate housing and government policy not to provide rented houses in the 
townships (Mashabela 1990). The task was to transform local government into viable entities capable of 
facilitating development (see: Reddy 1996, Simon 1996). 
16 Several pieces oflegislation aim at the reorganisation of the local sphere. The Municipal Stmctures Act 
(1998) provided for the restructuring of the different categories and types of municipalities outlined in the 
Constitution (section 155), and the division of powers and functions between them. The MUllicipal Demar-
catioll Act (1998) initiated a process of re'drawing municipal boundaries in order to create more viable and 
sustainable structures. In addition, a Municipal Systems Bill and a Mullicipal Property Ratillg Bill are expected to 
be tabled in Padiament in the near future. 
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turing has caused the newly formed municipalities to experience a dramatic increase in 
service responsibility, paired with an insignificant increase of the revenue base and exten-
sive non-payment of municipal accounts. 
Administrative problems are also being experienced at the provincial level. The previous 
Director-General of the Public Service, Paseka Ncholo, who was responsible for the 
"Provincial Review Report,,17, called the administration in the provinces chaotic. He be-
lieved that provincial government "is not affordable and needs a rethink" (Business DCf)', 
14 August 1997).18 A few months later, the Presidential Review Commissionl9 was re-
ported to have recommended a take-over of the Eastern Cape by the national govern-
ment in response to a breakdown of delivery structures in the province (Financial Mail, 1 
May 1998). 
The administrative ability of the provinces has been cast into doubt by a string of events. 
For instance, in January 1998 the Eastern Cape provincial government failed to pay pen-
sions to about 632000 pensioners, due to a lack of funds (Business DCf)', 9 January 1998). 
Soon afterwards the national government had to provide a "bailout" (in the form of an 
advance totalling R 1.5 billion) to the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal governments 
towards covering their budget deficits for the 1997-8 financial year20 • At the beginning of 
1999 pupils were left waiting for books and stationery in several provinces despite 
promises that study material would be delivered in time (Sowetan, 21 January 1999). Such 
events have brought disrepute to the provincial system, and comments such as the fol-
lowing are not uncommon: "It once saved bloodshed but now South Africa's constitu-
tion is wasting money" (Economist, 28 February 1998). This perception has led to calls 
from senior ANC politicians to take a fresh look at the structure of government in the 
country (e.g. Ramatlhodi 1998). The former Minister of Provincial Affairs and Constitu-
tional Development, Valli Moosa:', recommended a review of the constitutional powers of 
the three spheres of government in the interest of greater efficiency (Business DCf)', 20 May 
17 Also known as the Ncholo Report (Ministry for the Public Service and Administration 1997). 
18 The report was based on a review of the administration of every department in the nine provinces. In 
roughly 350 structured interviews, over 950 provincial staff were asked for their views of how well they 
were performing their jobs. 
19 The commission had been appointed by a presidential proclamation in April 1996, officially tided the 
"Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Transfonnation and Refonn of the Public Service". Amongst its 
mandates was to conduct an internal audit of each provincial administration, including planning, budgeting 
and financial execution (presidential Review Commission 1998: 2). A widely respected academic, VIncent 
Maphai, was the chairperson of the commission. 
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1999). President Thabo Mbeki, the successor of Nelson Mandela, has hinted that local 
government will soon receive greater attention (Sunday Independent, 23 May 1999). This 
would include the "deployment" of prominent ANC politicians to this sphere of gov-
ernment, in conjunction with a reallocation of resources. At a conference in March 1999 
Mbeki (1999: 6-7) remarked: 
"The proximity of our second democratic elections provides an opportunity for 
us to review the performance of the nine provinces we established in 1994. The 
future of the nine provinces has become a topic of public debate, with calls for 
changes to the structure and powers of the provincial sphere, and even the num-
ber of provinces. It is true that the establishment of nine provinces has brought 
government closer to the people, created more space for regional diversity and 
provided a mechanism for the implementation of national policies. At the same 
time serious concerns have been raised about the state of provincial governance, 
underscored by the instances of financial crisis and the failure of delivery institu-
tions, which we have experienced during the last five years. The strength and 
weaknesses of the provinces highlighted by a number of reports and audits of 
provincial government should be dealt with in a forthright manner. We shall have 
to address such critical issues as: Rooting out corruption in all spheres of gov-
ernment; Addressing cap~city deficiencies in our provinces; Reducing and con-
taining personnel costs in our provincial budgets; Adopting alternative methods 
of service delivery, to reduce costs and improve the quality of service to the peo-
ple." 
1.2 Research Problem 
South Africa's Constitution has assigned functions and resources to different spheres of 
government. At the same time it has been a challenge to ensure the smooth running of 
the new system, and calls for adjustments have been made. There is thus a need for an 
objective assessment of the functionality of the governmental structure in South Africa. 
The purposes of this study are: (1) to capture the assignment of functions and resources 
to the different spheres of government in South Africa and (2) to provide an assessment 
20 A financial year does not necessarily coincide with the calendar year, although it does so in many coun-
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of the functionality of this assignment. Such an assessment should indicate whether the 
constitutional assignment of functions and resources is to blame for the problems that 
have been encountered during the process of decentralisation, and whether adjustments 
to the assignment are necessary to achieve greater efficiency. 
1.3 Proposition 
This above discussion generates the following proposition: "The assignment of functions 
and resources to the different spheres of government in South Africa needs to be ad-
justed to achieve greater efficiency." 
1.4 Defining Fiscal Federalism 
The theory of fiscal federalism, or intergovernmental fiscal relations, provides guidance 
with regard to the assignment of expenditure functions and sources of revenue to various 
tiers in a de centralised system of government.21 This perspective, with its focus on func-
tionality and efficiency, offers an analytical tool for the assessment intended in this thesis. 
In a groundbreaking contribution building on the limited framework provided by Mus-
grave (1959: 179-183), Oates (1993: 17) describes the economic meaning of federal gov-
ernment as "[a] public sector with both centralized and decentralized levels of decision-
making in which choices made at.~ach level concerning the provisions of public services 
are determined largely by the demands for these services of the residents of (and perhaps 
others who carry on activities in) the respective jurisdiction". Oates adds the following 
distinction: "In contrast to the conception of federalism in political science, it makes little 
difference to the economist whether or not decision-making at a particular level of gov-
ernment is based on delegated or constitUtionally guaranteed authority." From this func-
tional perspeaive, it is not important whether a particular rystem is federal from a constitutional per spec-
tries. The financial year in South Africa runs from 1 April until 31 March of the following calendar year. 
21 For this analysis the following definitions are employed, as put forward by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF 1997: 8), unless otherwise indicated: The term revenue covers all non-repayable government 
receipts other than grants; grants are defined as unrequited, non-repayable, non-compulsory receipts from 
other governments. I refer to transfers as payments to which the recipient is legally (often constitutionally) 
entitled. Often, however, the terms transfers and grants are used interchangeably in the literature. 
8 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
tive. Rather, economists tend to treat all governmental [Jstems as federal in character, to varying extents, 
in the sense that budgetary decisions are made at different levels (Heyns 1995: 150, Shah 1994b: 9-
10).22 Thus, fiscal federalism is studied across a range of constitutional systems (e.g. Ter-
Minassian 1997a). 
The theory of fiscal federalism is concerned with assigning expenditure functions and 
revenue sources to the economically appropriate level of government. Guiding principles 
are proposed to govern the assignment of expenditure functions (e.g. Ahmad et a11997, 
Oates 1993: 31-63) as well as the assignment of revenue sources (e.g. Norregaard 1997, 
Spahn 1995, Oates 1993: 119-180). When resources do not match the assigned expendi-
ture functions, imbalances can be addressed through intergovernmental transfers and grants 
(e.g. Ahmad and Craig 1997, Oates 1993: 65-118). Some guidance on borrowing arrange-
ments has also been proposed (e.g. Ter-Minassian and Craig 1997). 
However, while a certain fiscal design may be desirable according to economic theory, 
socio-political circumstances and constitutional provisions can limit the design options 
(Bird 1993). Bird and Chen (1998: 52) explain that jurisdictional boundaries and the as-
signment of functions and finances may often have been fixed at some earlier (e.g. con-
stitutional) stage. The implication is that any policy recommendations concerning fiscal 
design should take the constitutional framework of a country into consideration (unless, 
of course, these parameters can easily be changed). 
The literature on the practice of intergovernmental fiscal relations has grown substan-
tially over the past years. Ter-Minassian (1997a) provides the most recent and compre-
hensive review of fiscal federalism in theory and practice. Unfortunately, the impressive 
collection of case studies does not include an analysis of the South African system. In 
fact, there are only a few examples of academic writing on South Africa's. new fiscal fed-
eralism. Acting as a consultant to. the World Bank during a mission to South Africa in 
1993, McLure (1994) generated a basic set of recommendations. Heyns (1994) has of-
fered an interesting conceptual discussion of equity and redistribution from a fiscal fed-
eralism perspective, with reference to the interim Constitution. Based on the text of the 
new Constitution and some initial developments, Abedian et al (1997) produced a first 
description of South Africa's emerging fiscal structures. More recently, Dollery (1998) 
22 Exceptions may occur in geographically extremely small countries or "mini states". 
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suggested an initial evaluation of South Africa's revenue:"sharing arrangements under the 
current Constitution. While providing interesting and important snapshots, the rapid 
changes to the South African system have outdated substantial parts of these analyses. In 
addition, the work of the advisory Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) has contrib-
uted towards developing fiscal federal theory and practice within the South African con-
text (FFC 1998a, 1997, 1996, 1995). The work of the commission will be dealt with in 
detail in the discussion of the South African system. 
1.5 Structure of Inquiry 
The second chapter reviews considerations in the design of fiscal federalism by exploring 
the various theoretical aspects pertaining to the assignment of functions and sources of 
revenue. The purpose of the chapter is to generate a reference framework for the de-
scription and assessment of the South African system. 
The third chapter contains a comparison of two countries which served as prominent ref-
erence models for the structure of government during the constitutional negotiations in 
South Africa. The chapter tracks some of the key options that constitutional designers 
were faced with, and their impact on fiscal arrangements. Its purposes are to demonstrate 
the practical relevance of the theoretical considerations outlined in the previous chapter, 
and to provide a comparative context, from a fiscal perspective, for the description and 
analysis of the South African system. 
The existing structures in South Africa are discussed in the fourth chapter. It draws mainly 
on the final Constitution and relevant legislation, budgetary data, and a discussion of 
suggested and actual practices. The purposes of this chapter are to provide an in-depth 
analysis of the South African system, enabling a comparison to the reference framework 
developed earlier, and to highlight key issues relating to its· practical functioning. 
Thefifth chapter contains the conclusion. Its purposes are to summarise the main findings 
and to come to an assessment oLthe functionality of the South African system. Based on 
this analysis, the necessity of adjusting the current assignment of functions and resources 
, will be investigated. 
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1.6 Relevance of Inquiry 
Actors outside government have not yet undertaken a comprehensive functional assess-
ment of the structure of government in South Africa. This inquiry is aimed at contribut-
ing towards filling this research gap. In addition, political scientists have not yet thor-
oughly analysed South Africa's fiscal structures. This may partially be due to the fact that 
public finance is often regarded as a "technical" or "economics-driven" field, unsuitable 
for the analytical tools of the political scientist. On the other hand, political scientists are 
highly regarded contributors to the development of fiscal arrangements in many other 
countries. This inquiry is an attempt to bring the fiscal aspects of multi-level governance 
into the debate amongst political scientists over the future of the three-sphere system in 
South Africa. 
1. 7 Scope of Inquiry 
Provincial government is at the centre of this analYsis, since the purpose oflocal government as a 
separate sphere is generally not disputed. The analysis does, however, include local gov-
ernment, and refers to national government were contextually necessary. A comprehen-
sive assessment of the role of provincial government requires an understanding of its in-
teraction with the other spheres of government. 
It is not the purpose of this analYsis to provide a description of the constitutional negotiations. The ne-
gotiating phase has been captured elsewhere (e.g. Sparks 1994). Rather, the focus of this 
analysis is on the fiscal structures outlined in the new Constitution and developments 
that have taken place within these structures. 
Due to the rapid changes to the South African [lstem, this analYsis is necessarilY a snapshot. Apart 
from minor details, the research towards this thesis was concluded in June 1999. The 
analysis thus seeks to capture the relevant developments between the taking effect of the 
new Constitution as from 1997 and the second democratic elections. 
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1.8 Chapter Conclusion 
The negotiated transition to democracy brought with it a new structure of government 
for South Africa, consisting of the national, provincial and local spheres. The functional-
ity of this new structure is increasingly being questioned, and calls for reform have been 
made. The inquiry sets out to capture the assignment of functions and resources to the 
different spheres of government in South Africa and to provide an assessment of the 
functionality of this assignment. The ~erspective of fiscal federalism focuses on the as-
signment of functions and resources within the context of a decentralised system of gov-
ernment. This perspective, with its focus on functionality and efficiency, offers an ana-
lytical tool for the intended assessment. The study draws on theoretical considerations, a 
comparative background, and an in-depth analysis of intergovernmental fiscal relations in 
South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DESIGN OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 
This chapter reviews considerations in the design of fiscal federalism by exploring the 
various theoretical aspects pertaining to the assignment of functions and sources of 
revenue. The purpose of the chapter is to generate a reference framework for the de-
scription and assessment of the South African system. The chapter discusses constitu-
tional models which have a bearing on the design of fiscal structures, and the criteria 
provided by the theory of public fmance. 
2.1 Constitutional Considerations 
The division of powers and functions to various levels of government varies across 
countries. With regard to the form of state, constitutions may be seen to fall into two 
broad categories (Kriek 1996). 
2.1.1 Unitary SYftemf 
In a unitary system of government, the iffective overall control of all governmental functions rests 
with the centralgovernment (Shah 19?4b: 5). Until the recently initiated process of decentrali-
sation2.3, the United Kingdom was a classic example of a unitary state (Kendle 1997). 
Other examples are France, Turkey and Japan. In a unitary system, the central govern-
ment is free do decide which functions and resources are to be assigned to its regional 
and local administrative branches, and it can adjust this assignment at its discretion. 
2.1.2 Federal Systems 
In a federal system, decision-making is divided between levels of government usually 
based on a constitutional assignment of powers (Schultze 1996: 157, Nathan and Bal-
maceda 1990: 60). Federalism can enable a balance between unity and diversity by medi-
23 Scodand and Wales have recendy voted in favour of regional assembles which will regulate areas oflocal 
concern. In the case of Scodand the electorate also voted in favour of giving its assembly the power to tax 
(DailY Telegraph, 25 February 1998). Elections to the newly created assemblies took place in May 1999. 
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ating between diverging ideas about the nature of political communities. Although this 
category is diverse, a common feature in these systems is the existence of elected regional 
governments in addition to national and local governments.24 Prominent examples of fed-
eral countries are Germany, Canada, the United States, Switzerland, India and Brazil.25 
Unlike in unitary states, the constitutional division of powers in federal states makes it 
more difficult to affect adjustments to the fiscal structures, as this would require amend-
ments to the constitution. 
2.1.2.1 Political Rationales for Regional Government 
The following are some central political rationales for regional go~ernment: 
Enhancing Democrary. Every democratic order relies on the broad support of its citizens. 
The more interfaces a political system offers, the more opportunities to express prefer-
ences exist, and the greater the potential for overall satisfaction. In a federal state, the 
most common form of participatlon, voting, can be practised more frequently than in a 
state without regional governments.26 In other words, regional government offers more 
opportunities for participation. Although this does not automatically make participation 
more meaningful, it encourages a closer link between decision-makers and citizens, and 
24 The concept of federalism is "a classic example of concept overstretch" (Bulpitt 1996: 180), and there is 
a lack of a generally accepted definition (Verney 1995: 81, Burgess and Gagnon 1993, Nathan and Bal-
maceda 1990: 59). Wheare (1946) identified only a handful of states that he claimed could be called federal. 
His work is based on a definition of federalism as a situation where the citizen is a citizen of two govern-
ments, a general and a regional one. Since then, some writers have emphasised that national and regional 
polities in a federal system are or should be equal (Elazar 1995 and 1991). In practice, however, regional 
governments are often regarded as middle tiers or levels of government, implying a hierarchy of govern-
ments covering the same geographical area. Nathan and Balmaceda (1990: 60) conclude: "As we see it, the 
acid test of federalism is not whether the general and local government are co-equal. The test of whether a 
political system is federal is whether it has regional governments with consequential [emphasis in the original] 
power." They suggest a framework for ~alysis to compare the role and character of elected regional gov-
ernments in contemporary federalism. This framework includes an assessment of (1) legal powers; (2) 
revenue powers; (3) functional-area authority and responsibilities; (4) the role of the regional governments 
in the affairs of the central government; (5) historical, social and cultural identification; and (6) the power 
of local units. Given the dispute over the definition of the teon, and the variety of systems it is associated 
with, such a flexible framework seems adequate. While constitutions are important indicators, federalism 
can easily develop differently to constitutional intentions (Hodgins et 011989). 
2S A third category may be cOlifederal systems of government, where a centralgovernment aas as an agent Jor inde-
pendent member units. Examples of this latter group are the European Union (EU) and the Conunonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) consisting of the fooner Soviet Republics. A number of regional structures for 
economic co-operation, such as the Southern African Development Conununity (SADC), also bear some 
characteristics of a confederation. For the purpose of this analysis, this option is regarded as an extreme 
form of federalism, although some authors consider it to be a separate, albeit less prominent, category (e.g. 
Shah 1994b: 6). 
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helps to "bring government closer to the people". The empowerment aspect of regional 
government is based on the principle of subsidiarity, which prescribes that any commu-
nity shall only fulfil those tasks that cannot be fulfilled equally well, or better, by a smaller 
constituent community (Isensee 1968). 
Protecting Democrary. There is also a line of thought that presents regional government as a 
tool to prevent tyranny by means of "parcelling off" and, to an extent, fragmenting state 
power along a vertical axis (Laufer and Munch 1997: 24-25). This makes regional gov-
ernment especially attractive to c0untries emerging from authoritarian rule or dictator-
ship and facing the task of constitutional redesign, such as Spain after the death of 
Franco or Germany after the demise of Nazi rule. 
Cotiflict Management. Especially in ethnically divided societies, regional government offers a 
chance to national minorities to gain a majority at subnationallevel. According to 
Horowitz (1991: 217), for instance, such representation at subnationallevel may ensure 
that minorities will not resort to extra-legal, violent and destabilising means to pursue 
their aims. Rather, the possibility to gain political majorities, at a subnationallevel, acts as 
an incentive to remain within the overall system. Federalism can therefore act as political 
glue to ethnically divided societies (Smith 1995). This was the idea behind propagating 
the "federal solution" in the context of decolonisation, albeit without success in many 
cases due to a complex set of factors (Kendle 1997: 123-149).27 The relationship between 
territoriality and ethnicity is pivotal for conflict to be managed through federal arrange-
ments (Schultze 1995: 158). This requires that ethnic minorities be concentrated in spe-
cific regions, as for instance in Canada but unlike in the United States. 
While it is recognised that regional government has the potential to achieve these goals, it 
is also recognised that federalism is Janus-headed, which means that its advantages may, 
under certain circumstances, tum into its disadvantages (Simeon 1998: 47, Laufer and 
Munch 1997: 28). For instance, federalism may contribute to a perception that the wishes 
of minority communities are valued over those of national majorities. If the overwhelm-
26 This effect is weakened in cases where national and regional elections are held at the same time, as cur-
rendy in South Africa, as national issues often dominate the regional election agenda. Regional elections 
tend to receive more attention when the regions have varying election dates. 
27 Notably, many post-colonial constitutions were based on the recommendations of foreign advisors and 
. supposed experts in their fields, rather than the result of an indigenous negotiating process. The latter, 
however, is important to promote ownership of the new dispensation, and to ensure that a constitution 
addresses the particular social and political needs of a country. 
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ing wish of the majority were repeatedly frustrated and hindered by a small minority, this 
would be undemocratic. With regard to the ethnic management goal of regional govern-
ment, the dilemma is that by giving institutional recognition to such cleavages, they may 
also be perpetuated and even augmented. This may ultimately reinforce centrifugal ten-
dencies. As Simeon (1998: 50) concludes: "All regional and autonomist movements are a 
combination of 'we want out' and 'we want in'. The trick is to find the right balance." 
2.1.2.2 Models of Regional Government 
Constitutional arrangements in federal systems are diverse (Saunders 1995, Elazar 1991). 
One basic distinction is between divided (dual and competitive) systems on the one 
hand, and shared (integrated and co-operative) models of regional government on the 
other (Simeon 1998, Laufer and Munch 1997: 157, Schultze 1995: 160, Shah 1994b: 7). 
In the divided model, the idea is that national and regional institutions should be as inde-
pendent as possible. Responsibilities are assigned to national and regional governments 
according to policy areas such as health, education or defence. As far as possible, the re-
sponsibilities of government are divided into distinct lists and each is assigned to one 
specific tier. The aim is to create "watertight compartments" by eliminating overlapping 
responsibility. In practice, this ,means that if a government is responsible for health, it 
regulates and implements policy in this sector. 
The shared model, on the other hand, integrates and unites governments at different lev-
els by emphasising co-operation and joint functions. Responsibilities are assigned ac-
cording to governmental functions such as regulation by rn"eans oflegislation on the one 
hand, and implementation and administration on the other. This means that one level 
formulates policy and monitors implementation, usually the national level, while another 
is responsible for actual implementation. 
Several factors may impact on the choice between these two basic options (De Villiers 
1994b: 269-270): . 
Approach to Federation. The far-reaching separation of functions pursued by the divided 
model is most likely to emerge from a "bottom up" approach to federation, i.e. one in 
16 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
which formerly separate units come together for a limited purpose (e.g. United States, 
Canada). In such a case, the necessary infrastructure to provide essential services will al-
ready existwithin member units, which logically limits the involvement that is required 
by the central government in many important areas such as policing, health and educa-
tion. If certain functions are already provided satisfactory at subnationallevel, there is no 
reason to facilitate central involv~ment in these areas. The shared model, to the contrary, 
is most likely to emerge from a "top down" approach to federation, where regional units 
are assigned some of the functions which were previously exercised at the central level. 
The constitutional changes taking place in Spain since 1978 are one example of such a 
top down process towards federalism, involving a transfer of functions from the centre 
to the regions (Newton 1997: 120). In this case, the centre is likely to retain some influ-
ence over regional functions, drawing on its experience and infrastructure. 
Increasing Complexity ofGove17lmental Funaions. The two models are also tied to the devel-
opment of the modem welfare-oriented state. From a historical perspective, the general 
direction seems to be from dual (or divided) to co-operative (or shared) systems of re-
gional government. De Villiers (1994b: 270) explains: "The practical circumstances asso-
ciated with modem government brought the realization that the respective levels of gov-
ernment could not operate in isolation from each other ... The consequence is a new style 
of government and a different culture of intergovernmental relations, based on co-
operation, co-ordination, and interdependency." 
Political Culture. It has been argued that the divided model is more compatible with the 
Anglo American majoritarian and competitive nature of politics, while the shared model 
is more compatible with the consensual and co-operative style of governance that is 
prevalent in the political systems of continental Europe (Schultze 1995: 159). 
There may be a .range of other political factors influencing the choice between the di-
vided and shared models. As Simeon (1998: 58-59) points out, the choice between these 
two alternative models is based on trade-offs. The divided model seems to maximise re-
gional autonomy. It also simplifies transparency by providing for undivided lines of ac-
countability; accountability is clearly assigned to the different levels of government by 
avoiding shared responsibilities. Furthermore, the divided model seems to promote 
competitive and adversarial federalism. The shared model, on the other hand, seems to 
17 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
maximise harmony, consistency and consensual policy making. It also requires ongoing 
co-operation and interaction. Accordingly, the shared model may tend to display more 
inherent centralised tendencies than the divided mode\. 
2. 1.3 Implicatiotls 
In a unitary system the central government has a rather free hand in the design of fiscal 
structures, which makes it easy to follow the economic considerations to be discussed 
below. Federal systems, however, circumscribe the power of the centre. Thus, the latter 
deserve special consideration in qrder to understand the particular limits federal consti-
tutions impose on fiscal design. As constitutional redesign is likely to be a controversial 
and lengthy process (Banting and Simeon 1985), the implication is that policy recom-
mendations relating to the design of fiscal structures have a better chance of being im-
plemented when this is possible within an existing constitutional framework. 
2.2 Economic Considerations 
The theory of public finance offers some guidelines with respect to the assignment of 
revenue and expenditure responsibilities to various levels of government in a decentral-
ised system. This section considets the theoretical frameworks for expenditure and reve-
nue assignment, and intergovernmental transfers and grants. A brief discussion of bor-
rowing arrangements - as a means of enhancing the total income derived from revenue, 
transfers and grants - is also provided. 
2.2.1 Expenditure Assignment 
The as~.ignIJlent of expenditure functions is guided by the "decentralisation theorem" put 
forward by Oates (1993: 31-63). The theorem proposes that each public service should 
be provided by the jurisdiction having control over the minimum geographic area that 
would internalise the benefits and costs of such provision. This rule is a rephrasing of the 
principle of subsidiarity. In other words, responsibilities should be assigned to the lowest 
level possible without compromising the effective provision of a service. 
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2.2.1.1 Expenditure Decentralisation 
It is argued that the local provision of goods and services has the following benefits 
(Shah 1994a: 3, Oates 1993: 11-13): 
Local provision enhances ifficienry by reflecting local needs. A centralised or uniform provision 
- -
often results in a "one size fits all" provision that may not satisfy specific local needs. 
Since preferences vary between localities, government would be wasting resources on 
services that may not be desired by some communities. The local provision of services 
allows communities to set their individual priorities, and allocate resources accordingly. If 
mobility is not otherwise restricted, citizens can "vote with their feet" by comparing 
service packages between jurisdictions and choosing according to their preferences. The 
overall result would be a more efficient allocation of resources, as allocations match the 
various sets of local preferences .. 
&ocal provision eliminates multiple lqyers q/jurisdiction. If a service can be provided at a lower 
level of government, this eliminates the need to have a central administration with sub-
national branches. As a result the central government is able to focus its attention and 
resources on those areas that require its involvement. This argument gains in strength 
with increasing geographical size or population of a country. The larger a country in 
terms of size or population, the more complex governmental functions become, and the 
more difficult it will be to administer public affairs through one centrally steered admini-
stration with agencies in the various regions. 
Decentralised decision-making results 11i healthy competition between authorities, which encour-
ages innovations in the provision of public services. Innovative new programmes can be 
pioneered at the subnationallevel before they are implemented on a broader scale. 
Should such new programmes fail, it would be less costly than if they had been imple-
mented on a nation-wide scale. Thus, while creating space for innovations, decentralised 
decision-making also limits possible financial losses due to policy failure. 
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2.2.1.2 Expenditure Centralisation 
Despite arguments in favour of decentralis~tion, centralisation is warranted when the 
following considerations apply (Ahmad et aL 1997: 28, Shah 1994a: 4, Oates 1993: 4-11): 
Imperfect mobility limits the possibility that citizens express their preferences by voting with 
their feet (i.e. moving between jurisdictions). As a result, the decentralised provision of 
services might not match local preferences. 
SpatiaL externalities occur when the geographical boundaries of a jurisdiction diverge sig-
nificantly from the geographical concentration of people who utilise its services. In the 
case of benifit spiLLoverr, the authority may not realise that substantial benefits accrue to 
non-residents. This would result in the lmder-provision of such a service. The reverse is 
the case with cost spiLLovers, where the costs for a service can be "exported" to other juris-
dictions.28 The rule is that where the benefits of a service are national in scope, it should 
be assigned to the national government. Most prominently, this is the case with defence 
and foreign affairs. 
Economies of scaLe exist with regard to certain services. If a service cannot be provided in a 
cost effective manner by a local jurisdiction, this service should be assigned to the next 
higher level of government where this would be the case. The need to provide transpor-
tation services, water and sewerage in a metropolitan area, for example, may justify a 
two-tier system of local government (e.g. Ahmad 1996, Shah 1994b: 12-15). 
Furthermore, there is general agreement that certain policy functions simply cannot be 
successfully managed by subnational governments (Ahmad et aL 1997: 28-30). Macro-
economic stabilisation and monetary policies are instances where firm control and undivided ac-
tions are required (Gupta et aL 1994). This is unlikely to be possible if these functions 
were assigned to various subnatiorial actors. Effective redistribution is only possible 
through programmes that are national in scope. Finally, equalisation between jurisdictions 
requires centralisation (Ladd and Yinger 1994, Bramley 1990). 
28 For example, if a local authority closed health clinics for the poor, they may utilise the services of a 
neighbouring jurisdiction. Spillover grants may help to compensate jurisdictions that are adversely affected. 
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There is a need for a model that fakes into account not only the assignment of expendi-
ture functions to one or another level, but also provides principles to decide when and to 
what extent responsibilities should be shared. The theory of fiscal federalism provides 
little or no guidance to determine where centralised regulation with decentralised imple-
mentation may be advisable (Oates 1994: 143-147). However, the theoretical framework 
for expenditure assignment hinges on the distinction between national public goods on 
the one hand, and regional and local public goods with geographically more limited bene-
fit areas on the other. Ahmad et al (1997: 25-26) concede: 
"Most goods that governments supply, however, do not fit neatly into either one 
of these two categories. ~or these mixed goods some degree of decentralization 
coupled with some centralized coordination of policy is both feasible and desir-
able, owing to unclear benefit r~gions, externalities, or national redistributional 
implications ... When conflicting goals arise, the analysis of which level should be 
assigned expenditure responsibility can become quite complicated and subject to 
normative bias." 
2.2.1.3 Framework for Expenditure Assignment 
Oates (1993: 3-30) describes the benefits of federal government as enabling a compro-
mise between the economic case for centralised government on the one hand, and the 
economic case for decentralised government on the other. Shah (1994a: Table 1.1 and 
1994b: Table 2) proposes a conceptual framework for the assignment of expenditure 
functions that expresses this compromise. The benefits and costs of a number of func-
tions are national in scope (e.g. defence and foreign affairs).29 Due to their primarily local 
benefits, basic services (e.g. water, sewerage and refuse) are assigned to local government. 
However, the framework does not resolve the above-mentioned problem with mixed 
goods. This is partially due to the complexity of some sectors. For instance, while there 
are advantages to the local provision of primary education and preventative health care, 
such as allowing communities to express cultural and curative preferences, economies of 
scale and externalities imply that more centralised control of tertiary education and hos-
This would require that the extent that non-residents use a certain service, as well as their origin, be known 
to the providing authority. 
29 For example, frontier regions may be more concerned with national defence issues, while interior com-
munities might simply depend on the border regions to protect them. Therefore, if defence was a subna-
tional function, this assignment would lead to the under-supply of a national good (Ahmed et at 1997: 29). 
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pitals may be war~anted (Ahmad et at 1997: 25). Other factors may further influence ex-
penditure assignment. Commenting on the "dangers of decentralisation", Prud'homme 
(1995: 215) notes that subnational capacity needs to be considered to determine the ex-
tent to which responsibilities are to be decentralised: "For decentralized units to be effi-
cient and achieve the potential benefits of decentralization, they must be sufficiently large 
in terms of population, activities, and income. This efficiency can be increased by per-
sonal training and institution building, but decentralizing taxes and even expenditures to 
small and weak local governments is unlikely to be successful." The comparative data 
below show the distribution of governmen~al expenditure in selected countries, which is 
a summary indicator of expenditure decentralisation. The variations indicate that there is 
no single model that is empirically dominant, and that careful consideration needs to be 
given as to why certain variations occur in individual countries. 
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Table 1: Theoretical Framework for Expenditure Assignment 
Expenditure category Regulation Administration Comments 
Defence N N 
Foreign affairs N N 
International trade N N 
Currency and banking N N 
Immigration N N 
Unemployment insurance N N 
Airlines and railways N N 
Natural resources N N, R, L 
Environment N, R, L R, L 
Industry and agriculture N, R, L R, L 
Education N, R, L R, L 
Health N, R, L R, L 
Social welfare N, R, L •. R, L 
Highways and roads N, R, L R, L 
Police R, L R, L 
Fire protection L L 
Water, sewerage, refuse L L 
Benefits and costs national in scope. 
Benefits and costs national in scope. 
Benefits and costs national in scope. 
Benefits and costs national in scope. 
Benefits and costs national in scope. 
Benefits and costs national in scope. 
Benefits and costs national in scope. 
Promotes a common market. 
Benefits and costs may vary in scope. 
Significant interjurisdictional spillovers. 
Varying benefit regions. 
Varying benefit regions. 
Unclear benefit regions. 
Some roads with significant spillovers. 
Primarily local benefits. 
Primarily local benefits. 
Primarily local benefits. 
Source: Adapted from Shah (1994a: Table 1.1 and 1994b: Table 2). 
Notes: N = national government, R = regional government, L = local government. 
Table 2: Distribution of Government EXEenditure in Selected Countries 
Total general government expenditure* 
As % of total 
Country Year As %of Central gov- Regional gov- Local govern-
GDP ernment ernment ment 
IndustriaL countries 
Australia 1995 46.5 59.0 36.0 5.0 
Belgium 1994 56.5 88.5 n.a. 11.5 
Canada 1993 60.1 41.7 41.2 17.1 
France 1995 56.5 82.3 n.a. 17.7 
Germany 1995 57.2 59.2 24.1 16.7 
Netherlands 1995 66.5 76.4 n.a. 23.6 
Norway 1994 60.2 68.4 n.a. 31.6 
Spain 1993 55.9 70.4 18.2 11.3 
United Kingdom 1995 54.1 77.3 n.a. 22.7 
United States 1994 41.3 53.4 25.6 21.0 
Developing and transition countries 
Argentina 1992 21.8 55.1 44.9 u. 
Brazil 1993 56.6 65.7 24.8 9.5 
India 1993 30.8 54.7 45.3 u. 
Kenya 1994 30.0 96.1 n.a. 3.9 
Mexico 1993 19.1 78.3 21.7 u. 
Poland 1995 51.8 83.8 n.a. 16.2 
Russian Federation 1995 38.5 62.4 u. 37.6 
South Africa 1994 50.1 66.3 25.4 8.3 
Thailand 1995 17.3 92.6 n.a. 7.4 
Source: International Monetary Fund (1997). 
Notes: n.a. stands for not applicable; u. stands for data unavailable. 
* General government is defined to include the central government; the social security system; and regional 
and local governments. Expenditure covers all non-repayable payments (whether capital or current, re-
quited or not) by government. 
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2.2.2 Revenue Assignment 
The expendtture requirements of the different levels of government should inform the 
assignment of revenue sources to ensure that each level has sufficient revenues to fulfil 
its respective functions (Wiltshire 1989: 181).30 The following principles indicate which 
sources of revenue are suitable for subnational governments (e.g. Norregaard 1997, 
Spahn 1995, Shah 1994a: 13 and 1994b: 18-21). The argument is usually presented in re-
verse order compared with expenditure assignment, where the assumption tends to be in 
favour of decentralisation. 
2.2.2.1 Revenue Centralisation 
Progressive taxes with redistribution obJectivel1 should be centralised, because a decentralised 
redistribution policy may easily become self-defeating. For example, if a local jurisdiction 
decided to redistribute income to poor residents, rich residents may simply move on to 
other jurisdictions where this is not the case. The authority attempting redistribution 
would be left with a population that is on average less wealthy, which in tum would leave 
fewer resources for the purpose of redistribution. 
Taxes suitable for macro-economic management or stabilisation, such as company taxes, should be 
centralised to avoid distortions within the country. In addition, the usefulness of these 
taxes to influence the direction of the overall economy is likely to be weakened or even 
lost when different jurisdictions i!llpose differential rates. 
Taxes that have widelY differential tax bases between jurisdictions, for instance those linked to 
natural resource exploitation, should be centralised to avoid extreme inequalities. As 
natural resources tend to be subject to price volatility, they also constitute an unreliable 
source of revenue for subnational authorities. 
30 The decentralisation of expenditure functions should be accompanied by an equivalent decentralisation 
of resources, and vice versa. In practice, two types of mismatches have been noted (Shah 1994b: 43): (1) 
Federal deficits have been passed on to subnational governments by expenditure decentralisation without a 
concomitant increase in revenue for subnational governments. This is referred to as "unfunded mandates". 
A good country example for this problem is the Russian Federation (Craig et aI1997). (2) The opposite 
happened in Brazil as a result of the implementation of the Constitution of the Federal Republic ofBra:d1 (1988), 
which devolved revenues without a concomitant transfer of functions. This constrained the federal gov-
ernment and provided perverse incentives for fiscal management at subnationallevel (pablos 1997, Ter-
Minassian 1997b, Oliveira and Velloso 1994, Campbell 1991: 28-30). 
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Taxes on mobile factors, such as income, should remain with the central government. A high 
local tax rate on corporate profit, for example, may lead a business to move to a jurisdic-
tion with a lower rate. In addition, competition between jurisdictions may erode the tax 
base. The more mobile a tax base, the greater the case for centralisation. 
Taxes with economies of scale in tax administration should be administered by the national gov-
ernment. For example, if a value-added tax (V A1) were to be levied by the subnational 
jurisdiction in which consumption takes place32, implementation would require border 
controls between different jurisdictions. Such a system would not only be costly to ad-
minister, but may also impede the free movement of goods and services. 
2.2.2.2 Revenue Decentralisation 
Taxes on completelY immobile foctors, such as property and land, are most suited for the local 
level. Since the tax base cannot move in a physical sense, differences in tax rates between 
jurisdictions are unlikely to cause serious problems. With taxes on immobile factors it is 
also always clear which authority is entitled to the revenue they yield. 
Single-stage sales taxel3 are suitable to be levied by subnational governments, provided that 
they do not levy these taxes with highly different rates. Otherwise, residents will be en-
couraged to shop in other jurisdictions. The extent to which "this is likely to occur de-
pends on factors such as the vicinity of jurisdictions with differential rates, the cost of 
travel, and the value of the goods purchased. 
User charges and licensefees can be used by all levels of government. They are especially suit-
able for local governments to the.extent that costs and benefits are "internalised" to the 
local taxpayer. 
31 Progressive taxation is associated with an income tax system which levies a proportionately higher tax 
rate on those with higher incomes. 
32 The destination Pril1ciple implies that the tax is levied by the jurisdiction in which consumption takes place, 
independent of the origin of the goods. The on"gin principle requires the tax to be levied by the jurisdiction in 
which produaion takes place. Norregaard (1997: 65) notes that the need to make the VAT neutral with re-
gard to the spatial allocation of production and consumption implies that it should generally conform with 
the destination principle. 
33 A distinction is made between single-stage sales taxes (e.g. excises and retail taxes) and multi-stage sales 
taxes (e.g. turnover taxes and VATs). Excises are taxes on specific goods (e.g. tobacco and alcohol) or serv-
ices manufactured, sold or consumed in a jurisdiction. 
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2.2.2.3 Framework for Revenue Assignment 
Based on the arguments outlined above, Shah (1994a: Table 1.4 and 1994b: Table 6) 
proposes a conceptual basis for tax assignment. It is clear that economic theory favours 
the centralisation of the main sources of revenue used by modem governments (e.g. in-
come taxes and VAl). Spahn (1995: 221) further observes: "Although guidelines to local 
taxation can be found in the theory of federalism, their impact on actual arrangements is 
remarkably weak." The comparative data below show the distribution of tax revenue in 
selected countries, indicating various degrees of revenue decentralisation. A range of 
factors may influence these revenue patterns. For instance, local revenue bases tend to be 
more substantial in developed countries. The existence of a regional tier of government, 
which may claim certain tax bases, also impacts on tax assignment. Nonetheless, in most 
cases the revenue shares of subnational governments are smaller than their expenditure 
needs require. This is sometimes addressed through tax-sharing, where the central gov-
ernment shares the revenue from a particular tax, or through general revenue-sharing. 
Alternatively, subnational governments are dependent on income from intergovernmen-
tal transfers and grants, which are discussed in detail in the following section. 
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Table 3: Theoretical Framework for Revenue Assignment 
Determinf1tion of 
Revenue source Base Rate Collection and 
administration 
Comments 
Customs N N •. N International trade. 
Corporate income N N N Mobile factor, stabilisation tool. 
Natural resources N N N Unequally distributed tax bases. 
VAT N N N Economies of scale in administration. 
Personal income N N, R N Redistributive, mobile factor. 
Retail sales R R, L R, L Higher compliance cost. 
or N R N Lower compliance cost. 
Property, land R L L Completely immobile factors. 
Fees, user charges N, R, L N, R, L N, R., L Payment for services received. 
Excises R, L R, L R, L Relatively immobile factors, residence-based. 
SOUfW. Adapted from Shah (1994a: Table 1.4 and 1994b: Table 6). 
Notes: N = national government, R = regional government, L = local government. 
Table 4: Distribution of Tax Revenue in Selected Countries 
Total general government tax revenue* 
As % of total 
Country Year As %of Central gov- Regional gov- Local govern-
GDP ernment ernment ment 
Industrial countries 
Australia 1995 28.9 76.6 19.9 3.5 
Belgium 1994 45.7 94.8 n.a. 5.2 
Canada 1993 38.7 53.5 36.5 10.0 
France 1995 42.4 89.8 n.a. 10.2 
Germany 1995 41.1 73.0 21.0 6.0 
Netherlands 1995 44.7 96.3 n.a. 3.7 
Norway 1994 40.3 78.6 n.a. 21.4 
Spain 1993 33.2 86.6 4.6 8.8 
United Kingdom 1995 34.8 96.4 n.a. 3.6 
United States 1994 27.0 65.7 20.6 13.7 
Developing and transition countries 
Argentina 1992 19.8 57.2 42.8 u. 
Brazil 1993 25.7 71.4 26.0 2.6 
India 1993 14.9 61.8 38.2 u. 
Kenya 1994 21.1 97.8 n.a. 2.2 
Mexico 1993 .. 16.3 84.6 15.4 u. 
Poland 1995 40.0 92.1 n.a. 7.9 
Russian Federation 1995 29.0 60.0 u. 40.0 
South Africa 1994 27.6 91.4 3.1 5.5 
Thailand 1995 18.2 94.9 ri.a. 5.1 
Sourc([. International Monetary Fund (1997). 
Notes: n.a. stands for not applicable; u. stands for data unovoiloble. 
* General government is defined to include the central government; the social security system; and regional 
and local governments. Tax revenue is defined as unrequited, compulsory payments to government, ex-
cluding non-tax categories (e.g. fees, sales and fines). 
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2.2.3 Intergovernmental Transfers and Grants 
2.2.3.1 The Need for Transfers and Grants 
Imbalances or "fiscal gaps" occur when expenditure needs are not covered by available 
revenue. There are two types of such fiscal imbalances:34 Horizontal imbalances arise when 
resources, in relation to expenditlJ.re functions, are unevenly spread between jurisdictions 
within the same level of government. Vertical Imbalances are due to a mismatch between 
the assignment of expenditure functions and revenue sources to different levels of gov-
ernment, in which case one level may find that its expenditure needs are not covered by 
the revenue at its disposal. To ensure that governments are able to fulfil the functions 
assigned to them, there is a need to address horizontal and vertical imbalances. 
Vertical imbalances can be addressed by sharing the yield of a particular tax, or a general 
pool of revenues, between different levels of government. An entitlement to receive a 
percentage of the proceeds of a shared tax can make the income derived from constitu-
tionally shared taxes very close to own revenue35 (Biehl 1994: 88). The greater the fiscal 
gap, after the sharing of revenue if this is practised, the more important are intergovern-
mental transfers and grants (Ahmad and Craig 1997, Shah 1994a: 22-51 and 1994b: 24-
39, Oates 1993: 65-118). Apart from ensuring that governments have sufficient revenue 
to fulfil their functions, there are various other objectives of transfers and grants. 
2.2.3.2 Objectives of Transfers and Grants 
Stabilisation can be achieved through adjusting the total level of transfers, as well as their 
distribution. This may be the case when some regions are more heavily affected than 
others by economic downturns. A decline in demand for natural resources, for instance, 
directly affects those regions were mining operations provide a substantial share of em-
ployment opportunities. Shah (1994a: 32) outlines the counter-cyclical effect that can be 
achieved: "Grants could increase in periods of slack economic activity to encourage local 
expenditure and diminish during the upswing of the economic cycle." 
34 The indicator of "fiscal dependency" is used to measure such imbalances (e.g. Rao and Vaillancourt 
1994: 104, Wolman 1990: 40, Nathan and Balmaceda 1990: 62). The share of regional or local expenditure 
that is not covered by own revenue indicates the extent of fiscal dependency of subnational governments. 
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Equity between the various regions of a country often requires that those authorities with 
insufficient fiscal capacities receive additional funds to provide a basic level of service~ to 
the public (Heyns 1995, Ladd and Yinger 1994). While some countries accept differential 
benefits, others emphasise the need to provide equivalent services. Equalisation may be 
aimed at equalising the actual performances (outputs) of different jurisdictions in order 
to achieve uniformity. Alt~rnatively, the goal may be to equalise fiscal capacities (inputs) 
without influencing the specific configuration of services (Wehner 1997a: 4). 
Minimum or national standards aim at ensuring a minimum of service delivery to be 
achieved by subnational units. Such standards are often thought to be in the national in-
terest, to insure social and economic unity, or to further social justice. This objective is 
closely linked to the concept of output equity.36 
EJlicienry in the provision of a service is threatened by spillovers: "In such circumstances, 
regional governments may consider only benefits to their own citizens and underprovide 
public services, hence yielding a case for supplementary central government grants for 
the given purpose" (Ahmad and Craig 1997: 82). 
Sometimes these objectives are in conflict with each other (Ahmad and Craig 1997: 84-
86). For instance, stabilisation and equity goals may be in conflict when the activities of 
the national government have a differential effect on subnational authorities. The objec-
tives of equity and efficiency maybe in conflict where the extent of equalisation rewards 
regions with a low fiscal capacity. 
2.2.3.3 The Design of Transfers and Grants 
The question remains as to which design of transfers and grants can be applied for 
achieving such objectives. Several basic choices have to be made by the policy-maker. 
Conditionality versus Non-Conditionality. The contributing government can increase its con-
trol over the spending activities of the recipient government by attaching conditions to 
any payments that are made. Thi~.may be necessary to ensure that certain minimum 
35 Own revenue is the revenue derived from taxation that is levied directly by a jurisdiction. 
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standards are met or that a specific expenditure is effected: "The main justification for 
conditional grants over unconditional grants, however, must be that local decision mak-
ing fails to produce the socially optimal outcome, as in the case of interjurisdictional 
spillovers ... " (Ahmad and Craig 1997: 87). The specific design of conditionality also 
needs to be considered (Wehner 1997a: 4). Input-based conditions restrict the use of a 
, grant to a specific sector or programme. Output-based conditions, on the other hand, 
requires certain targets to be achieved by the recipient. In the latter case, there is a strong 
incentive to provide a service at the least possible cost, as the recipient authority would 
be free to use the remainder of a grant on its own priorities. Problems arise where there 
is a lack of capacity to enforce conditions. 
Matching versus Non-Matching Conditional Grants. A Matching requirement forces the recipi-
ent government to supplement a granted amount for a specific purpose with own funds 
equivalent to an agreed percentage of the grant. The national government is thereby able 
to influence the spending of the recipient government by providing an incentive to pri-
oritise certain services. Problems may arise when some regions are able to exercise more 
influence on the total size of a matching grant, simply due to their fiscal capacity. 
The Extent of Equalisation. The more weight is assigned to indicators of fiscal need, the 
greater the equalising effect of such transfers or grants across regions. 
Open-Ended versus Capped.37 Open-ended matching grants can serve to fully acknowledge 
detectable spillovers, thereby ensuring that the desired level of services is provided. 
However, it is often necessary to cap the total amount available for such 'purposes due to 
budgetary constraints. Without caps, national spending may be determined in part by 
subnational decisions, which would blur accountability. 
Grant design should take into account the objectives that are to be achieved, as different 
scenarios require different designs (Shah 1994b: 24-27). For example: 
36 In some countries, such as Canada, the tenn "national" standards is often used instead of "minimum" 
standards, to denote the idea that some common level of services, wherever one lives, is an aspect of 110-
tionol citizenship. 
37 An open-ended payment is not subject to a maximum total amount To the contrary, if a payment is 
capped, a limit is set with regard to the total amount 
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Vertical fiscal imbalances, due to expenditure needs being greater than revenue-raising ca-
pacity, may be addressed through general transfers (or revenue-sharing). Should this not 
suffice, changes to the assignment of functions and revenue sources may be necessary. 
Horizontal fiscal imbalances, due to different revenue-raising capacities, may call for general 
equalisation transfers. These would protect the general ability of recipient governments 
to fulfil their functions, while not distorting their expenditure decisions. 
Benifit spillovers may be fully compensated through open-ended matching transfers, with 
the matching rate determined by the benefit-spillout ratio (i.e. the cost incurred by the 
use of a particular service by non-residents). 
Ensuring minimum or national standards may be effected by conditional grants. The recipient 
would be bound to fulfil the requirements the grantor attaches to such funds, with the 
result that national priorities are reflected in subnational expenditures. 
In practice, numerous problems are encountered. These include confusion about transfer 
and grant objectives, and the appropriate design to achieve such an objective, a lack of 
transparency with regard to allocations, or the absence of explicit standards.38 In other 
instances, especially in developing countries, a lack of reliable data is an obstacle to the 
design of an appropriate formula.39 
2.2.3.4 Institutional Arrangements 
There are at least four possible models for assigning institutional responsibility for the 
guidance of a system of transfers and grants. First, the task could be delegated to an in-
dependent panel of experts. This would place emphasis on depoliticising the process, but 
the use of non-elected specialists raises questions of accountability. The Australian 
Commonwealth Grants Commission (Craig 1997: 184-185) and the Indian Finance 
Commissions (Hemming et al 1997: 531-532) are examples of this option. Second, the 
38 These problems have been well documented in the Indian case (Hemming et al1997: 531-533, Cashin 
and Sahay 1995, Chelliah 1994). Increasingly larger amounts of the Union Budget have been earmarked for 
the states over the past two decades (Economic Times, 27January 1999). The Tenth Finance Commission 
. proposed to guarantee the states a definite share in the total central pool of taxes to ensure greater predict-
ability, stability and transparency (Andhra Pradesh DailY News, 1 March 1997). 
39 The case of Ethiopia is instructive in this regard (Brosio and Gupta 1997). 
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central government could be responsible for determining subnational shares. This would 
allow greater control by the centre, but undermines the autonomy of subnational gov-
ernments. For instance, federal grants in the United States, in relation to state and local 
expenditures, have fluctuated substantially over the past decades (Stotsky and Sunley 
1997: 368-372). Third, the process could be finalised by agreement in an intergovern-
mental body, based on bargaining. This may help to build consensus amongst the par-
ticipants, but may also favour a few participants with strong bargaining positions. This 
has been a characteristic feature in Canada (Krelove et a11997: 213-220). FinallY, a system 
of transfers and grants may be outlined in detail in a constitution, which greatly reduces 
the need to assign responsibility for the design of transfers and grants according to one 
of the above options. Such arrangements produce predictability, but reduce the flexibility 
to adapt a system in line with ch~ging needs and circumstances. For instance, the Basic 
Low for the Federal Republic ofGerma1!J (1949) outlines the revenue shares from particular 
taxes accruing to the different levels of government, and the way in which these are to be 
distributed (Spahn and F6ttinger 1997: 228-230). 
2.2.3.5 Framework for Transfers and Grants 
A specific design of intergovernmental transfers and grants should attempt to reconcile a 
number of criteria (Shah 1994a: 33-34): subnational autonomy, revenue adequacy, equity, 
predictability, efficiency, simplicity, incentive for sound fiscal management, and safe-
guarding the grantor's objectives. Clearly, these criteria can be in conflict with each other. 
For example, there is a trade-off between protecting the autonomy of sub national gov-
ernments and the desire to safeguard the grantor's objectives. In practice, value judge-
ments determine which of these principles will be maximised. 
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Figure 1: Regional Fiscal Dependency in Selected Countries 
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Table 5: Theoretical Framework for Intergovernmental Transfers and Grants 
Criteria Comments 
Auton0"!Y Subnational governments should have independence and flexibility in setting their 
own priorities. 
Revenue Adequary Subnational governments should have adequate revenues to fulfil the functions 
assigned to them. 
EquifY Allocations to subnational governments should vary positively with fiscal need 
factors and inversely with taxable capacity. 
Predictabilzty Transfer and grant mechanisms should ensure the predictability of subnational gov-
ernment shares. 
Efficimry Design of system should be neutral as to subnational government choices about the 
allocation of resources to different sectors or types of activity. 
Simplz'cifY Allocations should be based on objective factors which are transparent and not 
prone to manipulation. 
Incentive Design of system should provide incentives for sound fiscal management and dis-
courage inefficient practices. 
Safeguard of graTltor's Design of grants should ensure that the grant recipients properly adhere to certain 
objeaives well-defined objectives. 
Source: Adapted from Shah (1994a: 33-3lf). 
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2.2.4 Borrowing Arrangements 
2.2.4.1 The Need for Subnational Government Borrowing 
The income of a government is in many cases insufficient to finance all its spending, 
which results in a deficit.40 Although a government may decide to raise taxes to cover the 
deficit, it may also resort to borrowing. 
Subnational government borrowing is required to fmance substantial capital41 spending 
(Oates 1993: 153). Equity considerations support the argument that the cost of an in-
vestment project should be spread across a number of years to coincide more closely 
with the stream of future benefits. However, if the returns 'from an investment do not 
cover the costs of debt repayment, future generations are likely to have to pay higher 
taxes to payoff debt that was accumulated in the past. High costs of debt repayment, in 
tum, restrict the ability of the government to fund needed programmes (Abedian et a! 
1997: 25-29). In addition, it might also be argued that access to borrowing fosters effi-
ciency. Financial markets would penalise poor performance by raising interest rates or 
blocking access to further funds. 
2.2.4.2 Possible Approaches to );ubnational Government Borrowing 
The following are the main possible approaches to subnational borrowing (Ter-
Minassian and Craig 1997): 
Tota! reliance on market discipline forfeits any legal constraints on the borrowing activities of 
subnational governments (e.g. Canada, Finland and Russia). 
A co-operative approach to debt controls arrives at limits on the indebtedness of sub national 
governments through a negotiating process between the central and lower levels of gov-
ernment (e.g. Australia and Denmark). 
40 A deficit is the amount of money by which planned government expenditures are more than the revenue 
. expected to be available. 
41 Capital goods are goods that are used in the production of other goods or services, for instance machin-
ery, vehicles, buildings etc. 
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A rules-based approach controls sub national borrowing through standing legal rules (e.g. 
Germany, Switzerland and the United States). For instance, borrowing may be restricted 
to investment purposes (the so-called "golden rule"), or required not to exceed a certain 
level of indebtedness. 
Direct centralised control over sub national borrowing (e.g. Chile and Spain) may take a num-
ber of forms. The central government may set annual limits on the overall debt of indi-
vidual subnational jurisdictions, authorise individual borrowing activities, or undertake all 
government borrowing with subsequent on-lending to sub national authorities. 
Ter-Minassian and Craig (1997: 169-171) conclude that no standard pattern can be ob-
served with regard to the regulation of subnational government borrowing. They note 
that the nature and coverage of controls on subnational government borrowing reflects 
~. 
the individual country's history, the balance of power between various levels of govern-
ment, macro-economic conditions and the development of financial markets. 
2.3 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed considerations in the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
The discussion generated economic reference frameworks with regard to the assignment 
of expenditure responsibilities, sources of revenue, and the design of a system of inter-
governmental transfers and grants. These frameworks can be utilised for the assessment 
of the South African system. However, the analysis also indicated that constitutions can 
impose limits on fiscal design. The implication is that any policy recommendations con-
cerning fiscal design cannot ignore an existing constitutional framework. This notion will 
be developed further in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
FISCAL FEDERALISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
This chapter contains a comparison of two countries which served as prominent refer-
ence models for the structure of government during the constitutional negotiations in 
South Africa. The chapter tracks 'Some of the key options that constitutional designers 
were faced with, and which have a bearing on fiscal arrangements. The purposes of the 
chapter are to demonstrate the practical relevance of the theoretical considerations out-
lined in the previous chapter, and to provide a comparative context, from a fiscal per-
spective, for the description and analysis of the South African system. 
During the constitutional negotiations in South Africa, Canada and Germany were re-
peatedly used as reference models for the design of the country's provincial system (e.g. 
Constitutional Assembly 1995, De Villiers 1994b).42 Canada and Germany exemplify 
diametrically opposed visions of a system of regional government: the divided and the 
shared model respectively. Canada is perhaps the most decentralised federation in the 
world, whereas the German syste'.:n is characterised by a strong central government. 
While the Canadian model appealed to supporters of substantial autonomy for the re-
gions, the German "unitary federation" (Hesse 1962) served as a model for those fa-
vouring a system of regional government that complements the role of the centre.43 
Canada is a federation of ten provinces and three territories characterised by differences 
in territorial size, economic development, population and ethnic composition. The British 
North America Act of 1867 and its subsequent amendments laid the basis for today's fed-
eralism (Simeon and Robinson 1990: 19_30).44 
42 Simeon (1998: 50-51) summarises: "Among the models which South Africa considered were those of 
Canada and Germany - Canada perhaps because of the Commonwealth link, and its marriage of federalism 
with a parliamentary system of government; Germany perhaps because of other cultural affinities, and its 
quite different model: The United States, India and Australia have also been sources of ideas, in the latter 
two cases in large part because they are relatively centralised models." 
43 The German system appealed to a group of ANC strategists who visited the country as part of a study 
tour in 1992. Its integrated design is favoured in the 1993 "ANC Regional Policy" (Besdziek 1998). 
44 The Constitution Aa (1982) attempted to modernise the Constitution. It added a Charter of Rights, the 
recognition of Aboriginal rights, a commitment to the principle of equalisation and an amending formula, 
among other things. The British North Amen·ca Aa (1867) was renamed the Constitution Aa (1867). 
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Gennany is a federation of 16 provinces (Lander), five of which were incorporated from 
the territory of the fonner Gennan Democratic Republic with unification on 3 October 
1990 (Burgess and Gress 1993). The Basic Law for the Federal Republic ofGerma1fY (Grundge-
set:(j of 1949 regulates the relationship between the levels of government.45 
3.1 Expenditure Assignment 
A key issue in the assignment of expenditure functions is to what extent functions should 
be shared or divided. Shared functions usually involve one level setting nonns and stan-
dards, while delegating implementation to lower levels of government. The clear division 
of functions, on the other hand, relies on the furthest possible separation of responsibili-
ties. If one level is responsible for setting nonns and standards that are administered by 
another level, the question follows whether and how the latter can participate in the for-
mulation of policy. 
3.1.1 Canada 
The Constitution Act (sections 91 and 92) lists exclusive federal and provincial functions.46 
The federal government regulates the provision of goods and services with national 
scope, such as defence and international affairs. The provinces are assigned the right to 
regulate "generally all matters of a merely local or private nature in the province", which 
includes health care and education. Local governments in Canada are creatures of their 
provincial government (Bird and Chen 1998).47 Fonnal concurrency is limited to agri-
culture and immigration. In the case of conflict in the areas of concurrent federal and 
provincial powers, federal law supersedes.48 Apart from these cases, the Canadian Con-
45 For overviews of Gennany's fiscal Constitution, refer to Laufer and Miinch (1997: 150-185) and Bun-
desministerium der Finanzen (1998 and 1996: 93-108). 
46 The Canawan Supreme Court plays a pivotal role in detennining into whose area of competence a par-
ticular piece oflegislation falls (Coder 1~96). For an analysis of the impact of Supreme Court on federalism 
in the United States, see Wise (1998). 
47 There are approximately 8000 local units, including agencies, commissions, special-purpose boards, mu-
nicipal governments and school authorities. 
48 In 1949 old age pensions was added as an area of concurrent juriswction in which provinces retain 
paramountcy (Simeon 1998: 51). 
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stitution emphasises exclusive functional responsibility.49 There is no unified public serv-
ice, and the levels of government rely on separate administrations to implement policies. 
The role of the Senate as a repreSJ!ntative of the provinces in the national law-making 
process is largely symbolic (Verney 1995: 95). Despite formal powers, the regional cham-
ber rarely refuses the passage of a bill. Since it is an appointed bodyso, the Senate is not 
considered to have the political mandate to obstruct the democratically elected House of 
Commons. The failure of the Senate as an effective provincial representative has 
strengthened the role of "federal-provincial diplomacy" (Simeon 1972) through negotia-
tions by the executives of the different governments (Watts 1990: 3). 
3.1.2 Germaf!Y 
The Grundgesetz assigns specific legislative competencies to the federal government (Bund) 
(Art. 71 and 73), such as defence;foreign affairs, immigration and currency matters. The 
residual competencies are left to the Lander (Art. 70), including education, police and in-
ternal administration (Fuhr 1997: 28-58, Hesse and Ellwein 1992: 78-81). A substantial 
list of concurrent competencies (Art. 72, 74 and 74a) names those areas in which the 
Lander may exercise legislative authority as long as the Bund does not do so (e.g. welfare 
and public health). The Bund also has a framework legislation authority that allows it to 
legislate basic norms and standards, but no details, in seven areas (Art. 75) (e.g. the public 
service, tertiary education, and the media). Furthermore, article 91a provides for a num-
ber of shared responsibilities (e.g. the construction of universities and coastal protection). 
In case of conflict between legislation, federal law supersedes if the federal government 
has jurisdiction (Art. 31). Federal norms and standards are encouraged by the constitu-
tional demand for the creation of equal living conditions throughout the country (Art. 
72(2»). The functions of local governments are mostly delegated, relating to public health 
and basic services (water, electricity, gas, public transport and fire protection).Sl Charac-
49 Some exclusively assigned areas have been subject to increased co-operation between the levels of gov-
ernment. For example, innovative health care programmes were pioneered in the western provinces, but 
later promoted jointly by the federal and provincial levels (Gray and White 1989). Defacto concurrency also 
occurs when both levels move into new areas of activity that are not assigned in the Constitution, as they 
were not matters of concern in the previous century when it was drafted (Simeon 1998: 52). 
50 It consists of 24 senators for each of the four divisions of Ontario, Quebec, the three maritime prov-
inces and the four western provinces. The senators are appointed by the federal government, and once 
appointed hold office until age 75. Party alignment plays the major role in the appointment process. 
51 Gennany has a two-tier system of local government (De Villiers 1997a: 6, Hesse and Ellwein 1992: 68-
70). 
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teristic of German federalism is the integration of Bund and Under tasks. While the Bund 
has broad legislative authority to set unifonn standards, the Under provide most of the 
administrative infrastructure. The Bund has few executive organs (e.g. the foreign service, 
army and border control). Scharpf's (1988) concept of "policy interlacing" (Politikverjlech-
tung) summarises this mutual dependency (see also: Rudzio 1991: 352-359). 
As the federal Parliament sets policy standards in many areas that are administered by the 
Under, the regional chamber of P.arliament, the Bundesrat, acts as a powerful direct repre-
sentative of the governments of the Under.52 The consent of the Bundesrat is required for 
bills that affect the Under. The Bundesrat may object to all other legislation, which can be 
overruled by the Bundestag, the lower house of Parliament (Art. 77). In case of conflict 
between the two houses, a mediation committee is fonned of 16 members from each 
house. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the mediation committee is able to facili-
tate an agreement (Hesse and Ellwein 1997: 318-319). 
3.2 Revenue Assignment 
With regard to the assignment ofrevenue sources, a central question is whether levels of 
government should have independent access to tax bases, or whether revenues should be 
shared. While the first option maximises the autonomy and independence of different 
governments, the latter option allows for a unifonn tax regime across the country. 
3.2.1 Canada 
The Constitution Act (section 91(3)) grants the federal Parliament the power to levy indi-
rect as well as direct taxes, while the provinces are confined to direct taxation.53 In prac-
tice both levels have a wide range of revenue-raising powers. The federal government 
mainly relies on revenue from personal and corporate income taxes, as well as the Goods 
and Services Tax (GS1) levied since the beginning of 1991 (Krelove et a11997: 209). The 
provinces impose both personal and corporate income taxes, the collection of which is 
administered by the federal government (with the exception of Quebec's) on the basis of 
52 The Prime Minister of each Landis a member of the Btlnriesrat, in addition to other delegates. The deIe-
. gates of a particular Land always vote as a block, not individually. 
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tax collection agreements. A 1982 constitutional amendment allowed provincial use of 
taxes on natural resources. Judicial interpretation in Can~da further allows the provincial 
use of retail sales tax, which all provinces collect, by deeming it to be a direct tax levied 
on the consumer but collected by the seller. 
3.2.2 Germa1!)l 
The Grundgesetz (Art. 106) applies the separation principle to most taxes, but the sharing 
principle to the most important taxes, namely income tax, corporation tax and VAT 
(Spahn and F6ttinger 1997: 228-230).54 The Bund and the Under share equally the reve-
nue from income tax and corporation tax. The respective shares of the Bund and th"e 
Under in the revenue from the VAT are determined by federal legislation requiring the 
consent of the Bundesrat. This arrangement introduces an element of flexibility in accor-
dance with changing needs and circumstances.55 Both the Bund and the Under receive 
two thirds of their income from shared taxes. Tax legislation remains centralised (Hesse 
and Ellwein 1992: 83).56 Local governments raise their own revenue mostly from service 
charges, property taxes and a local business tax5? They also receive 15 per cent of per-
sonal income tax, on the basis of the income tax paid by their population. 
Table 6: Tax Sharing in Gennany (1997) 
In per cent of revenue co!leaed 
Joint tax Federal 
Personal income tax 42.5 
Corporate income tax 50.0 
Value-added tax 50":5 
Local business tax* 5 
Source: Gf'I.Indgeset~ Spahn and Fottinger (1997). 
Provincial 
42.5 
50.0 
49.5 
15 
Note: * The shares result from a formula apportionment and are rounded. 
Local 
15.0 
o 
o 
80.0 
53 Direct taxation is taxation on individuals or companies, which is paid direcdy by them or through their 
employer. Usually, it is levied on wealth or income. Indirect taxation is levied on expenditure. 
54 Interestingly, the former Minister of Finance, Theo Waigel, supported a separation of revenues and 
powers of taxation. This would have left indirect taxation to the Bund and direct taxation to the Under (Der 
Spiegel, 10 August 1998). 
55 In the period between 1995 and 1996, the share of the Bundwas lowered from 56 to 50.5 per cent, con-
sequendy raising the Under share to 49.5 per cent The adjustment was made necessary by changes con-
cerning the taxability of child maintenance grants, which caused a lower tax yield for the Under (Laufer and 
Miinch 1997: 165-167). 
56 Local governments in Germany have some discretion with regard to the setting of tax rates. 
5? The local business tax was initially a three-part tax on local business capital, capital returns, and wage 
sums paid (Biehl 1994: 87). The latter p~ of the business tax was abolished in 1980, while the federal gov-
ernment in 1997 initiated moves to do away with its working capital component (Spahn and Fottinger 
1997: Footnote 4). About 15 per cent of the revenue collected from the local business tax are passed on to 
the Under, and 5 per cent to the Bund 
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3.3 Intergovernmental Transfers and Grants 
The design of intergovernmental transfers and grants requires the following choices: To 
what extent should differences in~:wealth between regions be equalised? Should equalisa-
tion include a redistribution process from rich to poor regions? To what extent should 
the central government influence subnational expenditure through conditional grants? 
3.3.1 Canada 
The Constitution Act (1982) commits the federal government to equalisation "to ensure 
that provincial governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable 
levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation" (section 36). These 
federal grants are based on a formula that compares the tax capacity of each province to 
a representative standard.s8 If a province's total revenue-raising ability falls short of this 
standard, its per capita revenue i~raised to the standard level through federal equalisation 
payments. Only Alberta, British Columbia wd Ontario do not receive equalisation grants 
under this system. French-speaking Quebec is the single largest recipient of equalisation 
payments in absolute terms (Hobson and St-Hilaire 1993). 
Inter-provincial redistribution outside the equalisation programme but through the 
"spending power"S9 of the federal government includes the Canada Health and Social 
Transfer (CHS1) in support of health care, post-secondary education and social assis-
tance programs.60 One condition attached to the CHST is that there be no period of 
minimum residency with respect to social assistance. In the area of public health the only 
other condition is provincial maintenance of the criteria and conditions spelled out in the 
Canada Health Act (1984).61 The "Framework to Improve the Social Union for Canadi-
58 First, the amount of revenue that each province could raise (at national average tax rates) is calculated for 
each kind of revenue that provinces and their local governments typically levy. Second, each province's 
overall ability to raise revenues from these sources is compared to that of the five provinces making up a 
representative standard: Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and British Columbia. For details on 
the formula, see: Krelove et 01 (1997: 215-220) and Shah (1994b: 49-50). 
59 Its "spending power" allows the federal government to spend money in areas assigned to provinces. 
60 The Canada Health and Social Transfer replaced federal transfers for social assistance under the Canada 
Assistance Plan (CAP), and for health and post-secondary education under Established Programs Financ-
ing (EPF) on 1 April 1996 . 
. 61 Health is a provincial competence in Canada. However, broad political consensus made it possible for 
the federal Parliament to pass this act, which established some essential criteria for the entire country. Due 
to this consensus, the act has not been challenged in the constitutional court, although the federal Parlia-
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ans", signed on 4 February 1999 by all governments except Quebec, promises some 
funding predictability in return for a provincial commitment to nation-wide priorities. 
Table 7: Major Federal Transfers to Provinces in Canada (1997-8) 
In millions o£.Canadian dollars unless otherwise indicated 
Province CHST Equalisation Total transfers Total transfers Total transfers 
(dollars per capita) (% of estimated 
revenues} 
Newfoundland 500 933 1351 2400 42 
Prince Edward Island 115 185 281 2000 37 
Nova Scotia 800 1144 1848 1950 42 
New Brunswick 635 883 1434 1870 32 
Quebec 6799 '·3878 10283 1400 28 
Ontario 9082 9082 800 20 
Manitoba 952 1030 1894 1650 35 
Saskatchewan 828 238 964 900 19 
Alberta 2128 2128 750 15 
British Columbia 3166 3166 800 15 
Total 25005 8291 32431 
Source: Website of the Canadian Federal Department of Finance. 
Note.r. The CHST has two components: a cash transfer and a tax point transfer. Tax point transfers involve 
the federal government reducing its taxes to allow provinces to raise theirs by an equal amount. Equalisa-
tion associated with tax point transfers under CHST appears in both the Equalisation and CHST figures. 
Total transfers are adjusted to avoid double counting, and may not add due to rounding. 
3.3.2 Germa1[Y 
Equalisation between the Lander is achieved through two mechanisms (Deutsches Insti-
tut fur Wirtschaftsforschung 1996). First, the Grnndgesetz (Art. 107) allows 25 per cent of 
the Lander share of the yield of the VAT to be used to pay supplementary tax shares to 
those Landerwith a below average tax capacity. The aim is to uplift the fiscal capacity per 
inhabitant of poor Lander to 92 per of the Lander average. Second, horizontal fiscal equali-
sation shifts funds from rich to poor Lander (Shah 1994b: 50-52).62 The aim of horizontal 
equalisation is to achieve a minimum fiscal capacity of95 per cent of Landeraverage.63 
Unconditional supplementary grants from the Bund fill the remaining gap between the 
fiscal capacity of an individual LAnd and the Lander average. 
In addition, the Bund is responsible for financing tasks delegated to the Lander (e.g. stu-
dent support). It also provides conditional grants for "especially important investments", 
ment transgressed its assigned powers. The federal level penalised the use of hospital "user fees" and doc-
tors' "extra billing" with the Canada Health Act by deducting appropriate amounts from the transfers to the 
provinces. This forced the provinces to harmonise their legislation with federal demands (Leslie 1988: 52). 
62 Over a transitional period, from unification until the beginning of 1995, the new .L!imferdid not partici-
pate in the existing horizontal equalisation scheme (Bundesministerium der Finanzen 1997). 
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such as the construction of roads, social housing and hospitals (Art. 104a), and towards 
the financing of the shared responsibilities (Art. 91a and 91b). 
Table 8: Effects of Equalisation in Gennany (1996) 
Fiscal capaci!J per capita in per cent of Under average 
Hessen 
Baden-Wiirtemberg 
Bayem 
Hamburg 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 
Schleswig-Hols tein 
Rheinland-Pfalz 
Niedersachsen 
Saarland 
Brandenburg 
Sachsen 
Thiiringen 
Sachsen-Anhalt 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommem 
Bremen 
Berlin 
Before equalisation 
117.2 
108.8 
108.6 
107.9 
106.4 
99.6 
96.2 
95.4 
89.7 
85.1 
84.5 
84.0 
~S3.9 
83.5 
79.2 
72.3 
Source: Bundesministerium der Finanzen (1998: 34-35). 
After horizontal 
equalisation 
104.1 
102.9 
102.8 
102.8 
102.2 
99.8 
97.6 
97.1 
95.0 
95.0 
95.0 
95.0 
95.0 
95.0 
96.4 
95.0 
After additional 
federal grants* 
104.1 
102.9 
102.8 
102.8 
102.2 
103.3 
103.6 
101.1 
104.5 
120.0 
119.0 
120.6 
120.6 
121.4 
105.0 
114.6 
Note: * Excluding budget consolidation grants to Bremen (OM 1.8 billion) and Saarland (OM 1.6 billion). 
3.4 Borrowing Arrangements 
Finally, governments require access to borrowing to finance capital projects. But the 
question remains how subnational access to borrowing should be regulated: Should there 
be rules, co-ordinating procedures or centralised control? Or should subnational bor-
rowing be subject to market discipline only? 
3.4.1 Canada 
Both the federal and provincial governments can borrow funds for current and capital 
purposes without constitutional or other legal restrictions. They are also not required to 
balance their budgets annually and are only subject to market discipline, since one or 
more international investment firms rate their debt. In recent years, some of these ratings 
have been downgraded, reflecting increasing public concern about the accumulation of 
debt. Debt targets are now used as part of consolidation efforts. Municipal governments 
63 The population figures of cities with Landerstatus are weighed 35 per cent higher than those of "normal" 
Under to compensate for the expenses incurred due to their small size. For instance, substantial spillovers 
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are required by the provinces to balance their current account budgets, while capital ex-
penditure is subject to varying restrictions imposed by the different provinces (Krelove et 
a11997: 220-222). 
3.4.2 Germany 
The Grundgesetz (Art. 115(1» restricts the Bund to borrowing for capital expenditure, 
which is referred to as the "golden rule". Similar restrictions are enshrined in the consti-
tutions of the Lander. Local capital expenditure may also be financed through loans, sub-
ject to Lander supervision (Spahn and Fottinger 1997: 236-239). 
3.5 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated the impact that the choice for a particular model of regional 
government has on fiscal arrangements in a country. In the divided model (as in Canada), 
national and regional governments pursue their functions as independentlY as possible and 
directlY access sources of revenue. In the shared model (as in Germany), the emphasis is on 
concurrent responsibility and shared sources of revenue. It is possible to explain the choice 
between these models by factors such as the approach to federation ("bottom up" versus 
"top down" approach to federation), the age of the constitutional framework (older versus 
recent federations) and the prevalence of ethnic cleavages (ethnically heterogeneous versus 
ethnically homogeneous federations). Nonetheless, economic considerations are to some 
extent reflected in both cases. For example, there is congruence with regard to the as-
signment of some expenditure functions with a natiorlaL~cope (e.g. defence and foreign 
affairs). However, the extent of decentralisation is greater in Canada, on both the expen-
diture and revenue side. It is an iQ.teresting question whether, in general, divided models 
are associated with a higher degree of (expenditure and revenue) decentralisation than 
shared models. This issue deserves further research. 
which occur when these cities provide services for residents of surrounding Liil1der. 
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Table 9: Models of Regional Government and their Fiscal Arrangements 
Divided modeL' Canada Shared modeL' Germany 
FundamentaL pn'nciples Diversity, dualism and competition. Uniformity, integration and co-
operation. 
Expenditure assignment 
Revenue assignment 
Equalisation 
Borrowing 
Possible explanatory 
variables 
According to policy areas (e.g. health, 
education, defence). 
Concurrency and joint responsibilities 
minimised: Norms and standards de-
termined by level of government to 
which policy area is assigned. Separate 
federal and provincial administrations. 
No meaningful provincial representa-
tion in national Parliament 
Direct access to own revenue for levels 
of government 
Vertical: Equalisation the sole respon-
sibility of the federal government (pa-
ternal settlement). Regional disparities 
and diversity accepted. 
Separate responsibility. 
Ethnically heterogeneous. Bottom up 
approach to federation. Older consti-
tutional framework (1867). 
45 
According to governmental functions 
(regulation and implementation). 
Concurrency and joint responsibility 
emphasised: Federal government sets 
norms and standards in many areas, but 
depends on subnational administra-
tions. 
Strong provincial representation in 
national Parliament 
S~aring of revenue sources between 
levels of government. 
Horizontal: Equalisation based on the 
principle of interregional solidarity 
(fraternal settlement). Goal to achieve 
uniformity of living conditions. 
Common rules. 
Ethnically homogeneous. Top down 
approach to federation. More recent 
constitutional framework (1949). 
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CHAPTER 4: 
FISCAL FEDERALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
This chapter outlines the design of fiscal federalism in South Africa. It draws mainly on 
the final Constitution and relevant legislation, budgetary data, as well as a discussion of 
suggested and actual practices. It also highlights key issues relating to the functioning of 
the structure of government in the country. Since South Mrica's fiscal structures are still 
evolving, the following analysis is necessarily a snapshot. Nonetheless, it draws together 
some of the central trends that have emerged since the implementation of the new con-
stitutional framework as from 1997. 
In 1997, for the first time, the nine provinces that had been created in 1994 were respon-
sible for drawing up their own budgets, within an overall resource envelope, rather than 
merely managing centrally determined allocations for each spending area. Prior to the 
1997-8 financial year, provincial budgets were the sum of centrally determined allocations 
for various functions. Allocations for specific functions were consolidated in aggregate 
transfers from the budget vote of the national Department of Finance to each province, 
supplemented with specific project funds from other national departments or the Recon-
struction and Development Programme (RDP) fund.64 This process involved a system of 
centrally steered function committees according to expenditure areas (Hartzenberg 1995). 
The 1997-8 budget introduced a system of block grants distributed to the provinces by 
formula. Conditional grants were introduced in the following year, in conjunction with a 
more detailed formula for the distribution of funds between provinces. Local govern-
ment was included in the new system of transfers and grants in 1998. Both local and 
provincial governments now receive a share of nationally collected revenue, in line with 
the provisions of the new Constitution. Fundamental adjustments have thus been af-
fected over the past three years, while a number of details remain to be finalised. 
64 The RDP was the socio-economic policy framework published by the ANC in 1994. The programme 
emphasised two aims: the alleviation of poverty and the reconstruction of the economy (see Lodge 1999: 
27-39). The fund financed related projects across the provinces. The effectiveness of this spending has 
. been subject to controversy. In KwaZulu-Natal, for example, a row erupted in October 1998 when it 
emerged that about R 28 million of RDP funds spent during the 1995-6 and 1996-7 financial years could 
not be fully accounted for (Business D'!},} October 1998). 
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4.1 Expenditure Assignment 
The key to the division of functions is the classification provided in schedules 4 and 5 of 
the Constitution. Schedule 4 lists functional areas of concurrent national and provincial 
legislative competence. Schedule 5 lists functional areas of exclusive provincial legislative 
competence. Both schedules are Ciivided into two parts, A and B. The former contain the 
executive functions of provincial governments, the latter the executive functions of local 
governments. Matters that are not listed in these schedules, the residual, fall under the 
legislative and executive authority of the national sphere. The following section discusses 
the division of legislative powers between the spheres, to gain a clear picture of which 
sphere is responsible for the formulation of policy across various expenditure areas, fol-
lowed by an analysis of executive responsibilities. 
Table 10: Constitutional Assignment of Legislative and Executive Powers in South Mrica 
Part A: 
Provincial 
executive 
junctions 
Part B: 
Local 
executive 
junctions 
Schedule 4: Functional areas of concurrent Schedule 5: Functional areas of exclu-
national and provincial legislative competence 
Administration of indigenous forests, agriculture, 
provincial airports, animal control and diseases, . 
casinos, consumer protectio~, cultural matters, 
disaster management, education excluding tertiary 
education, environment, health services, housing, 
indigenous and customary law, industrial 
promotion, language policy, provincial media 
services, provincial nature conservation, police, 
pollution control, population development, 
property transfer fees, provincial public 
enterprises, public transport, public works, 
regional planning and development, road traffic 
regulation, soil conservation, tourism, trade, 
traditional leadership, urban and rural 
development, vehicle licensing, welfare services. 
Air pollution, building regulations, child care 
facilities, electricity and gas reticulation, fire 
fighting services, local tourism, municipal airports, 
municipal planning, municipal health services, 
municipal public transport, municipal public 
works, Pontoons, ferries, jetties, piers, harbours, 
stormwater management systems in built-up areas, 
trading regulations, water and sanitation services. 
sive provincial legislative competence 
Abattoirs, ambulance services, provincial 
archives, provincial libraries, liquor 
licences, provincial museums, provincial 
planning, provincial cultural matters, 
provincial recreation and amenities, 
provincial sport, provincial roads and 
traffic, veterinary services excluding 
regulation of the profession. 
Beaches and amusement facilities, 
billboards and advertisements in public 
places, cemeteries, funeral parlours and 
crematoria, cleansing, control of public 
nuisances, liquor outlets, facilities for 
animals, fencing and fences, licensing of 
dogs, food outlets, local amenities, local 
sport facilities, markets, municipal 
abattoirs, municipal parks and recreation, 
municipal roads, noise pollution, pounds, 
public places, refuse removal, refuse 
dumps and solid waste disposal, street 
trading, street lighting, traffic and parking. 
Source: The C01utitution of the Republic of South Ajn·ca, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), schedules 4 and 5. 
Note: Schedules 4 and 5 contain additional detail, which has been omitted here for the benefit of brevity. 
Due to the summary of certain items, alphabetical order could not always be maintained. 
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4.1.1 Assignment of Legislative Powers 
4.1.1.1 National, Provincial and Local Legislative Powers 
The national Parliament has the right to pass legislation in any matter, excluding, under 
normal circumstances, those relating to exclusive provincial competencies (section 44). A 
provincial legislature may pass a provincial Constitution, in accordance with the national 
Constitution, pass legislation in those areas that are listed in schedules 4 and 5, and per-
taining to matters that have been delegated to a province through national legislation. 
Furthermore, a province may delegate a legislative power to a municipal council and rec-
ommend legislation to the lower house of the national Parliament, the National Assem-
bly (section 104). Legislating is not a main function of municipalities. A municipality is 
restricted to passing by-laws when this is necessary for the "effective administration" of 
its executive functions, i.e. those listed in parts B of schedules 4 and 5 or delegated to it 
(section 156). A by-law that conflicts with national or provincial legislation is invalid. 
Although provinces have substantial law-making powers, they have so far tended not to 
utilise their legislative "space" to the fullest.65 There are two explanations for this. First, 
many provincial legislatures struggle to legislate beyond the necessary annual appropria-
tions.66 This may be due to the fact that the consideration of national legislation and the 
negotiating of mandates for provincial delegates to the national Parliament are time-
consuming (see section on the participation of provinces in the national law-making pro-
cess). Hindering factors also include a lack of skilled staff to draft legislation, and the 
need for provinces to wait for national legislation to be passed so that their legislation 
would be compatible with it. Second, national norms and standards in the concurrent areas 
are rather detailed, leaving little to be regulated by provincial legislation (see section on 
65 The provincial legislatures of Mpumalanga and the Northern Cape passed only two bills in 1997, while 
sitting for 33 and 36 days respectively. The Western Cape legislature passed the most bills, 13 in.55 days, 
followed by KwaZulu-Natal, North West and Gauteng with 11 bills each. The Gauteng legislature sat for 
34 days, while the KwaZulu-Natal and North West legislatures sat for 22 days each. The Eastern Cape 
legislature sat for the 60 days in 1997, the highest number across provinces, and passed nine bills. The Free 
State and Northern Province legislatures passed seven bills each, while sitting for 32 and 22 days respec-
tively (Business Dtg, 24 March 1998). By now one may have expected consolidating legislation in areas of 
provincial competence, and more progress in repealing legislation inherited from the apartheid era. 
66 Some provinces still rely on the assis~ce of the national Department of Finance for drafting their 
budgets (Interview: Donian, 8 April 1999). The review of budgets often stretches the ability of provincial 
legislatures (e.g. Newham 1997). The lack of capacity in some provinces to conduct an efficient legislative 
process was highlighted when all provincial expenditure in the Eastern Cape from April to August 1998 
turned out to have been illegal. The office of Premier Makhenkesi Stofile had omitted to publish the 1998-
9 Appropn'atioll BiU in the Government Gazette due to an "oversight" (Busilless Dtg, 30 September 1998). 
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mandates). Welfare is a case in point. Since entitlements are determined at national level, 
no variation of entitlements can occur across provinces. Provinces are bound to comply 
administratively with these national requirements. 
Only two provinces, in which the ANC did not obtain a majority in the 1994 elections, 
have so far drawn up their own Constitutions, the Western Cape and KwaZulu:-Natal. 
The Constitutional Court ruled that the Constitution oj the Western Cape required some 
technical adjustments to comply with the national Constitution, which were effected.67 
Premier Hernu~ Kriel signed the Constitution oJthe Western Cape into law on lS January 
1998. Amongst other items~ it marked the end of three years of compulsory power-
sharing between the NP and the ANC in the province (Business Dqy, 16 January 1998). 
The Constitution oJKwaZulu-Nata/was rejected by the Constitutional Court after being 
drafted in 1996. It was found to usurp powers not accruing to the province according to 
the national Constitution.68 After the 1999 elections, and the formation of a coalition 
government between the IFP and ANC in the province, the parties agreed to resume 
talks on the provincial Constitution (Business Dqy, 21 June 1999).69 
4.1.1.2 Conflict Between Legislation 
In case of conflict between national and provincial legislation falling within a concurrent 
area, national legislation prevails under certain conditions, for instance if it deals with a 
matter that cannot be regulated effectively at the provincial sphere or that requires uni-
formity across the nation. Such uniformity must be achieved by prescribing norms and 
standards, frameworks or national policies. National legislation relating to a concurrent 
matter also prevails if it is necessary f~r the maintenance of national security or economic 
unity, the protection of the common market, the promotion of economic activities across 
provincial boundaries, to promote equal opportunity or equal access to government 
services, or the protection of the environment (section 146(2)). National legislation fur-
ther prevails if it is to prevent unreasonable action by a province that is prejudicial to an-
other or the country as a whole or impedes the implementation of national economic 
policy (section 146(3)). 
67 Certification of the Co11stitution of the Western Cope, 1997,1997 (4) SA 794 (cq and 1997 (9) BCLR 1167 (cq. 
68 Certification of the Constitution of the Province ofKwaZulu-Nata~ 1996,1996 (11) BCLR 1419 (cq. 
69 Issues to be raised include the extension of the provincial cabinet, the role and powers of the Zulu mon-
archy, and traditional leaders. 
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While national legislation in the concurrent areas is only to prevail if certain conditions 
are fulfilled, it is questionable how much legislative power these provisions leave to 
provinces. While the list of conditions in sections 146(2) and (3) is extensive, it suffices if 
only one of them is met in order for national legislation to prevail. Nonetheless, the Con-
stitutional Court found that this did not presume in favour of national legislation, as 
these factors were "objectively justiciable" in a court (Certification Judgement II, para. 155). 
The national Parliament may also intervene in exclusive provincial areas by passing legis-
lation if this is required in order to: maintain national security, economic unity or essen-
tial national standards; establish minimum standards required for the rendering of serv-
ices; or prevent unreasonable action by a province which is prejudicial to the interests of 
another province or to the country as a whole (section 44(2)). The Uquor Bill (1998) was 
an attempt by the national Department of Trade and Industry to regulate an area that is 
exclusively assigned to the provinces by the Constitution. This test case has been referred 
to the Constitutional Court for clarification (Business Dqy, 17 February 1999). 
4.1.1.3 Provincial Participation in the National Law-Making Process 
While the national Parliament has very broad legislative powers, the Constitution also 
provides for the participation of provinces in the national law-making process. The Na-
tional Council of Provinces (NCOP) represents the provinces to ensure that provincial 
interests are taken into account in the national sphere of government. It participates in 
the national legislative process and provides a forum for issues affecting the provinces 
(section 42(4)). The NCOP plays an important role in approving national legislation that 
affects the provinces (section 76). Although it does not have an absolute veto, the vote 
of the NCOP in case of section 76 legislation represents the composite result of a vote of 
each provincial legislature. To over-ride an NCOP decision on such legislation, the Na-
tional Assembly requires a two-thirds majority. Legislation deemed not to affect the 
provinces (section 75) and money bills (section 77)70 require only a non-binding recom-
mendation from the NCOP to the National Assembly (Wehner 1997b), as the assembly 
can choose to overrule the council's vote with a simple majority. 
70 A money bill is defined as a "bill that appropriates money or imposes taxes, levies or duties". 
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The Constitution (section 78) proyides for a mediation committee in case of conflict 
between the National Assembly and the NCOP with regard to section 76 legislation. This 
body is closely modelled on the German example.71 In contrast with the frequent use of 
the mediation committee in Germany, however, the South African conflict-resolution 
mechanism has not been utilised so far. This may be largely due to the fact that the same 
party, the ANC, enjoys a substantial majority in both houses. So far, the closest a situa-
tion has come to necessitating the use of the mediation committee was in November 
1998. Changes to the Liquor Bill (1998) by the Select Committee on Trade and Industry 
were endorsed by the NCOP, across party lines, and to the dismay of the national Min-
ister of Trade and Industry, Alec Erwin. The Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry 
in the National Assembly subsequently voted to concur with the council's amendments, 
thus avoiding the possibility of mediation being needed to resolve differences over the 
bill between the two houses (Business Dqy, 6 November 1998). 
The Constitution also envisages the participation, when necessary, of organised local 
government in the proceedings of the NCOP (sections 67 and 163). Up to ten part-time 
representatives designated by organised local government may participate, but not vote 
(Bhabha 1997). The South African Local Government Association (SALGA) has partici-
pated in discussions on matters affecting local government.72 
The NCOP has only been in existence since 1997, and it has been a challenge to ensure 
the smooth running of its affairs .£Murray and Simeon 1998, Sehurutshe and Newham 
1998, Van Heerden 1997). The effective co-ordination of various role-players and com-
munication processes had to be achieved (NCOP 1999a, b and c). Provinces had to re-
spond to the demands of participating in the national Parliament, by attempting to rec-
oncile the tension between their own legislative activities and the requirement to develop 
mandates for national legislation. The complexity of national bills often does not allow 
members of provincial legislatures to give their NCOP delegates a considered mandate 
(Friedman 1999: 46). Nonetheless, the NCOP passed 108 bills in 1997,27 of which were 
bills affecting the provinces. The council amended nine section 75 bills and 12 section 76 
71 The mediation committee consists of nine members of the National Assembly and one delegate from 
each of the nine provincial delegations in the NCOP. Agreement on a version of a bill is reached when at 
least five members of each set of representatives agree . 
. 72 For instance in the negotiations leading up to the approval of the intervention by the government of the 
Eastern Cape in the municipality of Butterworth. This case is dealt with in detail in the section on moni-
toring and intervention. 
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bills (NeOp 1998). The NeOp also used its right to initiate legislation with the Organised 
Local Government Bill (1997). It remains to be seen whether such initiatives will become 
more commonplace in the future. 
Friedman (1999: 46) concludes that the NeOp "might become a dynamic part of our 
political process if parties would relax their internal discipline and allow delegates to vote 
according to their perceived provincial interests rather than the party line. They do not. 
So, instead of becoming a site for shifting alliances and bargaining between politicians 
with constituencies, the NeOp becomes another rubber stamp, as wasteful and irrele-
vant as the old Senate." 
4.1.2 Assignment of Executive Responsibilities 
4.1.2.1 National, Provincial and Local Executive Responsibilities 
While the national Parliament haS" broad powers to set policy standards, the provinces 
have extensive executive responsibilities. They are not only the principle agents for im-
plementing provincial legislation, but also national legislation within the concurrent areas" 
The administration of matters outside the functional areas listed in schedules 4 and 5 can 
be delegated to a province through national legislation (section 125). Any other functions 
fall under the responsibility of the national government. Municipalities are assigned to 
administer the local government matters listed in part B of schedules 4 and 5, as well as 
any matter delegated to them by national or provincial legislation (section 156). This sec-
tion also stipulates that the national and provincial governments must assign to a munici-
pality, by agreement and subject to any conditions, any of the functions listed in parts A 
of schedules 4 and 5 if local provision would enhance efficiency. 
In practice the national government is mainly responsible for economic services (finance, 
trade and industry, labour), protection services (police, defence, justice, prisons), housing 
and general administration. The responsibilities of provinces include primary and secon-
dary education, health and welfare services, as well as provincial roads and local eco-
nomic development. Municipalities provide essential basic services, such as electricity, 
water and refuse removal. Even though there is a lack of complete data, available docu-
mentation indicates that the bulk of local authority expenditure is undertaken by the four 
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metropolitan areas in Gauteng, greater Cape Town and Durban (Siebrits 1997: 36-40). 
While the focus of local government expenditure remains on the provision of basic 
services, overall expenditure reprioritisation has had a substantial impact on provincial 
expenditure patterns. The interaction between general expenditure trends and provincial 
expenditures is explored further in the following sections. 
4.1.2.2 General Expenditure Trends 
General government expenditure-has been subject to reprioritisation since the demo-
cratic elections in 1994. These developments have been made more explicit with the in-
troduction of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF).73 An overview of 
consolidated national and provincial expenditure during this decade reveals that defence 
spending has been subject to drastic cuts, offsetting increases for policing and prisons. 
The "icon of oppression" (Walker 1999: 8) during the apartheid years is projected to 
consume only 5.2 per cent of budgeted expenditure at the beginning of the new millen-
nium, down from 11.3 per cent at the beginning of this decade. Declining defence ex-
penditure is reflected in the national budget, since defence is the executive responsibility 
of the national government. Social expenditure - comprising education, health and wel-
fare - will receive increasing shares of the budget. As provinces have administrative re-
spunsibility in these areas, this tre'nd highlights the important role of provinces in social 
development. The seeming dip in housing expenditure is misleading, as until 1997 the 
poorer provinces were not able to fully disburse the money allocated by the national de-
partment, which resulted in substantial rollovers of unspent funds. Expenditures on 
smaller functions are projected to decline over the next financial years. The most dis-
turbing trend is that debt-servicing costs are projected to take up 21.4 per cent of the 
budget in the 2000-1 financial year, up from 12.5 per cent in 1990-1. The rising debt 
servicing costs are a constraint on social spending and developmental expenditures. At 
the same time, some expenditures cannot be reduced any further without threatening the 
viability of certain departments. This reduces the possibility for further reprioritisation by 
shifting funds between functions (Department of Finance (1999: 133): 
73 The MTEF brought about a system of three-year rolling budgets, in line with identified priorities and 
commitments. Under the new system, the broad spending intentions and the underlying economic and 
policy framework are outlined annually in the "Medium Term Budget Policy Statement", which was pub-
lished for the first time in December 1997 (Department of Finance 1997b and 1998c). Three-year estimates 
for each department and summaries by function are now included in the budget, and the policy priorities 
and objectives of government are outlined for the next three years (Walker 1999). 
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"Shifts in the distribution~of spending will be more moderate over the next few 
years. Infrastructure and development programmes have gained considerable 
momentum and spending trends now closely match budgeted allocations. The 
emphasis in extending and improving service delivery will increasingly fallon 
better organisation and management within departments and gains through im-
proved efficiency and more effective delivery of services. In taking forward the 
nation's economic and social development commitments, the emphasis is now on 
improved service delivery within the broad structure of spending priorities ... " 
Figure 2: Consolidated National and Provincial Expenditure Trends (1990-2000) 
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4.1.2.3 Provincial Expenditure Trends 
Provincial expenditure data reveals several trends.74 Most notably, budgeted provincial 
expenditure has been subject to a 2.9 per cent real decrease between 1996-7 and 1999-0. 
As the following sections will show, this is a result of decreasing shares transferred from 
the national revenue pool, and der<;:reases in the collection of own revenue. 
Table 11: Total Provincial Budgets 
1996 Rands 
1996-7 1999-0 % change 
Eastern Cape 14208923 12939023 -8.9% 
Free State 5700379 5413871 -5.0% 
Gauteng 11982019 12765335 6.5% 
KwaZulu-Natal 15330797 15280652 -0.3% 
Mpumalanga 4769589 4869431 2.1% 
Northern Cape 1834298 1829724 -0.2% 
Northern Province 10052725 9734178 -3.2% 
North West 6906958 6383986 -7.6% 
Western Cape 8882160 8157878 -8.2% 
Total 79667848 77374078 -2.9% 
Source: Data provided by the Idasa: Budget Information Service. 
Note: The substantial increase in Gauten$. is a result of conditional grants for academic hospitals. 
The share of social expenditures (on health, education and welfare) in provincial budgets 
has risen steadily, and now makes up more than 80 per cent. According to an executive 
agreement reached in the Budget Council75 provinces pledge to spend 85 per cent of 
their budgets on social expenditures. Most provinces, however, have not reached this 
standard. The introduction of provincial finance reserves in order to budget for contin-
gencies squeezes the resources that are left over for exclusive provincial concerns. Over-
all, little provincial expenditure is directed to areas where provinces have full control over 
how money is spent. Differences in the composition of spending across provinces indi-
cate varying needs. For instance, the share of the welfare budget is lowest in Gauteng, the 
economic centre of the country, with a younger population than the rural provinces 
where recipients of welfare grants are concentrated. Differences in the composition of 
provincial spending may also arise from varying costs of providing a service, or differing 
levels of ejficienf)' between or within provinces (Walker 1999: 11). 
74 For independent microanalyses of provincial budgets, please refer to the annual overviews published by 
the Budget Information Service at Idasa. The following are the overviews of the 1998-9 provincial budgets: 
. Hopley (1998), Makhanya (1998), Msimango (1998), Steyn (1998), Van der Merwe and Van Rensburg 
(1998), Van Zyl (1998b,c and d), Walker (1998). 
75 This body is dealt with in the section on transfers and grants below. 
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Figure 3: Consolidated Provincial Expenditure Trends (1995-2001) 
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Figure 4: Social Spending in 1999-0 Provincial Budgets 
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4.1.2.3.1 Mandates 
In the social expenditure areas, ptovincial discretion is limited through national norms 
and standards. In order for this system to work optimally, it is important that the national 
sphere takes into account the fmancial and administrative ability of the provinces to im-
plement national legislation. The Ncholo Report pointed out (Ministry for the Public 
Service and Administration 1997: 14): "Many National departments create new policies 
without considering how they are to be implemented. The unwritten expectation is that 
the provinces will make the necessary financial and organisational arrangements. There 
appears to be an assumption at national level that policy will automatically become activ-
ity." Examples cited include free health care for nursing mothers and infants and the 
provision of abortion on demand. One provincial health administrator comments that 
these policies were implemented "overnight", and that a definite increase in the use of 
health care services has been rec6tded as a result (Interview: Abdullah, 17 June 1998). 
The exact impact of such legislation is, however, difficult to ascertain in most provinces 
due to the lack of adequate and consistent patient records. 
The recent Public Finance Management Act (1999), as amended, contains a section dealing 
with "unfunded mandates" (section 35). The act prescribes that draft national legislation 
that assigns any obligation to a provincial government must project the financial implica-
tions for the province in an accompanying memorandum. This is the first time that un-
funded mandates are given legal recognition (Wehner 1999b). The act does not require 
that the respective national department cover the cost imposed on provincial depart-
ments. Nonetheless, the provision should enhance the information available to the 
~ 
NeOp for its deliberations. In practice much will depend on the detail and accuracy of 
such costing. Other observers have noted that the NeOp has no access to independent 
bodies which could review such costing, and mediate in case of conflicting opinions (In-
terview: Donian, 8 April 1999). Unlike in some other countries (e.g. Gullo and Kelley 
. 1998), Parliament in South Africa lacks research capacity in budgetary matters (Krafchik 
and Wehner 1998b). Although provinces raised the issue, a review of financial mandates 
contained in existing legislation is not foreseen by the act.76 The example of the health 
sector indicates that this would be a valuable area for further research. 
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4.1.2.3.2 Personnel Expenditure 
Apart from reprioritisation, increased social expenditure reflects rising personnel expen-
diture across the provinces. Provinces employ about 60 per cent of all civil servants. 
While personnel expenditure comprised 53 per cent of total provincial expenditure in 
1995-6, budgeted expenditure for the 1999-0 financial year projects this share at almost 
60 per cent. The ability of provinces to control their personnel expenditure, however, is 
limited: First, provincial wages are subject to decisions in the Central Bargaining Cham-
ber. Second, it is the obligation of the national government to finalise an affordable re-
trenchment tool that would enable provinces to cut their number of civil servants. 
Provinces have increasingly shown discontent with the delays in the formulation of a na-
tional policy on retrenchments. The former Premier of the Free State, Ivy Matsepe-
Casaburri, noted that the issue "is a big problem because we have to abide by national 
policy and there is no national policy" (Business Dqy, 18 September 1998). Skills audits in 
the provinces and national departments are hoped to ensure that service delivery will not 
be affected by any retrenchments (Business Dqy, 10 February 1999). A process involving 
voluntary severance packages proved costly and was characterised by a disproportion-
r· 
ately high number of much needed experienced personnel, with private sector prospects, 
leaving the civil service (see also: MacGregor et aI1998). 
A question mark has been over the number of excess civil servants. While in 1995 this 
figure had been put at 55000 (Business Dqy, 2 October 1998), the number of redundant 
public servants was estimated to total 35000 in May 1999 (Business Dqy, 13 May 1999).77 
The then Director-General for the Public Service, Paseka Ncholo, reported that the 
overall size of the public service had decreased by 10 per cent since 1994 due to the vol-
untary severance packages scheme, natural attrition and resignations. 
The example of the health sectorrillustrates the personnel problems of provinces. About 
90 per cent of provincial budgets for primary and secondary education are taken up by 
personnel expenditure (mainly on teachers' salaries). This leaves few resources to main-
76 The author observed the deliberations of the NCOP's Select Committee on Finance on the bill. 
77 By 1999 audits had been completed in a number of provinces. These identified 8000 "supernumaries" in 
the Northern Province, 3000 in the North West, 22000 in the Eastern Cape, 12 in the Northern Cape and 
none in the Western Cape. In the case of the Eastern Cape, the filling of about 8000 vacancies could re-
duce the total number to 14000. 
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tain schools, pay telephone and etectricity bills, or purchase learning materials (Sundqy 
Independent, 6 June 1998). The national Department of Education decided that "there 
were enough teachers but they were in the wrong places" (Van Niekerk and Ludman 
1999: 64). The department prescribed student-teacher ratios (40-1 for primary schools 
and 35-1 for high schools) and in 1996 announced a "rightsizing" strategy. This required 
each province to compile a list of "excess" teachers and offer them either retrenchment 
packages or redeployment to other schools where there was a shortage. The department 
prescribed that hiring was to draw on this list of excess teachers. One of the many set-
backs occurred when Grove Primary School in Cape Town successfully took the minister 
to court in 1997 over the requirement to hire teachers from the list. By the end of 1997 
the department abandoned the exercise and announced that provinces would from now 
on work out their own ratios. A new redeployment process entailed provincial education 
departments dividing their personnel expenditure budgets by the average teacher salary 
to determine the number of teachers they could afford (Business DC!)', 18 November 
1998). Redeployment has since proceeded at various speeds across the provinces.78 
After several years of increasing shares of personnel expenditure in the provinces, a sta-
bilisation at just below 60 per cent of consolidated provincial expenditure has been pre-
dicted for the following years (Department of Finance 1999: Table 4.1). To halt the ex-
isting trend, however, provinces require mechanisms to control their wage bills. An ef-
fective retrenchment tool may provide such action space, as may decentralised wage bar-
gaining structures. Without empo.wering provinces to control their personnel expenditure 
the projected stabilisation of the wage bill may tum out to be over-optimistic. 
4.1.2.3.3 Capital Expenditure 
As a direct result of the need to finance rising personnel expenditure, the average budg-
eted capital expenditure share of provincial budgets has decreased by almost half since 
1996. Decreasing capital expenditure, especially in health and education, represents a 
threat to strategies that aim to extend services to communities in historically disadvan-
taged areas and bring about a more equitable access to services (Interview: Abdullah, 17 
78 In KwaZulu-NataI, for example, the reacher and student numbers changed as "ghost" teachers and 
learners were discovered. Different interpretations of the process by department officials and schools also 
led to problems. Finally, it was detected late in the process that the provincial education department had 
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June 1998). Thus, as Simkins (1997) remarks, the control of provincial service numbers 
and wage levels is central to ensuring more rapid growth in delivery. 
Table 12: Budgeted Provincial Capital and Personnel Expenditure 
Per cent of total provinrial budget 
Capital Expenditure Personnel Expenditure 
1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-0 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-0 
BC 7.1% 6.0% 2.8% 3.2% 52.3% 50.7% 58.5% 57.9% 
FS 8.2% 9.6% 5.7% 1.9% 53.2% 53.2% 58.2% 64.3% 
G 8.4% 7.5% 7.3% 7.6% 52.3% 50.7% 60.0% 58.5% 
KZN 10.9% 7.2% 2.5% 5.9% 50.1% 54.9% 58.8% 57.7% 
M 13.4% 8.0% 4.9% 4.9% 47.2% 54.0% 60.0% 60.0% 
NC 8.0% 4.9% 5.5% 3.6% 45.4% 46.0% 49.8% 49.2% 
NP 7.9% 8.7% 4.4% 3.1% 55.6% 60.0% 65.4% 65.2% 
NW 9.1% 10.7% 6.0% 5.2% 43.3% 52.6% 58.2% 60.6% 
WC 5.0% 5.0% 4.5% 3.4% 51.6% 52.7% 55.1% 56.3% 
Average 8.7% 7.5% 4.9% 4.7% 50.1% 52.8% 57.4% 58.3% 
Source: Provincial budgets. 
Note: Data provided by the Idasa: Budget Information Service. 
4.1.3 Monitoring and Intervention 
4.1.3.1 Ensuring the Fulfilment of an Executive Obligation 
The Constitution (section 125) stipulates that a province has executive authority only to 
the extent that it has the administrative capacity to assume effective responsibility. The 
national government is required to assist provinces to develop the necessary capacity. 
Any dispute concerning the administrative capacity must be referred to the NCOP for 
resolution within 30 days. When a province cannot or does not fulfil an executive obliga-
tion, the national executive may intervene "by taking any appropriate steps to ensure ful-
filment of that obligation" (section 100). This may include issuing a directive, or assum-
ing direct responsibility for the re).evant obligation. The latter is only allowed to the ex-
tent that it is necessary to maintain or enforce national minimum standards, to maintain 
economic unity or national security, or to prevent unreasonable action by a province. In 
the case of direct intervention the NCOP must be notified and approve any such action. 
The council has the duty to review the intervention regularly and advise the national ex-
ecutive accordingly. 
used a computer model which erroneously allocated extra teachers to primary schools, instead of secondary 
and technical schools (Business D~, 13 April 1999). 
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The Constitution also allows a provincial executive to intervene in local government af-
fairs should this be necessary to ensure the fulfilment of an executive obligation (section 
139). The NCOP is required to approve and monitor such interventions, and to make 
recommendations to the relevant provincial executive. National legislation that may 
regulate the process established by these sections is still outstanding. The Department of 
Constitutional Development has been conducting research into this matter (Department 
of Constitutional Development 1999: 7). 
4.1.3.2 Intervention in Practice-
So far, only the national Department of Finance has utilised the provisions of section 
100. When the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal recorded considerable budget overruns 
in the 1997-8 financial year, a R 1.5 billion "life-line" in form of an advance was granted 
under this section, which allowed conditions to be attached (Business Day, 2 April 1998, 
Department of Finance 1999: 94).79 These conditions included a provincial undertaking 
to remain within budget, providing a detailed spending plan and supplying monthly prog-
ress reports. Early in 1999 the national Department of Finance invoked section 100 for a 
third time when it emerged that the Free State expected to run a deficit of about R 170 
million for the 1998-9 financial y~ar. 
Section 139 enabled the Eastern Cape provincial government to take over the municipal-
ity of Butterworth in March 1998 by dispatching administrators to take charge of local 
authority functions (Business Day, 21 April 1998). Lessons still have to be drawn from this 
precedent. For instance, the process revealed the need for formalised procedures to 
regulate the consideration and approval of intervention by the NCOP (Franks 1998). The 
previous Chairperson of the NCOP, Patrick Lekota, subsequently announced that a new 
unit is to be set up within the council to oversee interventions, and to ensure their effec-
tiveness (Business Day, 9 April 1999).80 Another question is whether intervention can en-
sure delivery. In the case of Butterworth, the municipality continues to be plagued by 
leadership battles similar to thosei:hat led to intervention (Cullinan 1999: 7-9). Mean-
79 Wh.i.Ie provincial expenditure overruns in the 1997-8 financial year occurred not only in these two prov-
inces, KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape were the only ones that applied for additional funds from the 
national government. 
80 The likelihood of increased intervention in local government affairs due to the executive failure of a 
number of authorities was confirmed in interviews conducted by the author with the Heath Special Inves-
tigating Unit (Interview: Rich and Visagie, 29 March 1999) and the FFC (Interview: Donian, 8 April 1999). 
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while, traffic lights are not working, refuse is not being removed, and local roads are in 
dire need of repair. 
4.1.3.3 Corruption 
The debate around intervention according to section 100 and 139 has been partially in-
formed by reports on the work of the Heath Special Investigating Unit, an independent 
body investigating incidents of corruptionS1 in all spheres of government. Data provided 
by the unit may at first sight be interpreted as supporting a need for direct national inter-
vention in the affairs of some authorities. A breakdown of the value of cases by province 
shows a concentration of incidents in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. 
Table 13: Corruption Cases by Province 
----~-----------------------
Eastern Cape 
Free State 
Gauteng 
KwaZulu-Natai 
Mpwnalanga 
North West 
Northern Cape 
Northern Province 
Western Cape 
National Government 
Total 
Number of cases 
7641 
26 
3 
2042 
52 
240 
35 
19 
3 
50 
10111 
Value 
R 727642932.58 
R 188033424.93 
R 14253702.00 
R 34970970.96 
R 423324642.11 
R 106726744.91 
R 199213977.23 
R 5155194888.00 
R 81000.00 
R 1501958043.62 
R 8351400326.34 
SOIlrw: Provided by the Heath Special Investigating Unit on 29 March 1999. 
Note: The value of cases has been subject to a protracted dispute between the Heath Special Investigating 
Unit and the national Department of Finance. The department commissioned a report by the Auditor-
General in April 1999 after the Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, disagreed with Judge Heath's claim 
that the unit had recovered about R 42 million in cash and assets and had prevented the loss of R 848 mil-
lion. The report largely verified the unit:~ work (Business Df!J, 1 July 1999). 
However, this data should be interpreted with caution. Factors that need to be taken into 
consideration include the duration for which the Heath Unit has been functioning in the 
various provinces and the existence of internal anti-corruption units in some of the 
81 Section 2 of the Special Investigating Um'ts and Special Tribunals Aa (1996) allows the president to refer mat-
ters to the unit on grounds of any alleged serious maladministration in state institutions; improper or un-
lawful conduct by its employees; unlawful appropriation or expenditure of public money or property; un-
lawful, irregular or unapproved activities relating to state property; intentional or negligent loss of public 
money or damage to public property; corruption in state institutions; or unlawful or improper conduct by 
any person against the interests of the public. A case is investigated by the unit once this has been author-
ised by means of a presidential proclamation. Refer to Klitgaard (1998) for an introductory analysis of the 
nature of corruption. Klitgaard propose§. that corruption equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountabil-
ity (C = M + D - A). Corruption has been identified as a major obstacle to development (Gray and Kauf-
mann 1998). For an introductory essay on political corruption in South Africa, see Lodge (1999: 56-67). 
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provinces.82 Judge Willem Heath has also noted the varying quality of the working rela-
tionships his unit has been able to establish with the provinces. For instance, he criticised 
the Western Cape for being "extremely slow" in referring corruption cases to his unit 
(Business Dqy, 12 January 1999). Indicating a will to uncover corruption, the North West 
province has installed a "Hotline on Fraud and Corruption", situated in the office of the 
Premier, Popo Molefe (S owetan, cYMay 1998). These examples illustrate the different ways 
with which corruption is dealt with by individual provincial governments. 
Due to such factors, the Heath Unit itself has rejected suggestions that the breakdown of 
cases is a reflection of the actual incidence of corruption. Instead, the unit points to the 
fact that its investigating teams for the different provinces are roughly of equal size, indi-
cating that investigators consider corruption to be an omnipresent problem. When asked 
whether the unit considered corruption to be a greater problem at subnational than at 
national level, the representatives noted the link between corruption and procurement 
procedures. As procurement procedures are multiplied at subnationallevel, there are also 
more opportunities for corruption (Interview: Rich and Visagie, 29 March 1999). 
In other provinces, such as Mpumalanga, the existence of provincial press agencies may 
contribute to a disproportionately high media coverage of corruption. Thus, the descrip-
tion as "Mamparalanga,,83 (Mail & Guardian, 16 October 1998), in recognition of a ~uc­
cession of scandals hitting the province, may be misleading if construed to imply that 
corruption is a more serious problem here than elsewhere. 
Lodge (1999: 59) further suggests that by the 1980s corruption was wide-spread in the 
central government as well as the homeland administrations, and thus cannot be de-
scribed as a new phenomenon: "From 1948 ethnic favouritism characterised all civil 
service recruitment and promotio~n. Government loans and resources were equally in-
voked by ethic and political considerations." 
82 For instance, the high number of corruption cases in the Eastern Cape reflect the fact that the unit was 
active in this province since 1995, before its mandate was extended to the national level. Many of the cases 
attributed to the Eastern Cape, therefore, were carried over from the unit's previous mandate. 
83 According to the Oxford Dictionary 0/ South African English, a "mampara" or "mompara" describes "a fool, 
greenhorn or incompetent also a mode of address (abusive)". 
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4.1.3.4 Capacity 
Some commentators have expressed concerns about the capacity of some provinces to 
address basic needs (e.g. Rapoo 1995: 9-11, Walker and Van ZyI1999).84 
Table 14: Provincial Profiles According to the 1996 Census 
Popula- % of total % living in % without %unem % of house- % of house-
tion (thou- population urban ar- schooling ployed holds with holds using 
sands) eas tap inside wood for 
dwelling cooking 
EC 6303 15.5% 36.6% 20.9% 48.5% 24.7% 38.0% 
FS 2634 6.5% ~68.6% 16.1% 30.0% 40.6% 9.3% 
G 7348 18.1% 97.0% 9.5% 28.2% 67.7% 0.9% 
KZN 8417 20.7% 43.1% 22.9% 39.1% 39.8% 29.7% 
M 2801 6.9% 39.1% 29.4% 32.9% 37.3% 26.0% 
NC 840 2.1% 70.1% 21.7% 28.5% 50.0% 18.5% 
NP 4929 12.1% 11.0% 36.9% 46.0% 17.8% 63.6% 
NW 3355 8.3% 34.9% 22.7% 37.9% 30.6% 20.7% 
WC 3957 9.7% 88.9% 6.7% 17.9% 76.4% 4.5% 
SA 40584 100% 53.7% 19.3% 33.9% 44.7% 23.0% 
Source: Statistics South Africa (1998). 
1994 saw the amalgamation of the various administrations inherited form the former 
South African government, self-governing territories and the "independent" homelands. 
As employers of roughly 60 per cent of civil servants, the newly created provinces bore 
the brunt of this challenge. The former homeland structures are unevenly distributed 
across the nine provinces, which has contributed to the polarisation of provincial admin-
istrative abilities.85 Wehner (1998b: 23) comments: "The absurdity of such demarcation 
lies in the fact that those provinces which are historically advantaged by apartheid's sys-
tem of geographical resource allocation, especially the Western Cape and Gauteng, were 
spared large-scale incorporation of ailing homelands with a surplus of unskilled and often 
incompetent civil servants." As a result, underdeveloped and rural provinces not only 
display the greatest needs, but are also expected to operate within disproportionate ca-
pacity constraints due to their inherited personnel and administrative infrastructure. The 
Premier of the Northern Province, Ngoako Ramatlhodi (1998) summarises the chal-
lenges faced by his province: 
84 Stuart (1997) notes that available analYtical tools to measure public sector efficiency in South Africa can-
not be utilised yet, as the necessary public sector output data is not yet being generated. It is thus difficult 
to objectively assess the efficiency of certain departments and governments. 
85 The former Transkei and Ciskei are now part of the Eastern Cape; KwaZulu part of KwaZulu-Natal; 
Qwa Qwa and a part of Bophuthatswana incorporated in the Free State; Venda, Gazankulu and Lebowa 
part of the Northern Province; four blocs of Bophuthatswana incorporated in North West; KwaNdebele 
part of Gauteng; and Kangwane and a small section of Lebowa included in Mpumalanga (Welsh 1994). 
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"We inherited three homelands and bits and pieces of a so-called "white prov-
ince", which for all practi£al purposes could have been situated on four different 
planets. We have to merge four systems of bookkeeping, four sets of personnel 
records and four different standard operating procedures, and our critics expect 
of us to undo five decades of bad administration and disregard for the needs of 
the majority of the population within four years." 
4.1.3.5 Intervention and Co-operative Government 
Whether increased intervention or a determined exercise in capacity building is the an-
swer to these challenges is open to debate. Comparative evidence suggests that interven-
tion powers are not unique to South Africa, but that their use has often been accompa-
nied by controversy.86 However, these powers must be considered in conjunction with 
other constitutional provisions. Most notably, chapter 3 binds all spheres of government 
to the "principles of co-operative government and intergovernmental relations" (section 
41). Under these provisions, all spheres of government and their organs must: preserve 
the peace, national unity and the indivisibility of the republic; respect the constitutional 
status, institutions, powers and functions of the other spheres; not usurp powers or 
functions; not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of gov-
ernment in another sphere; and co-operate with one another. They are even obliged to 
avoid legal proceedings against one another by exhausting all other possible avenues of 
conflict resolution before approaching a court. If a court is not satisfied that this re-
quirement was fulfilled, it may refer a dispute back to the organs of state involved. 
Placed early in the text, before the allocation of powers and functions to the different 
spheres is outlined, the provisions of chapter 3 represent a set of overarching guiding 
principles for the conduct of governmental activities. The Department of Constitutional 
Developmen t (1999: 10) interprets these provisions "to place an obligation on the three 
86 The Constitution of the Federal Republic ofBra~t (1988) contains an entire chapter dealing with intervention 
(chapter Vl). Article 355 of the Constitution of India (1950) obliges the central government to protect the 
states against external aggression and "internal disturbance". The following article 356 outlines provisions 
in case of failure of the "constitutional machinery" in the states. The central government view has been 
that the Constitution allows it to act "according to its own perception of the situation", as noted in a recent 
speech by the Union Home Minister, L. K Advani (Hindu, 23 January 1999). As intervention is a common 
but highly controversial feature in India, the states are in favour of incorporating more detailed advice as to 
65 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
spheres of government to put the national interest first and to co-operate with each 
other, to support each other and to avoid destructive competition over the political and 
economic resources of the country".87 This notion indicates that the Constitution envis-
ages a collaborative partnership between the spheres, which limits the possibility of in-
tervention in a manner that would not be conducive to restoring the capacity of authority 
in question to effectively comply with its executive obligations 
4.1.4 The Controverry Surrounding the Assignment 0/ the We/are Function 
The We/are Laws Amendment Act (1997) provides the national Minister of Welfare with 
the exclusive power to set standards for welfare grants. As a result, provinces act as 
agents of the central government. While they have no real jurisdiction over the function, 
welfare grants are reflected in provincial budgets. The provinces spend more that 95 per 
cent of the total national and provincial expenditure on welfare, and more than 91 per 
cent of provincial welfare expenditure is used to provide social security (Fitschen 1999). 
4.1.4.1 Administrative Problems ....--
In January 1998 the Eastern Cape failed to pay social security grants to 632000 pension-
ers, leaving them and their dependants without money to buy food. The national gov-
ernment "rescued" the province with an advance of R 801 million, to which stringent 
conditions were attached. It has been convincingly argued that the root cause for the 
Eastern Cape welfare crisis was that the allocation to the province was not sufficient to 
allow it to meet growing social security commitments88 - a nationally determined entitle-
ment (Van Zyl 1998a). Nonetheless, the experience of the "Eastern Cape pensions crisis" 
has given rise to a debate around the assignment of the welfare function. 
how the centre should determine when the government of a state could not function in accordance with 
the Constitution. Also refer to Wehner (1999a: 9-10). 
87 The department has been working on a White Paper on Intergovernmental Relations for the past two 
years in order to flesh out the practical meaning of chapter 3. This policy framework will have to avoid 
overly rigid requirements that may become a long-term straigh~acket, but should create conditions that 
encourage and facilitate mutual trust and co-operation (Watts 1997: 28). 
88 For the previous fiscal year, when the welfare budget was still administered by the national department, 
the provincial department had submitted an estimate of R 3,2 billion based on the number of beneficiaries 
(630 000) at that stage. However, the department had received only R 2,2 billion, less than in the preceding 
year. The 1996-7 under-funding resulted in overspending by the national welfare department and not by 
.. the provincial government. The increase of 1.7 per cent in provincial spending on welfare in the 1997-8 
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A related problem has hindered the effective planning and control of the function, as 
"ghost" beneficiaries have inflated provincial welfare expenditure. The "ghosts" are typi-
cally deceased pensioners whose relatives continue to draw their welfare benefits.89 At 
one stage, the then Minister of Welfare, Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, estimated that about 
20 per cent of the three million welfare beneficiaries were "associated with irregularities" 
(Business Dqy, 10 February 1998). Data irregularities are increasingly being detected by 
checking the names of beneficiaries against the population register of the Department of 
Home Affairs. Some provinces have attempted to reregister all pensioners and benefici-
aries to eliminate fraud and irregularities.9o 
4.1.4.2 Possible Solutions 
The Public Service Commission released its "Report on an Investigation into the Ren-
dering of Social Security" in February 1998. The commission endorsed the status quo: a 
system in which the national department is responsible for developing norms and stan-
dards, while the provincial departments would be responsible for day-to-day administra-
tion. However, the report left open where the responsibility for budgeting should be lo-
cated, with the national or provincial departments (Barberton 1998). 
The former Minister for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development, Valli 
Moosa, favoured the centralisation of the welfare function. Welfare grants would be re-
flected in the national budget (BUsiness Dqy, 9 February 1999). 
To the contrary, the FFC has argued that centralisation is only one of the available op-
tions. The commission (FFC 1998b: 15) recommends that provinces be responsible for 
all aspects of social security grants, which would result in the possibility of different rates 
or eligibility rules, in order to ensure fiscal autonomy and accountability. 
provincial budget, an adjustment made by the province after welfare became its responsibility, was not 
sufficient to cover the existing gap between resource allocation and actual expenditure need. 
89 More than 70000 of these were eliminated from the social security grant system during the 1998-9 finan-
cial year alone, resulting in savings of close to R 282 million (Business Dqy, 19 February 1999). Cases of 
teenage "pensioners" have also been reported (Mail & Guardian, 19 February 1999). Other irregularities 
include the duplication of names and names with multiple identity numbers. 
90 The Western Cape, for example, revived such a process in October 1998 after a similar initiative two 
. years earlier had not been completed (Cape Argus, 12 October 1998). In the Northern Province, a number 
of lawsuits forced the provincial department to abandon an attempt to reregister recipients of pensions and 
disability grants (Mail & Guardian, 15 January 1999). 
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A middle path has also been suggested (Barberton 1998). This would see the national 
department developing a welfare formula to determine each province's share of the total 
welfare budget according to cleaned-up beneficiary data. The resources would be taken 
out of the pool of nationally collected revenue before revenue-sharing, a practice referred 
~ 
to as "top-slicing".9t Provinces would then have access to the savings from efficiency 
gains, or pay for poor performance. 
It would seem that the current disjuncture between policy-making and financial respon-
sibility has caused inefficiency. Any changes should ensure that budgeted amounts are 
fully aligned with the expenditure requirements for welfare grants in each province, on 
the basis of cleaned-up beneficiary data. 
4.2 Revenue Assignment 
4.2.1 National Revenue 
The main sources of tax revenue in 1998-9 were personal income tax (42 per cent of to-
tal), VAT (24 per cent) and company92 tax (11 per cent) (Department of Finance 1999: 
Table 6.15). As tax assignment in South Africa remains centralised, these constitute the 
main contributions to the national revenue pool. 
4.2.2 Provincial Revenue 
Although the Constitution allows provincial legislatures to impose taxes, levies and du-
ties, this does not apply to income tax, VAT, general sales tax, rates on property or cus-
toms duties (section 228). The Constitution requires that provincial taxation powers be 
regulated in terms of national legislation, taking into account any recommendations by 
the FFC. This legislation is still outstanding. 
The collection of provincial revenue, mainly derived from fees, has declined in recent 
years, from 5.6 per cent of total provincial revenue in 1995-6 to 3.8 per cent in 1999-0. 
91 This practice will be further discussed in the discussion of the vertical division of revenue. 
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One reason for this decline is a lower collection rate for user fees in hospitals due to 
poor accounting and billing systems. Hospitals have limited incentive to improve the 
collection of user fees, as these funds accrue to the province rather than the contributing 
hospital. The national Department of Health and the Budget Council have initiated steps 
to improve provincial revenue collection (Department of Finance 1999: 93). Provincial 
initiatives have also been announced. For example, the KwaZulu-Natal Member of Ex-
ecutive Council (MEC)93 for Finance, Peter Miller, has appointed a team to bolster reve-
nue collection in the province .and outlined plans to provide an incentive for agencies to 
collect more revenue than was budgeted, by allowing them to keep any excess revenue 
(Business Dqy, 19 March 1999). 
One possibility for provinces to increase their own revenue is to find new revenue bases. 
Despite the fact that the constitutionally required national framework legislation is still 
outstanding, two provinces have recently introduced new taxes. These initiatives may in-
dicate frustration with the slow process of implementing the provincial revenue-raising 
powers contained in the Constitution. The Gauteng MEC for Finance, Jabu Moleketi, 
caused some controversy with the announcement, in his 1999-0 budget speech, of the 
introduction of a 5 per cent bed levy in the province in October 1999. The levy will be 
based on bed nights sold in the p.rovince (Business Dqy, 26 February 1999). Similarly, the 
North West MEC for Finance, Martin Kuscus, announced the introduction of a 5 per 
cent levy on the gross income of bookmakers and totalisators (Business Dqy, 25 February 
1999). The possibility for additional revenue from gambling activities, however, has been 
hampered by irregularities in provincial casino licensing processes.94 
The Constitution also allows for flat-rate provincial surcharges on the base of any tax, 
levy or duty imposed by national legislation, other than corporate income tax, VAT, rates 
on property or customs duties. This leaves the possibility of a provincial surcharge on the 
national personal income tax base. Necessary national enabling legislation is still out-
92 Gold mines and other mines are taxed separately. While tax on gold and other mines constituted 8 per 
cent of tax revenue in 1984-5, this share shrank to less than one per cent by 1998-9. This is due to de-
pressed commoctity markets, as well as tax allowances in the system (Department of Finance 1999: 169). 
93 MECs are the provincial equivalents of ministers in the national cabinet. 
94 Corruption allegations against senior provincial politicians and relating to the licensing process were 
muted, amongst others, in Gauteng (Financial Mail, 19 February 1999) and the Western Cape (Mail & 
Guardian, 12 March 1999). As a result, it has been speculated that the national Ministry for Trade and In-
dustry has plans to exercise more central control over gambling due to "the perception that provincial 
gaming boards were too susceptible to political influence" (Busifzess Dt!J, 19 May 1999). 
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standing. In 1998 the Katz Commission95 questioned the capacity of the South African 
Revenue Service (SARS) to administer a system of provi~cial surcharges on personal in-
come tax. Instead, it favoured a provincial surcharge on the national fuel levy. The FFC 
(1998: 25-36), on the other hand, has been recommending the implementation of a sur-
charge on personal income tax to promote democratic and fiscally accountable govern-
ment in the provinces. The provincial surcharge would be "piggy-backed" on the na-
tional personal income tax. The FFC suggests the creation of tax room96 by the national 
government in order to ensure that there is no increase in the overall tax burden, to be 
phased in over a period of six years, up to seven percentage points of the personal in-
come tax base. Such a system would increase provincial own revenue while reducing the 
envelope of intergovernmental transfers and grants. Thus, there would be no decrease of 
revenue accruing to the national ~overnment. Contrary to the Katz Commission, the 
FFC was confident that sufficient collection capacity exists at the centrallevel97 to suc-
cessfully implement a surcharge. The introduction of the surcharge would reduce the ex-
isting imbalance between provincial expenditure and revenue assignment. 
4.2.3 Local Revenue 
The Constitution allows municipalities to levy rates on property and surcharges on fees 
for services (section 229). Service charges are the main sources of operating income for 
local governments, followed by property rates. Most authorities buy goods and services 
in bulk from public entities or private companies and derive income from reselling these 
goods and services to households-: The Constitution further allows that, if authorised by 
national legislation, a municipality may impose other taxes, levies and duties that may be 
appropriate. This possibility is constrained by the prohibition of a local income tax, VAT, 
general sales tax or customs duty. However, the "establishment levy" of the former re-
gional services councils, now a source of revenue for metropolitan and district councils, 
is in essence and despite its name a general sales tax based on the turnover (gross income 
generated by sales) of business enterprises. The constitutionality of this tax has yet to be 
tested (Gildenhuys 1997: 89). 
95 The official name of the commission is the "Commission of Inquiry into certain Aspects of the Tax 
Structure of South Africa". 
96 Creating tax room defines the process by which the national government reduces its share of a tax in 
order to make it available to subnational jurisdictions in the form of own revenues. It is an attempt to pre-
vent an increase in the overall tax burden while allowing subnational governments to increase own reve-
nues. 
97 The FFC envisages the centralised collection of revenue derived from a provincial surcharge. 
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Currently about 95 per cent of budgeted local operating expenditure is covered by own 
revenue. This average ,figure, which includes the metropolitan spending centres, hides 
enonnous discrepancies. Many small rural councils have no viable tax base, for instance 
due to the absence of property tax revenue. (Wehner 1998a: 6). The Katz Commission 
recommended framework legislation to enable local governments to impose property tax 
in a coherent fashion, wherever they may be situated (Business Dqy, 30 November 1998). 
A Municipal Properry Rating Bill is expected to be tabled in the near future. 
An issue of continuous concern has been the revenue collection ability at local level. The 
"Masakhane" campaign was launched by President Nelson Mandela in 1995 with the 
goal of improving payment for services.98 To monitor payment levels, arrears and the 
effectiveness of credit control (collection) efforts on a continuous basis the Department 
of Constitutional Development launched "Project Viability" in the same year.99 Despite 
these initiatives, local government was owed R 12 billion by March 1999, a figure grow-
ing by between R 500 million an~.R 1 billion a month (Business Dqy, 18 March 1999).100 
Redemarcation efforts have been initiated in line with the policy framework for local 
government (Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development 1997 and 
1998). It is expected that the number of municipalities will be reduced substantially. This 
may even out disparities between the revenue bases of local authorities.lOl The drive to-
wards the creation of "megacities" in metropolitan areas, by unifying separate substruc-
tures into one central administration, is infonned by such arguments.l02 The evening out 
of revenue bases, however, cannot address the problem of non-payment. 
98 By the end of apartheid, most municipalities in black areas were ungovernable and bankrupt. Since they 
were regarded as illegitimate structures by the people under their jurisdiction, a widespread boycott of 
payments for services prevailed: "While local authorities are now legitimate, they have to reverse the an-
tagonistic rules engraved by decades of struggle" (Wehner 1998a: 4). 
99 This information is derived from questionnaires that are sent out to the chief executive officers of mu-
nicipalities. In 1997 responses were made compulsory. Nonetheless, there are still non-responding munici-
palities, most of them rural councils with limited capacity to respond to the questionnaires. 
100 Gauteng topped the list of debtors with R 6 billion, followed by the Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, the 
Eastern Cape and the Northern Province, with R 1.9 billion, 1.1 billion, 1 billion and 109 million respec-
tively 
101 The existing local boundaries were in many instances the outcome of a highly politicised demarcation 
process. Cameron (1996), in his analysis of the Western Cape metropolitan area substructures, highlights 
how the current demarcation was driven by electoral concerns rather than developmental considerations. 
102 Some commentators have argued in favour of maintaining a two-tier structure for urban areas (Cape 
Metropolitan Council et af 1997, Ahmad 1996). 
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4.3 Intergovernmental Transfers and Grants 
Because the assignment of revenue sources remains centralised, the Constitution estab-
lishes an elaborate system of intergovernmental transfers and grants. Local government 
and each province are entitled to a share of revenue raised nationally to enable them to 
provide basic services and perform their functions (section 227). They may also receive 
grants from the national government, either conditionally or unconditionally. The Con-
stitution prohibits the deduction of additional revenue raised by provinces or municipali-
ties from their share. Equally, there is no obligation on the national government to com-
pensate provinces or municipalities that do not fully utilise their revenue bases. 
4.3.1 The Concept qfEquitable Shares 
Central to the South African revenue-sharing regime is the "equitable share" concept es-
tablished in the Constitution (section 214). The Constitution requires that national legis-
lation must determine the equitable division of revenue raised nationally among the na-
tional, provincial and local spheres of government. Such legislation must also determine 
each province's equitable share of the provincial share of that revenue; any other alloca-
tions to provinces, local governm!nt or municipalities from the national government's 
share of that revenue; and any conditions on which those allocations may be made. Sec-
tion 214 goes further in that it demands that this legislation must take into account: the 
national interest; provisions for the national debt and other national obligations; the ob-
jective needs and interests of the national government; the need to ensure that subna-
tional governments are able to provide basic services and perform their functions; the 
fiscal capacity and efficiency of subnational governments; their developmental and other 
needs; economic disparities within and among the provinces; obligations of sub national 
governments in terms of national legislation; the desirability of stable and predictable al-
locations of revenue shares; the need for flexibility in responding to emergencies or other 
temporary needs, and other factors based on similar objective criteria. The Constitution 
requires that this legislation may only be enacted after the nine provincial governments, 
organised local government and the FFC have been consulted. Any recommendations by 
the FFC have to be considered. 
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4.3.1.1 The Role of the Financial and Fiscal Commission 
These provisions envisage an im~ortant role for the FFc03, which reflects a desire to 
depoliticise the revenue-sharing process (Mokgoro 1994, Dollery 1998). The Constitution 
establishes the FFC to make recommendations envisaged in the Constitution or national 
legislation to Parliament, provincial legislatures and any other authorities determined by 
national legislation (section 220). The Commission is independent and subject only to the 
Constitution and the law, and must be impartial. The commissioners are appointed by 
the President, and include a chairperson and a deputy chairperson104 who are full-time 
members, nine persons nominated by the provinces, two persons nominated by organ-
ised local government and nine other persons (section 221). The FFC must report regu-
larly to Parliament and the provincial legislatures (section 222). The Financial and Fiscal 
Commission Act (1997) supplements these provisions. It regulates the affairs and day-to-
day running of the commission. Amongst others, the act (section 27) guarantees the FFC 
free access, upon request, to any information it requires for the performance of its func-
tions and which is available to an organ of state or related institutions. 
In some instances, the Department of Finance (e.g. 1998b) has criticised the commis-
sions "fairly high level of abstraction", and has tended to describe its own approach as 
characterised "by a keener concern for the practical implications". It is true that the 
FFC's documents are not easily accessible to the broader public, which has been subject 
to criticism (e.g. Wehner 1997c). However, the theoretical grounding of the commission 
can be attributed to its concern with developing impartial standards. 
4.3.1.2 The Role of the National Council of Provinces 
The division of revenue between and within the spheres is dealt with annually in the Divi-
sion of Revenue Bill This bill is classified as a bill affecting the provinces subject to section 
76 of the Constitution, which reserves a potentially important role for the NCOP 
(Murray 1998). However, in practice, the role of the NCOP in the budgetary process has 
been limited. A lack of research capacity, limited time, and insufficient access to expen-
diture information constrain its ability to engage with the budget (Krafchik and Wehner 
1998a and 1998b). Other observers have noted that the Division of Revenue Bill is tabled 
103 The Australian Commonwealth Grants Commission (Craig 1997: 184-185) and the Indian Finance 
Commissions (Hemming et 0/1997: 531-532) fulfil similar functions. 
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too late in the process to afford a proactive role to the council, as it has by then been 
subject to extensive executive negotiations (Ajam 1998). 
4.3.1.3 The Role of the Budget Council 
Instead, the Budget Council has emerged as perhaps the major new player in the provin-
cial budget process (Ajam 1997) .1~S This body is not set up in terms of the Constitution, 
but was formalised with the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Aa (1997). The Budget Coun-
cil meets regularly throughout the year to discuss provincial financial matters. It brings 
together the Minister of Finance, who chairs the council, as well as the nine provincial 
MECs for Finance. The same act also establishes the Budget Forum, which consists of 
the Minister of Finance, the nine MECs for Finance, five representatives from the na-
tionallocal government body, as well as one representative nominated by each provincial 
local government organisation. The Budget Forum deliberates on matters pertaining to 
local government finance. Any decisions taken by these bodies with regard to the divi-
sion of revenue has to be approved by the cabinet. The Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Aa 
stipulates that a Division of Revenue Bill must be accompanied by a memorandum, explain-
ing the extent to which account was taken of any recommendations by the FFC.106 
4.3.2 The Recommendations I?Y the Financial and Fiscal Commission 
The allocation of transfers from the pool of nationally collected revenues entails,first, a 
vertical division of resources between the spheres of government and, second, a horizontal 
division amongst different governments within the same sphere.10? 
4.3.2.1 Vertical Division 
The FFC's initial recommendations related to the 1997-8 financial year, before local gov-
-
ernment was included into this re~enue-sharing process (FFC 1996). The FFC recom-
mended that provincial allocations be increased gradually as provinces assume their con-
104 This position is currently vacant. 
lOS South Africa has seen a proliferation of executive and administrative intergovernmental bodies (De Vil-
liers 1997b), indicating an emphasis on "executive federalism" (Watts 1990). 
106 This memorandum is included in annexure E of the "Budget Review", which is tabled together with the 
national budget each year. 
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stitutionally designated functions, and as security and defence spending at national level 
decreases and thus frees up extra resources. The FFC (1996: 2) also argued that provin-
cial expenditure required more growth than national expenditure as it was more sensitive 
to population growth, due to the administrative responsibility of provinces for social 
services such as health and education. 
Table 15: Recommended Vertical Division of NationaUy Collected Revenues, plus Provincial 
Revenues from a Surcharge on the Personal Income Tax Base, Phased in from 1 per cent to 7 per 
cent 
Shore per sphm in per cent 
1996-7* 1997-8 1998-9 1999-0 2000-1 2001-2 2002-3 
Provincial 51.85 52.35 52.85 53.35 53.85 54.35 54.85 
National 48.15 47.65 47.15 46.65 46.15 45.65 45.15 
Total 100 100 WO 100 100 100 100 
Source: Financial and Fiscal Commission (1996: Table lC). 
NoteJ: Improvements in conditions of service are included in the national share. 
* The base year figures derived from budgeted expenditures presented to Parliament on 13 March 1996. 
Table 16: Recommended Vertical Division of Nationally Collected Revenues, plus Provincial 
Revenues from a Surcharge on the Personal Income Tax Base, Phased in from 1 per cent to 7 per 
cent 
Shore per sphm in 1996 R miflions 
1996-7* 1997-8 1998-9 1999-0 
Provincial 75229 78306 81425 84661 
National 69919 71269 72636 74022 
Total 145218 149575 154062 158684 
Source: Financial and Fiscal Commission (1996: Table 10). 
2000-1 
88019 
75426 
163444 
2001-2 
91501 
76847 
168347 
NoteJ: Improvements in conditions of service are include9 in the national share. 
2002-3 
95113 
78285 
173398 
* The base year figures derived from budgeted expenditures presented to Parliament on 13 March 1996. 
The FFC recommended that total annual transfers to local governments be kept equal to 
-their historical volume. The commission proposed the identification of a time period in 
which backlogs would be addressed, and that the implications of increasing the transfers 
to local government in order to eliminate backlogs be considered (FFC 1997). 
4.3.2.2 Provincial Equitable Share and Conditional Grants 
The FFC proposed a foi:mula for the horizontal division of resources among the nine 
provinces, as it considered a formula more objective and less prone to manipulation by 
politicians and civil servants. A formula would enable provinces to predict revenues with 
greater certainty, which in tum would allow them to plan ahead. In order to address his-
torical funding imbalances, the p~oposed formula aimed to achieve equity in public ex-
107 In the following analysis, the descriptions of formulas and their components mirror closely those found 
in the indicated source documents. Due to the technical nature of the content, rephrasing might have dis-
torted the meaning of these descriptions in some instances. 
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penditure, in per capita tenus, over a period of five years. This would allow all provinces 
to adjust to the new funding arrangements. Provinces with a shrinking resource envelope 
would have the necessary time to reprioritise, while those with expanding allocations 
would have a period in which to build their capacity to handle resources efficiently. Pre-
viously over-funded provinces like the Western Cape and Northern Cape would experi-
ence a real decrease in funding, i.e. after inflation is taken into account. Other provinces 
would experience real increases, especially the Northern Province, North West and 
Mpumalanga. For the 1997-8 fiscal year, provinces would receive unconditional sums 
which they could all?cate as they saw fit. The FFC recommended a review of the fonuula 
after three years (Abedian et al 1997: 44-51, FFC 1996). The recommended fonuula con-
sisted of five components, making up the total allocation to a particular province (P): 
P=S+m+T+I+B 
The national standards grant (S) aimed to supply provinces with sufficient funds to provide a 
minimum standard of services in primary and secondary education and primary and dis-
trict-level health care. A province's allocation would be dependent on the size of its 
population eligible for these services and the average cost of providing them at the 
minimum standard (for instance, in education, the amount of school-aged children and 
the cost of teaching with a target pupil-teacher ratio of 1:38). 
The spillover component (m) was intended to finance those services which are subject to in-
ter-provincial spillover effects. It would be allocated to those provinces with academic 
hospitals to compensate for the costs of medical training and the provision of specialised 
health services such as heart transplants, services which benefit other jurisdictions. 
~ 
The fiscal capaciry equalisation grant (I) was based on the notion that each province must be 
accountable for any spending which would require raising additional revenue. The T 
grant would complement provincial taxation powers to equalise for varying fiscal capaci-
ties (i.e. tax bases). In the absence of the necessary enabling legislation for provincial 
taxati6.n, a transitionally assigned surcharge (TAS) would act as a proxy for own revenue 
equal to the tax room created. 
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The institutional grant (I) was to cover the cost of running a basic administration in each of 
the provinces, such as a legislature and provincial executives. 
Finally, the basic grant (B) would allow provinces to establish and maintain the institutions 
necessary to fulfil their constitutional obligations according to their own priorities. Pro-
vincial shares were calculated on the basis of the weighted population figures for each 
province. People living in rural areas were given aweight of 1.25. "Ruralness" was cho-
sen as a proxy for differences in wealth and as an indicator of deprivation with few data-
related problems. 
Table 17: Recommended Total Allocation per Province 
RmiUiom 
1996-7 Budget 1997-8 1998-9 1999-0 2000-1 2001-2 2002-3 
(Base Year} 
Western Cape 8378 8753 9163 9605 10078 10441 10830 
Eastern Cape 13901 15162 16584 18184 19981 21847 23952 
Northern Cape 1769 1847 1930 2017 2108 2178 2249 
KwaZulu-Natai 14546 16239 18158 20360 22883 25563 28644 
Free State 5195 5680 6233 6860 7573 8307 9144 
North West 6450 7151 7950 8863 9904 11009 . 12273 
Gauteng 11108 12284 13671 15302 17218 19143 21422 
Mpumalanga 4610 5124 5714 6393 7173 7992 8936 
Northern Province 9324 10439 11711 13163 14820 16607 18651 
Provincial govt. 75299- 82678 91114 100747 111737 123086 136101 
. National govt. 69919 77150 85120 93902 103578 114329 125981 
Source: FFC (1996: Table 8-7a). 
Table 18: Recommended Total Fonnula Allocation per Province 
Per cent oj totaL 
1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-0 2000-1 2001-2 2002-3 
Budget Target 
(Base Year) 
Western Cape 11.13 10.58 10.03 9.48 8.92 8.31 7.69 
Eastern Cape 18.46 18.38 18.30 18.22 18.15 18.16 18.18 
Northern Cape 2.35 2.23 2.12 2.00 1.88 1.76 1.64 
KwaZulu-Natai 19.34 19.67 20.00 20.33 20.66 21.04 21.42 
Free State 6.90 6.86 6.82 6.78 6.74 6.71 6.68 
North West 8.57 8.63 8.70 8.77 8.84 8.94 9.06 
Gauteng 14.75 14.79 14.81 14.84 14.85 14.68 14.49 
Mpumalanga 6.12 6.19 6.25 6.31 6.38 6.44 6.50 
Northern Province 12.38 12.68 12.98 13.28 13.58 13.96 14.35 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: FFC (1996: Table 19C). 
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Table 19: Recommended Total Grants per Province per Capita 
Rpercapita 
1996-7 Budget 1997-8 1998-9 1999-0 2000-1 2001-2 2002-3 
(Base Year) Target 
Western Cape 2145 2196 2252 2314 2379 2415 2455 
Eastern Cape 1905 2034 2177 2337 2513 2690 2886 
Northern Cape 2221 2289 2362 2438 2515 2566 2616 
KwaZulu-Natal 1572 1718 1882 2069 2279 2494 2739 
Free State 1718 1833 1963 2109 2272 2433 2613 
North West 1692 1830 1986 2160 2355 2554 2779 
Gauteng 1337 1432 1542 1671 1820 1959 2122 
Mpumalanga 1559 1697 1854 2031 2232 2436 2668 
Northern Province 1679 1847 2036 2249 2488 2740 3023 
Provincial govt. 1676 1799 1938 2094 2269 2443 2640 
National govt. 1557 1679 1810 1952 2104 2267 2444 
Sourw: FFC (1996: Table 8-7b). 
4.3.2.3 Local Government Equitable Share and Conditional Grants 
In a separate document, entitled "Local Government in a System of Intergovernmental 
Fiscal Relations in South Africa", the FFC presented its initial thinking on how to include 
local government in the revenue-sharing process (FFC 1997, Wehner 1997c). In an at-
tempt to ensure revenue stability and objectivity, the FFC proposed a formula for the 
horizontal division of the transfers to local government amongst the metropolitan and 
district councils. The formula intended to address basic needs, by eliminating backlogs 
and by enabling the poor to purchase the minimum quantities of certain essential serv-
ices. Three components made up the Intergovernmental Transfer (IG1): 
IGT= G + RS +T 
A conditional capitalgrant (G), stemming from the national government's share of revenue 
raised nationally, would address infrastructural backlogs in line with national develop-
ment objectives. The allocation to a municipality would be based on the cost to establish 
access to basic services. The extent of backlog would be indicated by the relative non-
provision of water and sanitation compared to other local units. These indicators were 
chosen in the absence of other adequate data. The costs for providing the needed infra-
structure thus calculated would be spread out over a number of years. 
An unconditional operating transfer (RS), stemming from local government's share of revenue 
. raised nationally, was intended to~subsidise access to basic services for those who cannot 
afford to pay for these services. It was based on the cost to the qualifying consumer (i.e. 
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household below the poverty line) of a minimum annual water supply and a basic level of 
sanitation. 
A tax capacity (equalisation) . component (I) considered the relative ability of the municipal or 
district council to subsidise the poor under its jurisdiction. If the aggregate wealth of a 
jurisdiction is equal or more than its aggregate need, it was expected to provide for its 
own needs. 
4.3.3 ActuaL DeveLopments 
The recommendations by the FFC are not legally binding. The national government de-
cided not to adopt the commission's recommendations without adjustments. 
4.3.3.1 Vertical Division 
The Budget Council decided to "rop-slice" (subtract) a number of items from the total 
available government revenue before the vertical split. These amounts are made up of 
the interest on government debt, projected improvements in the conditions of service 
(wage increases for civil servants), and carry-through costs for social pensions etc. In 
1997-8 the Budget Council recommended that the remainder be divided between the na-
tional and provincial spheres in the same ratio as applied in the 1996-7 budget (Abedian 
et a/1997: 52). As from 1999-0 the top slice also includes an amount set aside as a con-
tingency reserve for the national government. 
The analysis of the vertical division is obscured by the fact that the Department of Fi-
nance often uses expenditure data when elaborating on the vertical division, rather than 
nationally collected revenue. The practice of top-slicing further blurs the picture. Since the 
overwhelming share of government debt was incurred at the national level, this raises the 
question why debt should be top-sliced, rather than serviced directly from the national 
government share of revenue.10S The following figure shows that the provincial share of 
nationally collected revenue has been substantially decreased, from 57.6 per cent in 1996-
108 A process of incorporating a debt of R 14.8 billion incurred by the former TBVC states and self-
governing territories into the national government's debt portfolio has largely been completed. R 13.9 bil-
. lion of debt of the former regional authorities also reverted to the national government in 1994, and a fur-
ther R 5.3 billion are yet to be incorporated (Department of Finance 1999: 78). However, these amounts 
are relatively small compared with the total government debt, which stood at R 377.4 billion in 1999. 
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7109 to 49.7 in 1999-0. By comparison, the FFC had suggested that provinces should re-
ceive 53.35 per cent of nationally collected revenue by 1999-0.110 Why this "downward 
shift" in revenue was not implemented is not clear. An official from the national De-
partment of Finance acknowledges that "judgement and political discretion will always 
playa role in the budget process" (Interview: Momoniat, 10 June 1998). The Department 
of Finance (1999: 258) elaborates: "The shares allocated to each sphere are a political 
judgement made by Cabinet. A consultative process generates the information on which 
th o • d . d ,,111 is jU gement is rna e. 
In addition, SALGA has questioned the adequacy of the total share allocated to local 
governments. The association criticises that the Budget Forum is precluded from mean-
ingful participation in this debate, much of which takes place in the Budget Council, and 
that it remains unclear who was consulted during the consultative process. It describes 
the local government equitable share as "simply a more rational way of distributing funds 
which have historically gone to local government. This approach fails to respect local 
governments' constitutional status as a sphere of government, and fails to facilitate 
meaningful interaction on government priorities across the functions allocated to differ-
ent spheres" (SALGA 1998: 3). As local government functions have been extended to 
include "developmental duties" according to section 153 of the Constitution (Ismail and 
Mphaisha 1997: 16-17), it is indeed questionable whether historical resource flows are 
sufficient for the local sphere. Comparative evidence may also suggest that local govern-
ments, especially in developing countries, require a substantial volume of transfers and 
grants for effective redistribution to be achieved (Wehner 1998a: 22). However, any in-
crease of the local government share of nationally collected revenues would require 
equivalent decreases elsewhere. This, in tum, raises the question from where to take ad-
ditional funds for local government, the national or provincial equitable share. 
109 The FFC used a base share of 51.85 per cent for the 1996-7 financial year, which was derived from 
budgeted figures presented to Parliament The 57.6 per cent share used here was calculated on the basis of 
actual expenditure and revenue data for that year, indicating substantial expenditure overruns. 
110 Although some adjustments where made during this period, which affected this division, they cannot 
account for the overall trend of declining provincial shares. For instance, the 1998-9 budget introduced a 
share for local government from the na~onal revenue pool. This share cannot, however, account for the 
total decrease of provincial transfers: the volume of the local government share represents a mere 0.6 and 
0.9 per cent of the national revenue pool in 1998-9 and 1999-0 respectively. Adjustments to provincial 
allocations for a lower contribution to pension funds (see below) reduced provincial expenditure needs 
with regard to persolUlel (R 605.5 million in 1998-9 or OJ per cent of the revenue pool). 
111 The department explains that this process took into account the assignment of functions and revenue 
. sources, national priorities, the recommendations and analyses of key sectors by MTEF review teams, an 
analysis of baseline implications, as well as the delivery implications of alternative levels of funding and 
policy options. No detailed documentation of this process is available to the public. 
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Figure 5: Provincial Allocations from Nationally Collected Revenue (1995-1999) 
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Source: Department of Finance (1999: Annexure B and Table 4.7). 
Note: Calculations based on total ordinary national revenue and expenditure data. Total ordinary revenue 
figures reflect final outcome (1995-6 and 1996-7), preliminary outcome (1997-8), revised estimate (1998-9) 
and budget estimates after tax proposals (1999-0). Expenditure data represent audited expenditure (1995-6 
and 1996-7), preliminary expenditure estimate (1997-8), projected total expenditure after adjustments for 
the lower 15 per cent employer's contribution to pension funds (1998-9), and budget estimate plus pro-
jected improvements in conditions of service (1999-0). Grants to provinces for local government from the 
Department of Constitutional Development were excluded for the calculation of the share of conditional 
grants from national departments to provinces . 
. Table 20: Actual Vertical Division of Resources 
1998-9* 1999-0 2000-1 2001-2 
Rmil- %of Rmil- %of Rmil- %of Rmil- %of 
lion total lion total lion total lion total 
Total budget expenditure 204293 100% 216780 100% 230722 100% 247250 100% 
Less 'top-sliced' amounts: 
Debt service costs 43413 21.3% 48222 22.2% 49820 21.6% 52609 21.3% 
Contingen~ reserve 1100 0.5% 3500 1.5% 8000 3.2% 
S kiUs development /e1(Y grant scheme - 1000 0.4% 2000 0.8% 
~ 
Donorjinanced spending 651 0.3% 750 0.3% 750 0.3% 750 0.3% 
Resources to be divided 160228 78.4% 166708 76.9% 175652 76.1% 183891 74.4% 
National equitable share 78273 38.3% 78733 36.3% 81100 35.2% 84489 34.2% 
Of which: 
National departments 67573 33.1% 69972 32.3% 72739 31.5% 76232 30.8% 
Conditionafgrants to subnationafgovem- 10700 5.2% 8761 4.0% 8361 3.6% 8257 3.3% 
ments 
Provincial equitable share 80931 39.6% 86302 39.8% 92071 39.9% 96822 39.2% 
Incl. conditional grants 90499 44.3% 94420 43.6% 100432 43.5% 105079 42.5% 
Local government equitable share 1024 0.5% 1673 0.8% 2480 1.1% 2580 1.0% 
Incl. conditional grants 2156 1.1% 2316 1.1% 2480 1.1% 2580 1.0% 
Source: Data from Department of Finance (1999: Table 4.2). 
Notes: Equitable shares include estimates of improvements in conditions of service. 
* The national and provincial shares of expenditure in 1998-9 are adjusted for the reduction in the employ-
ers' contribution to pension funds from 17 per cent to 15 per cent. 
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A quantification of the cost of mandates assigned to the different spheres of government 
may be of value to ascertain the adequacy of the current :vertical division. To what extent. 
such an assessment is feasible remains an issue for further debate. 
4.3.3.2 Provincial Equitable Share and Conditional Grants 
To split up the provincial pool of revenues among the nine provinces for 1997-8, the 
Budget Council used a percentage distribution calculated by the FFC (1996: Table 20C). 
This basic allocation, provincial shares of the "top-sliced" amounts and other adjust-
ments for shifts in functions comprised the total provincial allocation in 1997-8. For the 
1998-9 fiscal year the Department of Finance introduced a formula for the horizontal 
division of revenue. 
Table 21: Budgeted Transfers to Provinces for 1996-7 and 1997-8 
R miUion unless otherwise indicated 
1996-7 1997-8 
Budget % of total Basic share Function Carry Increases in Budget % of total 
of revenue shifts through costs social grants 
EC 14001 18.5% 12173 17 1389 191 13770 17.0% 
FS 5196 6.9% 4767 71 650 57 5545 6.9% 
G 11108 14.7% 10959 141 1700 111 12911 16.0% 
KZN 14664 19.4% 13560 7 1711 214 15492 19.2% 
M 4610 6.1% 4192 113 449 48 4802 5.9% 
NC 1769 2.3% 1529 219 194 32 1974 2.4% 
NP 9324 12.3% 8669 6 1598 96 10369 12.8% 
NW 6450 8.5% 5956 145 615 68 6784 8.4% 
WC 8378 11.1% 7375 92 1170 120 8757 10.8% 
Supple- 402 0.5% 
mentary 
Total 75499 100.0% 69180 811 9476 937 80806 100.0% 
Sourre: Department of Finance (1997a: 6.5).· 
Table 22: Provincial Po~ulation Shares 
Demographic Infor- Preliminary 1996 Cen- Final 1996 Census re-
mati on Bureau data sus results (used in suits (used for 1999-0 
{used in 1997-8} 1998-9} and be~ond} 
Thousands % bftotal Thousands % of total Thousands % of total 
Eastern Cape 7454 16.2% 5865 15.5% 6303 15.5% 
Free State 3098 6.7% 2470 6.5% 2634 6.5% 
Gauteng 8580 18.7% 7171 18.9% 7348 18.1% 
KwaZulu-Natal 9453 20.6% 7672 20.3% 8417 20.7% 
Mpumalanga 3019 6.6% 2646 7.0% 2801 6.9% 
Northern Cape 807 1.8% 746 2.0% 840 2.1% 
Northern Province 5652 12.3% 4128 10.9% 4929 12.1% 
North West 3907 8.5% 3043 8.0% 3355 8.3% 
Western Cape 3987 8.7% 4118 10.9% 3957 9.7% 
. Total 45957 100% 37859 100% 40584 100% 
Sourres: Financial and Fiscal Commission (1996: Table 7.2) and Department of Finance (1999: Table 4.5). 
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Table 23: Actual Fonnula for the Distribution of the Provincial Equitable Share 
Component share I!.er province in I!.er cent 
Education Health Welfare Basic Economic Institu- Backlogs Target 
share activi!I tional shares 
Year 1998 1999 1998 1999 1998 1999 1998 1999 1998 1999 1998 1999 1998 1999 1998 1999 
Weighting 39.0 40.0 18.0 18.0 16.0 17.0 15.0 9.0 8.0 8.0 4.0 5.0 3.0 100.0 100.0 
BC 18.5 18.5 17.3 17.0 18.7 19.6 16.6 15.5 7.6 5.9 11.1 11.1 20.7 16.9 16.8 
FS 6.3 6.3 6.7 6.5 6.6 7.1 6.1 6.5 6.2 5.1 11.1 11.1 5.6 6.6 6.6 
G 13.8 12.3 15.6 14.7 13.3 13.9 15.8 18.1 37.7 43.2 11.1 11.1 5.0 16.2 15.7 
KZN 21.3 22.1 21.1 21.7 21.0 19.6 21.2 20.7 14.9 18.9 11.1 11.1 23.0 20.3 20.7 
M 7.5 7.3 7.0 7.2 7.2 6.5 7.5 6.9 8.1 4.7 11.1 11.1 8.5 7.6 7.1 
NC 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.2 1.8 2.1 2.1 1.6 11.1 11.1 1.3 2.3 2.4 
NP 14.3 15.7 11.8 13.3 13.2 13.7 12.8 12.1 3.7 1.7 11.1 11.1 22.9 12.5 13.5 
NW 8.0 8.0 8.3 8.6 8.8 8.7 8.7 8.3 5.6 5.1 11.1 11.1 9.5 8.2 8.2 
WC 8.5 7.9 10.3 8.9 9.1 8.8 9.3 9.7 14.1 13.7 11.1 11.1 3.6 9.6 8.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100J) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Department of Finance (1998b: E23 and 1999: 263). 
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding. 
For 1999-0 the weightings of the different component were adjusted "to reflect actual 
expenditure trends in the provinces" (Department of Finance 1999: 101).112 The incorpo-
ration of the final 1996 Census figures in 1999-0 also impacted on provincial allocations, 
given the formula's sensitivity to demographic factors (Donian and Rip-Botha 1997). The 
final population figures show a different distribution than the preliminary estimates, 
which were used to calculate equitable share allocations in the 1998 budget.ll3 Provinces 
such as the Northern Province and KwaZulu-Natal gained from the revised census data. 
The most notable loser of the adjusted census figures, compared with the preliminary 
results, is the Western Cape. It is-the only province whose population figure was de-
creased in the adjustment process, and its target share has been subject to the biggest de-
d ·th th th . 114 crease compare WI e 0 er provinces. 
To enable provinces to adjust to increases or decreases as a result of the new process, the 
formula will be phased in over a period of five years. Based on the final equitable share 
allocations for 1998-9, provincial allocations will be subject to five equal moves towards 
112 The weightings attached to the education, welfare and institutional components were increased. The 
previous basic component was split into a basic share imd a backlog component The combined weighting 
of these components was reduced from 15 to 12 per cent to accommodate increases elsewhere. These 
changes are discussed in detail below. 
113 However, the available documentation does not isolate the impact of the final census data from that of 
the formula changes. The impact of thenew data alone would be made explicit by the distribution out-
come of the new formula, but calculated with the population data used in the previous year. The difference 
between this calculation and the current share for each province would equal the effect of data changes. 
114 The provincial government of the Western Cape has questioned the credibility of the adjusted figures 
(Business Dqy, 22 October 1998). It commissioned a report from independent consultants, which disputed 
the census data (Business Dqy, 10 December 1998). 
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the target share. The further development of the formula has to be carefully balanced 
with the benefits of a predictable revenue allocation process. Walker (1999: 7) comments: 
"Continual changes introduce instability and uncertainty into the system, making it more 
difficult for provinces to plan their expenditures and manage adjustments required." 
The formula is currently made up of seven components, which are not intended to indi-
cate how provinces should allocate their resources. Rather, they represent estimates of 
the distribution of demands for services (Department of Finance 1999: 262-268): 
The education component targets primary and secondary schooling, which accounts for 
roughly 90 per cent of provincial education spending. Both the school-age population 
and the numbers of pupils enrolled are relevant to funding needs. The distribution of 
children of school-going age does not reflect repeater rates and the numbers of under or 
over-age pupils in the system. But using the number of enrolled pupils only would create 
perverse incentives.115 For 1998-9 a simple average of the two was used. From 1999-0 the 
education component double weights the school-age cohort, as an incentive for prov-
inces to reduce the number of over and under-age learners. 
The health component addresses the need for provinces to deliver primary and secondary 
health services. As all citizens are eligible for health services, the provincial shares of the 
total population form the basis for the health share. A distinction is made between those 
with access to medical insurance and those without. Contrary to 1998-9, people with pri-
vate medical insurance were not removed from the base population in 1999-0, to reflect 
that they are eligible to use public health facilities should they choose so. However, peo-
ple without medical aid are weighled four times higher, assuming that the uninsured ac-
count for 95 per cent of public health facilities usage. 116 
The we!fare component captures the responsibility of provinces to provide social security 
grants. The target populations of social security payments are weighted by the historical 
distribution of each type of grant. The base populations for the old age and childcare 
sub-components are those proportions of the population that are eligible for grants: 
males over age sixty-five, females over sixty and children under six. The base population 
liS Such a funding system would provide no incentive for provincial departments to improve passing rates, 
but reward poor performance by not penalising high repeater rates. 
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for the disability sub-component is the total population, based on an assumed symmetri-
cal distribution of the disabled across the provinces. An income factor is incorporated to 
capture the impact of the means test for old age and child support grants, considering the 
provincial share of the population that falls in the lowest two quintiles of the income 
distribution. The final welfare share is a combination of the income factor, weighted 
twenty-five per cent, and the weighted average of grant populations. 
The basic component was in 1998-9 weighted in favour of the rural population as a proxy for 
poverty. The newly introduced backlog component now incorporates the rural weighting, 
while the basic component is distributed by percentage share of the total population. 
The economic activity component, in the absence of effective provincial taxation powers, acts 
as a proxy for provincial tax revenue. It directs a proportion of nationally collected reve-
nues back to source. It also reflects the costs associated with economic activity, such as 
th · f· ·al d 117 e malOtenance 0 provlOcl roa s. 
The institutional component is targeted at covering the costs associated with running a basic 
structure for government. It is evenly distributed between provinces in an attempt to take 
into account certain fixed costs that all provinces must incur, irrespective of their size or 
state of development. 
The backlog component was introduced in 1999-0 to address criticisms that the formula had 
failed to take into account the developmental backlogs in some provinces. Its three sub-
components recognise the need for capital spending on rural infrastructure and facilities 
in the health and education sectors. The health and education sub-components are 
weighted as in the main formula, according to aggregate provincial spending on these 
functions, 18 and 40 per cent respectively. The health and education distributions are 
based on the distribution of capital needs identified in the audit of hospital facilities and 
schools register of needs. Provincjal shares of the rural population inform the distribu-
tion of the remaining 42 per cent. 
116 The proportions of the population with and without access to medical aid were taken from the i 995 
October Household Survey and applied to the census figures. 
117 Gross Geographical Product (GGP) figures for 1994 were used in 1998-9 to estimate the distribution of 
economic activity across the provinces. Because updated GGP figures are unavailable, they were replaced 
in 1999-0 by the distribution of remuneration of employees. Remuneration data are the largest component 
of provincial GGP. 
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Two personnel related deductions from the provincial equitable shares, as calculated by 
the formula explained above, were made in 1999-0. The estimated distribution of im-
provements in conditions of service was removed from the equitable share, to be allo-
cated as a conditional grant once wage negotiations have been concluded. Second, the 
employers' contribution to the Government Employees Pension Fund was reduced from 
17 per cent to 15 per cent. The adjustment was distributed to reflect lower expenditure 
commitments rather than a reduction in services.lls 
In addition to the equitable share, which is unconditional, a number of conditional grants 
were introduced with the 1998 budget, which are channelled through various national 
departments (Department of Finance 1999: 103-106). The largest conditional grants are 
found on the vote of the national Department of Health and relate mainly to specialised 
health services that are not provided by all the provinces (Van den Heever 1998). The 
conditional grant for education seeks to improve the quality of education and support 
various initiatives. The conditional grant from the Department of Finance was intro-
duced in response to financial difficulties in certain provinces in 1997-8. Provinces also 
receive conditional grants for local government (see following section). In 1999-0, condi-
tional grants comprise about 10 per cent of the total volume of transfers and grants to 
provinces, with the equitable share making up the remainder. 
118 In 1998-9 the savings of lower pension fund contributions were deducted from total expenditure, rather 
than allocated to provincial and national departments. 
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Table 24: Conditional Grants to Provinces· 
Rmi!.lions 
1998-9'" 1999-0 2000-1 2001-2 
Health 
Central hospitals 3021 3075 3112 3221 
Training and research 1060 1118 1174 1215 
Redistribution of specialised services 53 112 176 182 
Hospital rehabilitation programme 200 400 500 
Durban Academic Hospital 200 247 273 103 
Umtata Regional Hospital 100 64 
Primary school nutrition programme 526 555 582 603 
Finance 
Supplementary grant 2800 2500 2212 2000 
Contingency transfer to provinces for debt relief 1000 
Education 
Financial management and quality enhancement 200 111 272 283 
Classroom backlogs 50 
KwaZulu-Natal peace initiative 81 
Textbook grant 200 
Housing 
Capacity building 10 10 10 10 
State Expenditure 
Financial and personnel management 100 20 100 140 
Welfare 
Financial management of social security systems 100 50 50 
Labour 
Training centres in former Bophuthatswana 52 56 
Other conditional grants 15 
Sub-total 9568 8118 8361 8257 
Department of Constitutional Development 
Grants to provinces for local government 
R293 staff 951 463 
R293 transfer cost assistance grant 40 
Local government support grant'" 181 140 
Sub-total 1132 643 
Total 10700 8761 8361 8257 
Source: Department of Finance (1999: Table 4.7). 
Notes: 
• Improvements in condition of service are appropriated as a conditional grant in 1998-9 and 1999-0 but 
will become part of the equitable share in 2000-1. The amounts to provinces for 1998-9 and 1999-0 are R 
2419 million and R 2100 respectively. ~ . 
•• Some conditional grants had not yet been allocated to provinces . 
••• This grant was called the local government transition grant in 1998-9. 
4.3.3.3 Local Government Equitable Share and Conditional Grants 
The fonnula used by the Department of Finance for the distribution of the local gov-
ernment share differs from that recommended by the FFC. Most notably, it consists of 
only two components (Department of Finance 1998b and 1999: 113-115): 
A municipal basic services transfer aims to enable poor residents in all local government juris-
dictions to access basic municipal services. The basic approach involves estimating the 
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number of people in poverty (household income less than R 800 per month in 1998 
prices) and the current annual cost of providing basic services for each person. 
A municipal institutions transfer is earmarked for those jurisdictions currently lacking the 
administrative capacity to raise their own revenue or lacking the basic infrastructure nec-
essary to function as local authorities. This transfer pays for a minimum level of re-
sources to provide and maintain basic facilities for the operation of local government 
(such as a community centre and an office for elected officials). 
A number of historically privileged municipalities will receive lower subsidies in the fu-
ture. A once-off transitional grant ofR 181 million was introduced in 1998-9 to assist in 
this adjustment. For the 1999-0 fiscal year, the equitable share also includes R 447 mil-
lion, which will be given directly to former so-called R293 towns119 for functions that 
were previously paid for by provinces. It is expected that these funds will be fully incor-
porated into the local government equitable share from 2000-1. 
In addition to the local government equitable share, local governments also receive con-
ditional grants and agency payments from national and provincial governments for both 
capital and recurrent expenditure. Grants for recurrent expenditure cover R293 staff and 
assist in the transfer process and in rationalising local administrations. The main capital 
transfer to local government is the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme. 
This is a medium to long-term capital grant programme administered by the Department 
of Constitutional Development. Municipalities are requested to forward business plans to 
the department for the funds to be released. 
4.3.4 Review of Recommendations and Practices 
Current practice diverts substantially in some important aspects from the original rec-
ommendations made by the FFC. Most notably, there has been a decrease in the provin-
cial share of nationally collected revenues instead of the increase recommended by the 
119 R293 towns are largely local authorities which were operated by the former homeland authorities. Allo-
cations for services and staff in R293 towns have been channelled through the provinces in previous years, 
but it was planned to incorporate these funds into the equitable share during 1999-0. 1bis was dependent 
. on the progress with transferring staff from the provinces to these local authorities. Due to this process 
being slower than expected, service subsidies in 1999-0 are going directly to these towns through the equi-
table share, while a conditional grant covers staff costs until provinces are able to transfer the staff. 
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FFC. The Department of Finance describes the vertical division as a "political judgement 
made by Cabinet". This description stands in stark contrast to the process and role-
players outlined in the Constitution, which awards a substantial role to the FFC and re-
quires the consultation of provincial governments and organised local government. 
The FFC has argued for the implementation of provincial taxation powers, in conjunc-
tion with an equalisation component in the formula, to introduce accountability on the 
revenue side. The Department of Finance has been reluctant to follow this approach. 
Several adjustments were made to the provincial formula for the 1999-0 financial year to 
accommodate a backlog component. However, in the light of decreasing budgets in real 
terms and dwindling capital expenditures, it is doubtful that provinces "should be able to 
include amounts in their budgets to address these backlogs over the medium term" (De-
partment of Finance 1999: 101). The FFC has argued that backlogs should rather be ad-
dressed through ad hoc grants from the national government (FFC 1996: 3). In addition, 
as noted in chapter 2 (see section on borrowing arrangements), effective borrowing pow-
ers for provinces are likely to be required to finance developmental expenditure.12o 
The formula used by the Department of Finance for the horizontal distribution of the 
local government share also excludes the tax capacity (equalisation) component sug-
gested by the commission, which would be an incentive to improve revenue collection. 
The local government formula also excludes the capital grant suggested by the FFC. 
Whereas the FFC proposed an automatic grant system, the current arrangement under 
the auspices of the Department of Constitutional Development is application-driven. 
The FFC is presently working on "Project 2001". The objectives of the project are "to 
test the original and subsequent recommendation of the FFC against current practice and 
to prepare comprehensive recommendations for 2001-2 and subsequent fiscal years" 
(FFC 1999: 1). Such a review will be a valuable resource, as definitional inconsistencies 
120 The backlog component is also the smallest component of the fonnula, accounting for the distribution 
of merely 3 per cent of the provincial equitable share. The basic component was previously weighted in 
favour of the rural population as a proxy for poverty. With the introduction of the backlog component, the 
rural weighting was removed, and the basic share is being distributed according to provincial percentage 
shares of the total population. Therefore, the redistributing effect of the basic component was weakened, 
which to some extent neutralised the actual impact of the backlog component The backlog component 
has accordingly been described as "notional" (Interview: Donian, 8 April 1999). 
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and a range of continuous adjustments currently obscure a definite quantitative assess-
ment of the discrepancies outline.d above. The prevailing perception inside the FFC is 
that the commission has been sidelined, most likely because its recommendations are re-
garded as too much in favour of decentralisation (Interview: Donian, 8 April 1999). The 
commission hopes to improve its impact by working more closely with Parliament 
through a liaison office to be established in Cape Town. Otherwise, the demoralisation 
and exodus of qualified staff may wellieave the commission as a constitutional ruin. In a 
system where revenues are almost totally centralised, the sidelining of the FFC is a threat 
to the impartiality of the revenue-sharing process. 
4.4 Borrowing Arrangements 
While the Constitution does not limit the borrowing activities of the national sphere, it 
prescribes that provincial and local governments may raise loans for capital or current 
expenditure in accordance with reasonable conditions determined by national legislation 
(section 230). Loans for current expenditure may only be raised for bridging purposes 
duririg a fiscal year, and must be repaid within twelve months. l2l 
4.4.1 Provincial Borrowing 
The Borrowing Powers q/Provincial Governments Act (1996) allows for the Budget Council to 
function as a Loan Co-ordinating Committee (LCC). The act requires the committee to 
co-ordinate the annual borrowing requirements of the provinces, considering the aggre-
gate demand for capital market funds. The LCC would consider overall debt levels in the 
provinces, their contingent liabilities and ability to service their debt. The committee is 
required to report to the FFC on these matters. However, these provisions have never 
been fully functional since, at a Budget Council meeting on 5 January 1997, the majority 
of provinces agreed not to borrow. The first requests were submitted to the LCC only 
towards the end of the 1998-9 fiscal year (Interview: Donian, 8 April 1999). 
121 These restrictions must be seen against the experience with borrowing in the former homelands. Com-
mitments of R 14,8 billion due to the indebtedness of the former TBVC states and self-governing territo-
ries had to be converted to national debt after the dismantling of apartheid (Department of Finance 1999: 
78). 
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Most provinces have instead resorted to drawing down deposits and utilising overdraft 
facilities with banks to finance unanticipated expenditure needs. The provinces' com-
bined bank overdrafts stood at R 2.8 and 1.6 billion in December 1997 and 1998 respec-
tively (Business Dqy, 15 February 1999). Other means of implicit borrowing include rolling 
over debtors' accounts, withholding payments to the receiver, withholding employer 
contributions from the pension fund and withholding pay progression for public servants 
despite wage agreements (Folscher 1999: 2).122 
The Public Finance Management Act (1999) further prohibits provinces from entering com-
mitments in foreign currency (section 67). This follows a scandal revolving around secret 
funding deals with state assets by the Mpumalanga Parks Board, which issued six illegal 
promissory notes valued at about R 1.3 billion without cabinet or Reserve Bank approval. 
The promissory notes used the assets of the board as collateral for intemationalloans 
(Business Dqy, 25 September 1998). The Department of Finance is currently working to-
wards a new and consolidated framework for provincial borrowing (Folscher 1999). 
4.4.2 Local Borrowing 
Separate legislation pertaining to local financial management is expected in the near fu-
ture. A general constraint on local borrowing is the fact that a mere 150 out of 843 mu-
nicipalities in the country are estimated to be credit-worthy. The largest of these can be 
found in the well-developed urban areas (Business Dqy, 14 September 1998). Adjustments 
to the existing municipal boundaries and amalgamations may facilitate a more even ac-
cess to the borrowing market. However, it is also possible that the ratings of municipali-
ties with high credit-ratings could drop if they were to merge with other local authorities 
burdened by debt. These ratings could rise again as a result of savings due to economies 
of scale and the elimination of dttplication (Business Dqy, 5 June 1998). 
122 For example, after signing the 1996 wage agreement at national level, the Eastern Cape government 
failed to put the relevant personnel onto the new salary system which would have ensured various promo-
tions, affecting about 60 per cent of public servants in the province (Business Drg, 11 May 1999). 
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4.5 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter provided an in-depth analysis of intergovernmental fiscal relations in South 
Africa. The Constitution sets out a pattern that gives the national Parliament broad Legis-
Lative powers, while relying heavily on the provinces for the implementation of national pol-
icy, especially with regard to the social expenditure areas. Provinces currently do not have 
effective taxation powers, and rely almost totally on transfers and grants from the na-
tional pool of revenue. The degree of provincial fiscal dependency requires a well-
balanced and sizeable system of transfers and grants to address both vertical as well as 
horizontal imbalances. The design of such a system has been one of the foremost chal-
lenges that came with the new constitutional order. Local governments, on the other 
hand, have been expected to cover the overwhelming share of expenditure with own 
revenues. However, varied collection abilities and revenue bases make for a substantial 
asymmetry within the local sphere. Subnational Expenditure and Revenue data is sum-
marised in the following tables. 
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Table 25: Consolidated Provincial Revenue and Expenditure 
R billion 
Actual Preliminary Medium .term estimates 
estimate 
1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-0 2000-1 2001-2 
Transfers * 72.9 84.7 86 91.7 94.3 99.4 104 
Own revenue 4.3 4.2 3.5 3.3 3.7 4 4.2 
Total revenue 772- 88.9 89.4 95 98.1 103.5 1082-
per cent increase 15.1% 0.6% 62% 3.3% 5.5% 4.6% 
Education 29.4 36.6 38.7 38.8 40.3 42.6 44.7 
Health 15.8 20.4 22.4 22.7 23.7 25.3 26.3 
Welfare 14.4 15.9 17.7 18.4 18.7 19.5 20.3 
Other 16.2 18.5 16.6 14.5 13.5 13.9 14.6 
Finance reserve 1.9 2.1 2.3 
Total expenditure 75.9 91.4 95.3 94.4 98.1 103.5 108.2 
per cent increase 20.4% 4.3% -1.0% 3.9% 5.5% 4.6% 
Personnel spending 40.3 49.2 54.5 55.9 58.3 61.2 63.9 
Surplus / deficit 1.3 -2.5 -5.9 0.6 
per cent of GDP 0.3% -0.5% -1.0% 0.1% 
Source: Department of Finance (1999: T3l:Jle 4.1). 
Notes: Totals may not add due to rounding. 
* From nationally collected revenue, excluding conditional grants. 
Table 26: Composition of Consolidated Provincial Revenue and Expenditure 
Per cent of total 
Actual Preliminary Medium term estimates 
estimate 
1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-0 2000-1 2001-2 
Trans fers * 94.4% 95.3% 96.2% 96.5% 96.1% 96.0% 96.1% 
Own revenue 5.6% 4.7% 3.9% 3.5% 3.8% 3.9% 3.9% 
Total revenue 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Education 38.7% 40.0% 40.6% 41.1% 41.1% 41.2% 41.3% 
Health 20.8% 22.3% 23.5% 24.0% 24.2% 24.4% 24.3% 
Welfare 19.0% 17.4% 18.6% 19.5% 19.1% 18.8% 18.8% 
Other 21.3% 20.2% 17.4% 15.4% 13.8% 13.4% 13.5% 
Finance reserve 1.9% 2.0% 2.1% 
Total expenditure 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
~. 
Personnel spending 53.1% 53.8% 57.2% 59.2% 59.4% 59.1% 59.1% 
Source: Own calculations based on data in Department of Finance (1999: Table 4.1). 
Notes: Totals may not add due to rounding. 
* From nationally collected revenue, excluding conditional grants. 
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Table 27: Local Government Revenue and Expenditure 
RmiUion 
Estimated Projected 
1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-0 2000-1 2001-2 
Tax revenue 6701 7508 8264 9142 9707 11054 11924 
Non-tax revenue 9385 10136 9394 9954 10891 12092 12961 
Capital revenue 625 384 • 434 450 499 539 583 
Total grants 4089 6067 6350 5324 6Q77 6377 6931 
of which equitable share 1024 1673 2480 2580 
Revenue 20800 24095 24442 24870 27174 29062* 32399 
~ 
Current 
Goods and services 14124 17502 17563 16885 17982 18763 20538 
Interest 1704 1030 1245 1382 1477 1598 1728 
Subsidies and transfers 314 636 506 440 400 400 450 
Capital 
Acquisition of fixed assets 4105 4547 4742 5197 5934 6467 7043 
Capital transfers 492 498 454 778 900 1000 1150 
Net lending 590 649 714 694 795 860 930 
Expenditure 21329 24862 25233 25376 27488 29088 31839 
Surplus / deficit -529 -767 . -791 -506 -314 -26 560 
Source: Department of Finance (1999: Table 4.10). 
Notes: The estimates reflect South African Reserve Bank data, based on a sample survey by Statistics South 
Africa covering 60 local authorities. The Department of Finance prepared the projections beginning with 
1998-9. 
* Total reflects inconsistencies in the Department of Finance data. 
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CHAPTERS: 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis set out to capture the assignment of functions and resources to the different 
spheres of government in South Africa and to provide an assessment of the functionality 
of this assignment. The purposes of this chapter are to summarise the main findings and 
to come to an assessment of the functionality of the South African system. Based on this 
assessment, the necessity of adjusting the current assignment of functions and resources 
for the sake of greater efficiency will be investigated. 
The second chapter reviewed considerations in the design of fiscal federalism. The discus-
sion generated economic reference frameworks for the assignment of expenditure re-
sponsibilities, sources of revenue, and the design of a system of intergovernmental trans-
fers and grants. The analysis also indicated that constitutions can impose limits on fiscal 
design. The implication is that any policy recommendations concerning the assignment 
of functions and revenues cannot ignore an existing constitutional framework. 
The third chapter demonstrated the impact of constitutional models for regional govern-
ment on fiscal arrangements in a country. In the divided model (as in Canada), national 
and regional governments pursu~their functions as independentlY as possible and directlY 
access sources of revenue. In the shared mO,del (as in Germany), the emphasis is on concur-
rent responsibility and shared sources of revenue. An issue for further research is whether, 
in general, divided models are associated with a higher degree of (expenditure and reve-
nue) decentralisation than shared models. 
The fourth chapter provided an in-depth analysis of the South African system. It shows that 
the new Constitution sets out a pattern that gives the national Parliament broad legisla-
tive powers, while relying heavily on the provinces for the implementation of national 
policy. In return, provinces have a potentially powerful say in the national policy-making 
process. Provinces do not yet have effective taxation powers, and receive the over-
whelming share of their income from intergovernmental transfers and grants. Local gov-
ernments, however, are expected to cover most of their expenditure with own revenues. 
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South Africa's constitutional design resembles the shared model of government. The 
following are strong parallels between the German and South African systems: the em-
phasis on concurrent functions, regional representation in the national law-making proc-
~. 
ess, the reliance on subnational administrations for the implementation of national poli-
cies, the sharing of main revenue sources, and the evening out of disparities through a 
redistributing system of intergovernmental transfers and grants. 
An assessment of the functionality of the fiscal federalism in South Africa is possible by 
comparing the design of the system with the economic reference frameworks for the as-
signment of expenditure responsibilities, sources of revenue, and the design of a system 
of intergovernmental transfers and grants. 
Expenditure assignment in South Africa is largely congruent with the theoretical frame-
work recommendations. Several differences occur, however, reflecting a more centralised 
approach in South Africa. 
Table 29: Expenditure Assignment in Theory and in South Mrica 
Theoretical framework South Mrica 
Expenditure category Regulation Administration Regulation Administration 
Defence N N N N 
Foreign affairs N N N N 
International trade N N N N 
Currency and banking N N N N 
Immigration N N N N 
Unemployment insurance N N N N 
Airlines and railways N N N N 
Natural resources N N, R, L N N 
Environment N, R, L R, L N, R R 
Industry N, R, L R, L N, R N, R 
Agriculture N, R, L R, L N, R R 
Education N, R, l". R, L N, R N, R 
Health N, R, L R, L N, R, L N, R, L 
Social welfare N, R, L R, L N, R R 
Highways and roads N, R, L R, L N, R, L N, R, L 
Police R, L R, L N, R* N, R, L* 
Fire protection L L L L 
Water, refuse, sewerage L L L L 
Source: Theoretical framework adapted from Shah (1994a: Table 1.1 and 1994b: Table 2). South African 
data according to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), schedules 4 and 5. 
Notes: N = national government, R = regional government, L = local government 
* Provincial and local policing powers are limited by other parts of the Constitution (sections 205-208). 
With regard to education, the framework recommends regional and local governments as 
administrators. The South African Constitution assigns the executive responsibility for 
primary and secondary education to provinces, while the national government is admin-
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istratively responsible for tertiary institutions. This divergence is understandable from a 
historical perspective. The development of the former white universities was ensured by 
their historical funding privileges and the wealth of the constituency for which they were 
reserved. Many institutions in the former homelands, to the contrary, were creatures of 
apartheid and its ·notion of separate development. Many of the latter suffer from student 
debts, which are crippling administrations. There is also a distortion in the distribution of 
tertiary institutions across the country. The Northern Cape, for instance, has no univer-
sity of its own (Van Niekerk and Ludman 1999: 67-68). In recognition of these circum-
stances, tertiary education has to be regarded as a national, rather than a regional, asset. 
This does not preclude the possibility of devolving authority at some later stage once the 
landscape of tertiary education has been reformed. As local structures have been subject 
to a challenging restructuring process over the past years, and many have a long way to 
go before they fulfil their role as providers of essential services, it is not advisable to bur-
den them with responsibility for primary education at this stage. 
Perhaps the most notable divergence between the framework and South African practice 
is in the area of policing. Although schedule 4 of the Constitution lists policing as a con-
current matter, the activity of prQ.yinces is de/acto limited largely to an oversight role in 
other parts of the document (sections 205-208). Municipal policing, subject to section 
206(7) of the Constitution, awaits comprehensive development (Committee Appointed 
by the Minister for Safety and Security 1997). In favour of continued centralisation is the 
task of transforming the South African Police Service (SAPS). The policy service served 
to sustain a system of oppression during apartheid. Dealing with the post-1994 challenge 
of fighting crime and lawlessness, howev~r, requires an efficient and transformed police 
service that is trusted by all communities (Van Niekerk and Ludman 1999: 273-276). It 
can be argued that such a challenge demands central guidance. 
With regard to wetfore the comparison does not generate an answer as to where the budg-
eting function for social entitlements should be located. This analysis noted three possi-
ble developments: reflecting welfare grants in the budget vote of the national depart-
ment, "top-slicing" the cost for such entitlements before revenue-sharing, or giving 
provinces greater autonomy in determining welfare entitlements. Whichever option is 
chosen, it is recommended that budgeted amounts be fully aligned with expenditure re-
quirements according to cleaned-up beneficiary data. 
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It is on the revenue side that the most fundamental difference must be noted, as tax as-
signment remains centralised. The political accountability of provincial governments is 
hampered in the current situation. The provinces cannot finance their own priorities 
through additional taxation, for which a provincial authority would be accountable to it~ 
electorate. Rapoo (1995: 13-14) points out that an arrangement without effective provin-
cial taxation powers "creates a situation not unlike that in the former 'homelands' system 
in which, because allocations are decided by the centre, provinces are not responsible to 
their electorates for spending - shortfalls can simply be blamed on central government." 
Table 30: Revenue Assignment in Theory and in South Mrica 
Theoretical framework SouthMrica 
DeterminrJtion f!! 
Revenue source Base Rate Collection and 
administration 
Customs N N N 
Corporate income N N N 
Natural resources N N N 
VAT N N N 
Personal income N N, R N 
Retail sales R R, L R, L 
or N R N 
DeterminrJtion of 
Base Rate 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N,R* 
N 
Collection and 
administration 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
Property R L L N, L L L 
Fees, user charges N, R, L N, R, L N, R, L N, R, L N, R, L N, R, L 
Excises R, L R, L R, L N N N 
Source: Theoretical framework adapted from Shah (1994a: Table 1.4 and 1994b: Table 6). South African 
data according to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), sections 228 and 229. 
Notes: N = national government, R = regional government, L = local government 
* Provincial taxation powers are not effective yet, as national regulatory legislation is required (section 
228 (2) (b)). This legislation is still outstanding at the time of writing. 
The importance of intergovernmental transfers and grants for provinces and poor and smaller 
local authorities is substantial. An assessment of the South African system, based on the 
theoretical criteria that were outlined, is somewhat more subjective than the questions of 
assignment discussed above. Adequacy, predictability and incentive are the problem areas 
that were identified in this analysis. Whether the system provides adequate income to the 
spheres is difficult to assess, since the rationale behind the vertical division of revenue is 
not obvious and there is a lack of information as to how it was calculated. However, 
provincial allocations have been decreasing, while local government allocations reflect 
historical resource flows despite a broadening of mandates. This issue deserves further 
research. Predicta.biliry has been hampered by successive changes to the criteria guiding the 
horizontal distribution of the provincial equitable share. Incentives for sound financial 
management at the provincial and local levels will remain weak as long as the respective 
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formulas for the horizontal distribution do not emphasise revenue criteria, which dis-
courages efforts to increase own revenues and hampers accountability. 
Table 31: Proposed Rating of Intergovernmental Transfers and Grants in South Mrica 
Criteria South Mrican Comments 
Rating 
Auton0"!Y Medium. 
Revenue Adequary Low. 
Equity 
Predictability 
Efficienry 
Simplicity 
Incentive 
High. 
Potentially high, 
but so far low in 
practice. 
Medium. 
Medium to high. 
Low. 
Provincial equitable share to provinces is unconditional, but de-
tailed norms and standards are imposed by national legislation. 
Rationale behind the vertical division of revenue is not obvious. 
Provincial allocations have been decreasing, while local govern-
ment allocations reflect historical resource Bows. 
Formulas for the horizontal distribution of the provincial and 
local government shares are needs-driven and favour poor areas. 
Formula-approach for horizontal distributions is more predict-
able than ad hoc allocations. Successive changes to the criteria 
guiding the horizontal distribution of the provincial equitable 
share have been partially due to the incorporation of new data. 
Allocations are overwhelmingly unconditional, which enables 
spending patterns to reBect varying needs. However, very de-
tailed national norms and standards limit room for provincial 
~. expenditure prioritisation. 
New component in provincial horizontal formula and related 
adjustments make formula more complex. 
Formulas do not emphasise revenue criteria, which discourages 
efforts to increase own revenues and hampers accountability. 
Safeguard of gran- Medium to Detailed norms and standards imposed on provinces through 
tor's objectives strong. national legislation. 
Source: Criteria in column one according to Shah (1994a: 33-34). 
While economic theory may not be useful to determine a specific design for regulating 
subnational borrowing activities, it nonetheless indicates that subnational borrowing is rec-
ommended to fmance capital expenditure. The South African Constitution applies the 
so-called "golden rule" by restricting provincial and local borrowing to amounts neces-
sary to finance capital projects (apart from bridging purposes). The borrowing powers of 
provinces, however, have not been functional so far. Effective provincial borrowing is 
necessary to boost dwindling capital expenditure at this level, in order to address back-
logs and extend service provision to all communities. While local governments in South 
Africa engage in borrowing activities, it can be hoped that redemarcation will be able to 
facilitate a more even access to the capital market. 
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In summary, on the expenditure side, there is substantial congruence between what is 
theoretically desirable and what the Constitution permits~ In the medium to long-term, 
once transitional challenges have been overcome, there are arguments in favour of 
greater provincial and local responsibility in areas that have primarily local benefits. 
Revenue assignment, on the other hand, remains centralised although the theoretical 
framework indicates a number of sources that are suitable for provincial governments. 
The provincial taxation powers contained in the Constitution should be implemented to 
establish the link between expenditure and revenue that forms the basis of public fi-
nance. The current system of intergovernmental transfers and grants has achieved sub-
stantial equity. Further developments should be concerned with ensuring revenue ade-
quacy for all spheres and providing incentives for sound financial management, while 
maximising the predictability inherent in the formula approach by avoiding year-on-year 
adaptations. The borrowing powers of provinces contained in the Constitution need to 
be activated to enable a greater focus on developmental expenditures. 
This analysis indicates that the constitutional assignment of functions and resources as 
such cannot be blamed for a lack of governmental efficacy that has been experienced, 
and should be fully implemented. However, the analysis of the South African system 
pointed out several areas that hav~e impeded the smooth running of the governmental 
system. It remains to be discussed how these problems can be addressed. 
Corruption. Corruption is partially linked to procurement procedures, which are multiplied 
at subnationallevel. It has also been described as an overhang from the previous dispen-
sation, indicating that it is not inherently related to decentralisation. Clear procurement 
procedures and vigorous prosecution seem best suited to address this problem. 
Capacity. The rural and underdeveloped provinces in some instances had to amalgamate 
several formerly separate administrations into one new provincial administration. Simi-
larly, many newly created local authorities could not rely on an established service struc-
ture. However, even if services were centralised, administration would rely on the same 
public servants and their bureaucratic infrastructure. Rather, a drastic lack of capacity in 
some instance might be resolved by a temporary asymmetrical approach, in line with the 
Constitution (sections 41(1), 100, 125(3), 139 and 155(6)). As the Presidential Review 
. Commission (1998: 44) recommended: "5 en'ous consideration should be given to the asymmetn·cal 
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devolution offunctions [emphasis in the original] (i.e. the devolution of some of the functions 
to provinces and municipalities where there is capacity to undertake services rather than 
delaying such devolution until there is capacity overall) as has been proposed by the De-
partment of Housing. This could go some way to redress problems of capacity violating 
the provisions of the Constitution." However, the notion of co-operative government as 
a partnership between the spheres requires that any short-term interventions are ulti-
mately aimed at restoring the capacity of the authority in question to effectively comply 
with its executive obligations. 
Mandates. The Ncholo Report noted that national departments tended to assume that 
their policy would automatically become activity. More careful planning and the costing 
of mandates would strengthen the ability of the provinces to implement national stan-
dards. The NCOP is well-placed to consider the administrative and financial impact on 
provinces of mandates contained in national legislation. This role should be developed, 
for instance by enhancing the research capacity of the council. Rather than reducing 
provinces to "conveyor belts for the centre" (Friedman 1999: 46), a greater degree of 
flexibility through less detailed norms and standards could also enable provinces to set 
individually suitable and realistic targets. 
Personnel Expenditure. Rising personnel expenditure ratios across provinces threaten to 
undermine their developmental ability by squeezing out developmental expenditure. The 
ability of provinces to control their personnel expenditure, however, is highly limited due 
to the centralised wage bargaininll process and the continued absence of an affordable 
retrenchment tool. Provinces require a national policy on retrenchments, or they need to 
be empowered to design their own. Consideration should also be given to the possibility 
of decentralising the wage bargaining process for public servants. 
None of these problem areas are systemic; they are not inherently connected to the de-
sign of intergovernmental fiscal relations, and there is no evidence to suggest that they 
could be addressed by adjustments to the assignment of functions and resources. 
In conclusion, economic theory indicates that the constitutional assignment of responsi-
bilities and resources to the different spheres in South Africa should not be adjusted for 
the sake of greater efficiency. However, the challenge remains to implement the system 
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fully and properly, identify areas of concern, and to manage teething problems and tran-
sitional difficulties proactively. Decentralisation includes a learning process, and newly 
created structures and institutions need to be developed and strengthened before they 
can be expected to deliver the full. benefits of decentralised government. 
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